

OCT 27 1937

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v. 32#1

The CLASSICAL QUARTERLY and CLASSICAL REVIEW are the organs of the Classical Association. The QUARTERLY is published in January, April, and October, the last issue being a double number; the REVIEW in February, May, July, September, November, and December.

THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

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Vol. XXXI.

JULY-OCTOBER, 1937

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LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.

NEW YORK: G. E. STECHERT & CO., 31-33, EAST 10TH STREET

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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

JULY-OCTOBER, 1937.

THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF TWO PASSAGES IN THE *NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS*.¹

THE two passages in question are I. the discussion of Justice in Bk. V. chs. I-II, and in particular the definition and subdivisions of Corrective Justice (ch. II 1130b 30-1131a 9); and II. the discussion of the voluntary and *προαίρεσις* in Bk. III chs. I-III. My object is to show that each is better understood if it is seen in the light of contemporary legal ideas and practice.

I. The subject of Bk. V of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is Justice (*δικαιοσύνη*, τὸ δίκαιον), which Aristotle divides in ch. I into A. Universal, B. Particular Justice (*ἡ ἐν μέρει*). In ch. II, after a further discussion of the difference between the two, he proceeds to divide Particular Justice into 1. Distributive (τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον), and 2. Corrective (τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον); and Corrective Justice is again subdivided into (a) that concerned with voluntary transactions (*ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα*), (b) that concerned with involuntary transactions (*ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα*), of which some are *λαθραία*, some *βία*. The division is clear enough; but the exact meaning of the various terms is less clear. The term Corrective Justice and its two subdivisions in particular have proved difficult to interpret, and Aristotle's own subsequent discussion (ch. V) is too involved in mathematical analogy to give much help; so both Grant and Stewart criticize him for being unclear and misleading in his terminology, Grant objecting to his use of *διορθωτικόν*, Stewart to his use of *συνάλλαγμα*. The difficulties are resolved if the terms are seen in their legal context, and Aristotle's use of them is shown to be deliberate, and not simply the 'product of casual and slovenly expression'.² I will deal with the terms in order, dismissing Universal and Distributive Justice very briefly, and then proceeding to the more difficult Corrective Justice and its subdivisions.

A. *Universal Justice*.—Justice in this sense, Aristotle says, is synonymous with the whole of virtue (*ἀρετὴ τελεία* 1129b 26). For perfect Justice in this sense is the same as perfect citizenship; and the perfect citizen is to Aristotle, as to the Greeks in general, the perfect man. As Grant puts it, 'the abstract principle of the just may be identified with all law and therefore with all morality'.

This sense of Justice Aristotle dismisses; 'what we are investigating is the Justice which is a part of virtue' (ch. II init. 1130a 14: τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην: Mr. Rackham's translation).

B. *Particular Justice*.—1. Distributive (*διανεμητικόν*). This Aristotle defines as being 'exercised in the distribution of honour, wealth and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among its members in equal or unequal shares' (ch. II 1130b 32: Mr. Rackham's translation). Roughly, it may be said to comprise the regulations which the state makes, or should make, concerning the distribution of offices, honours and economic advantages. The state should ensure that its most deserving citizens are given its highest honours and greatest economic rewards, a rule which Aristotle expresses mathematically, saying that if you are twice as good a citizen as I am you should be twice as honoured and twice as wealthy. Distributive Justice is concerned with the distribution of rewards according to merit.

2. Corrective (*διορθωτικόν*). This is more fully defined as τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν (1131a 1): that is to say, its sphere is the *private transactions between citizens*

¹ I am very grateful to Professor Adcock for on the points of Greek law in this article.
reading my manuscript and giving me his advice

² Vinogradoff *Collected Papers* vol. II p. 3.

(συνάλλαγμα).¹ We are therefore concerned here with *private* law and not *public* law: Corrective Justice does not include criminal law, which might seem at first sight its most natural interpretation. For though a crime is usually committed on the person or property of an individual, criminal law is not concerned with the offence as an offence against the individual or with the adjustment of individual rights; it is concerned with the offence rather as an offence against public order, against the regulations laid down to ensure an orderly social life. Criminal law therefore cannot fall under the head of Corrective Justice: rather it must be supposed to fall under Universal Justice, as an offence against the social and moral order which Universal Justice defines.²

Corrective Justice is therefore concerned with private transactions: and these are of two kinds, voluntary (ἐκούσια) and involuntary (ἀκούσια). This division into voluntary and involuntary corresponds to that in English law between contract and tort, in Roman law between *obligationes ex contractu* and *ex delicto*.³ The voluntary transaction is a contract between two individuals, an agreement entered into voluntarily. The involuntary transaction is a liability to payment of damages which one citizen incurs to another under certain circumstances, e.g. theft or assault: it is a liability incurred 'involuntarily' in the sense that the citizen who commits e.g. a theft does not do so in order to incur the liability, but would escape the liability if he could.

The parallel with Roman law is instructive.⁴ We may put συνάλλαγμα = *obligatio*, ἐκούσιον = *ex contractu*, ἀκούσιον = *ex delicto*, and compare Aristotle's list of voluntary and involuntary transactions with the Roman contracts *re* and *consensu* and the Roman delicts. We then have:—

(a) Voluntary transactions: 'selling, buying, letting at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing, letting for hire.'

Roman contracts *re* and *consensu*: *mutuum, commodatum, depositum, pignus, locatio-conductio, emptio-venditio, societas, mandatum*.

(b) Involuntary transactions: (i) λαθραία, 'theft, adultery, poisoning, procuring, enticement of slaves, assassination, false witness'; (ii) βία, 'assault, imprisonment, murder, robbery with violence, maiming, abusive language, contumelious treatment.'

Roman delicts: *furtum, rapina* (robbery with violence), *damnum iniuria datum* (damage to property), *iniuria* (wrongs to person, including assault).⁵

That the parallel should be exact could hardly be expected; but it seems to be close enough to be remarkable, and to give justification for the assumption that Aristotle is here speaking in terms of a distinction in Greek law analogous to the Roman distinction of contract and delict, that he is speaking in terms of Greek legal practice and probably using Greek legal terminology, in so far as the very loose usage of legal terms by the Greeks can be said to constitute a 'legal terminology'. Some further support can be found for this assumption in Greek legal practice. Both actions for breach of contract and actions arising from delict have as their object the redressing of the balance between individuals; and Aristotle notices this as characteristic of τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον (I132a 25 ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανιστοῖ). But whereas actions for breach of contract aim simply at giving redress for breach of an agreement, actions arising from delict have as their object the infliction of some *penalty* on the offender. So in Athenian law there is a distinction between δίκαι πρὸς τινα and δίκαι κατὰ τινος, a

¹ This seems to be the normal meaning of the word, and certainly the one it bears in this context. Cf. *Pol.* IV 1300b 23 ff., *Dem.* xxiv. 213 (where we have ἴδια σ.), *Rhet.* A 1376b 11 (where the Oxf. trans. renders 'business relations').

² Cf. Vinogradoff *Papers* vol. II p. 4: Ross *Aristotle* p. 211 note 2.

³ Cf. Lipsius *Attische Recht* p. 683, Ross *Aris-*

totle p. 211: and more especially Vinogradoff *op. cit.*, paper I 'Aristotle on Legal Redress'.

⁴ I draw this parallel without assuming any connexion between Roman and Attic law.

⁵ It may also be noticed that Aristotle's λαθραία finds some parallel in the Roman *dolus*, and that one of the praetorian delicts was 'servi corruptio'.

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distinction 'which has in view . . . the punishment or non-punishment of the defeated party'.¹ The *δίκη πρὸς τινα* 'involved no penalty, although it might lead to certain payments in compensation of damages'²; the *δίκη κατὰ τινος* 'was concerned with matters in which public force had to intervene for the restoration of disturbed legal order, although the questions at issue were considered mainly from the point of view of the infringement of private rights and of the consequent necessity of compensating for incurred material and moral damages'.³

Here then is a first point of similarity between the distinction of *δίκαι πρὸς* and *κατὰ* and the distinction of contract (*ἐκούσια*) and delict (*ἀκούσια*); the *δίκη κατὰ* has penal consequences, the *δίκη πρὸς* has not. There is a further similarity in the contents of the two classes. The *δίκαι πρὸς* were concerned with matters of property or contract,⁴ the *δίκαι κατὰ* with offences more analogous to delicts or torts. So if we compare the list of *ἐκούσια* and *ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα* in Aristotle with the *δίκαι πρὸς* and *κατὰ*, as given by Lipsius, we have the following correspondences:—

σ. ἐκούσια: πρῶσις ὡνὴ δανεισμός ἐγγύη χρήσις παρακαταθήκη μίσθωσις.

These all lead to *δίκαι πρὸς*, falling under Lipsius' heading *Obligationrecht*.⁵

σ. ἀκούσια: λαθραία—κλοπή μοιχεία φαρμακεία προαγωγεία δουλαπατία δολοφονία ψευδομαρτυρία.

βία—αἰκία δεσμός θάνατος ἄρπαγή πῆρσις κακηγορία προηλακισμός.

Here *αἰκία*, *κακηγορία*, *κλοπή*, *ψευδομαρτυρία* all lead to *δίκαι κατὰ* heard before the Forty:⁶ the *φονικαὶ δίκαι* were *δίκαι κατὰ*, and this would cover *φαρμακεία*, *δολοφονία* and *θάνατος*:⁷ there were *γραφαὶ μοιχείας* and *προαγωγείας* which would fall under the head of *δίκαι κατὰ*. This leaves *ἄρπαγή*, which is akin to *κλοπή*: *πῆρσις* and *προηλακισμός*, akin to *αἰκία* and *κακηγορία* respectively; and *δεσμός* and *δουλαπατία*, for which there seem to be no exact parallels though they are offences of the same general nature as the rest.

We may say therefore that Aristotle's distinction of *συναλλάγματα ἐκούσια* and *ἀκούσια* corresponds to the distinction of *δίκαι πρὸς* and *κατὰ*. The correspondence is only a very general one, and the exact formulation in the *Ethics* is almost certainly Aristotle's own.⁸ Greek law had no *jurisprudentes* and so lacked the preciser formulation of Roman; and it is just such a preciser formulation that Aristotle is trying to give it. But his formulation is based on Greek legal practice.

There is one last point that may need explanation, the term *διορθωτικόν* itself. At first sight, and particularly when rendered by the traditional 'Corrective', it seems to apply more properly only to 'involuntary' transactions (torts, delicts); and Grant has accordingly objected to its application to 'voluntary' transactions (contracts). But clearly the state is only concerned with contracts between its members when these contracts have been violated. The law, it is true, defines the forms in which contracts may validly be made; but in so doing it is simply saying that it will give redress for breach of contract only when the contract is in one of several specified forms. And so the law of contract is not inappropriately classed under the heading of Corrective Justice, or, in Vinogradoff's better translation, Legal Redress. The law gives redress to the individual *either* when some agreement he has made with another (*συνάλλαγμα*, contract) has been violated (the law of contract), *or* when one individual has suffered some private wrong at the hands of another (delict, tort).

¹ *Companion to Greek Studies* p. 482.

² Vinogradoff *Hist. J.* p. 191.

³ *Ibid.* 192. Cf. Lipsius 246-8, 683.

⁴ Cf. Lipsius 674, 'Eigentumrecht oder Obligationrecht'.

⁵ V. Lipsius pp. 738, 738, 716, 705, 716, 735.

752 for these contracts in the order quoted.

⁶ Lipsius 636 ff.

⁷ Lipsius 601 ff.

⁸ A.'s use of *συνάλλαγμα* = *obligatio* is the first instance of his usage: v. Lipsius 683.

And it is this distinction that Aristotle is making when he distinguishes ἐκούσια and ἀκούσια συναλλάγματα as branches of τὸ διορθωτικὸν δίκαιον.

II. Bk. III chs. I-III. It has often been remarked that what we have in these chapters is not a metaphysical discussion of the freedom of the will. 'It is plain', writes Grant, 'that the discussions on will are never metaphysical. An appeal to language and common opinion sum up nearly the whole. The scope of the argument is limited to a political as distinguished from a theological point of view.'¹ None the less we are apt to try to find some metaphysical theory of the will implied in what Aristotle says,² or at any rate to suppose that it is the nature and operation of the will that he is discussing.³ But nothing is further from his mind here than metaphysics; it is doubtful if he thought of the freedom of the will as a 'metaphysical' problem at all. And in any case it is probably misleading to use our term 'will', with its load of metaphysical, psychological and emotional associations, in elucidating these chapters; it is as likely to hinder as to help.

Aristotle himself says in the opening section of ch. I of Bk. III, 'it is only voluntary feelings and actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned and sometimes pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics (τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι) to define the difference between the voluntary and involuntary; and this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments.'⁴ In other words, what he professes to be giving in his discussion of the voluntary and involuntary is not in any sense a theory of the will, but simply a discussion and definition of the meaning of the terms voluntary and involuntary as we use them in ordinary life in assigning praise or blame for a person's actions, and more particularly as they are used by the law in determining the infliction of punishment: he is asking when do we in fact in ordinary life say that a man is responsible for his actions, and more particularly under what circumstances does the law hold him so responsible?

The importance of this question in law, in cases both civil and criminal, is obvious. And I now propose (a) to outline the view of individual responsibility found in the Athenian law of homicide, (b) to compare this view with the view Aristotle expresses in these chapters of the *Ethics*. But I will first quote, as an analogy and a guide, an analysis of *mens rea*, the guilty intention necessary to make an act a crime in English law. The analysis is that of the late Professor Clark, and is quoted in Kenny's *Criminal Law* (p. 39 ed. 14).

(1) The power of *volition*; i.e. the offender must be able to 'help doing' what he does. This faculty is absent in persons who are asleep, or are subject to physical compulsion or to duress by threats, or whose conduct is due to accident or ignorance; it is absent in some cases of insanity, of drunkenness and infancy.

(2) *Knowledge* that what the offender is doing is wrong; wrong either intrinsically or, at any rate, in prospect of such consequences as he has grounds for foreseeing.

(3) In such crimes as consist of conduct that is not intrinsically unlawful, but becomes criminal only when certain consequences ensue, there must further be the power of *foresight* of these consequences.

This analysis is convenient and clear, and I shall make use of it in examining the Athenian law of homicide and the doctrine of *Eth. Nic.* III. I shall try to show that in each we find these three elements—volition, knowledge and foresight—included in the idea of responsibility for an action.

¹ Grant *Ethics* note on Bk. III ch. I §§ 1-2.

² Cf. Stewart *Notes on the Nic. Eth.* vol. I pp. 226 ff.

³ Cf. Ross *Aristotle* pp. 199-201. Rackham *Aristotle Nic. Eth.* (Loeb) note to ch. II of Bk. III, 'the writer here examines the operation

of the will.'

⁴ 1109b 31 ff.: Mr. Rackham's translation. The connexion between the voluntary and involuntary and reward and punishment is also stressed in ch. V 1113b 22 ff.

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(a) *The Athenian law of homicide.*

The kinds of homicide recognized in Athenian law were three, Deliberate, Involuntary and Justifiable. We find the distinction made in the *Ath. Pol.* (ch. 57, § 3), where the different kinds of homicide recognized by law are classified according to the different courts before which they were tried. 1. Before the Areopagus came (1 (i) a) cases of deliberate homicide or murder (*φόνος ἐκ προνοίας* or, as it is often elsewhere called,¹ *φόνος ἐκούσιος*), as also did (1 (i) b) cases of murder by poison (*φαρμάκων ἐὰν ἀποκτείνῃ δούς*, commonly called *φαρμακεία*²). Besides these two kinds of deliberate homicide the Areopagus dealt also (1 (ii)) with attempted homicide (*τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας*). 2. Before the Palladion came (2) cases of Involuntary Homicide (*φόνος ἀκούσιος*). 3. Before the Delphinion came (3) cases of Justifiable Homicide (*ἐὰν ἀποκτείναι μὲν τις ὁμολογῇ, φῆ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους*; more simply *φόνος δίκαιος*). The same classification occurs in the *Politics*, where Aristotle speaks of 'cases of deliberate homicide (*ἐκ προνοίας*), of involuntary homicide (*τῶν ἀκουσίων*), and of homicide admitted but claimed to be justifiable'.³

It is evident at once from this summary statement that the two elements of volition (*τὸ ἐκούσιον*) and foresight or intention (*πρόνοια*) play an important part in the definition of the various kinds of homicide.

1. The first kind of case, tried before the Areopagus, comprises those of *deliberate* homicide or *attempted* homicide: that is to say, in all cases of homicide brought before the Areopagus the *intention to kill* must be alleged—'überhaupt ist die πρόνοια, d.i. die Absicht zu töten, Bedingung für die Zuständigkeit des Areopags'.⁴

1 (i) a. *Φόνος ἐκ προνοίας*, Deliberate Homicide (by violence). *φόνος ἐκ προνοίας* seems to have been the formally correct designation:⁵ but its legal counterpart was *φόνος ἀκούσιος*, and as *ἐκούσιος* is the natural antithesis of *ἀκούσιος*, the designation *φόνος ἐκούσιος* seems frequently to have been used,⁶ and in one passage in Antiphon we have both designations combined in the phrase *τῆς δὲ ἐκουσίως ἐκ προνοίας ἀποκτείνουσης*.⁷ We thus find the two elements of volition and foresight included in the intention to kill: to be deliberate, homicide must be committed both *ἐκουσίως* and *ἐκ προνοίας*. The literal meaning of *πρόνοια* is exactly our 'foresight': L. and S.⁸ give 'perceiving beforehand, foresight, foreknowledge'. And here we have our third element, *knowledge*.

But foresight implies forethought, and *ἐκ προνοίας* looks as much to previous intention as to subsequent action: an act done with foresight is an act done with intention.⁹ We should therefore expect to find some stress laid on motive in the speeches of the orators in cases of homicide, more especially where the circumstantial evidence against the accused is weak. For though motive does not imply intention, yet it is unlikely that there will be intention unless there is also motive—it is unlikely that A will deliberately and intentionally kill B if he has no motive for so doing. And we in fact find Antiphon devoting a section of his speech *De Caede Herodis* to

¹ E.g. Dem. XXIII 77.

² E.g. Antiphon's *κατηγορία φαρμακείας*.

³ *Pol.* IV 13 1300b 24, Mr. Rackham's translation. The court in Phreatto, mentioned both here and in the *Ath. Pol.* in addition to the other three, dealt not with cases of homicide of a further kind, but with cases of *φόνος ἐκούσιος* under special circumstances. 'It was required if a man, already banished for unintentional homicide, sought to clear himself of a further charge of murder or malicious wounding' (*Companion to Greek Studies* p. 480). Cf. Dem. XXIII 77.

⁴ Lipsius, p. 603. Cf. Dinarchus I. 6 ἡ τῶν

ἐκ προνοίας φόνων ἀξίωσις οὐσα βουλή.

⁵ It is used by Aristotle loc. cit. and by Demosthenes XXIII 24 when quoting the law on the subject.

⁶ So Demosthenes uses it in the same speech XXIII 77, 78: cf. 73. And in Antiphon's second tetralogy, whose subject is a *φόνος ἀκούσιος*, the antitheses *ἐκούσιος*—*ἀκούσιος*, *ἐκόν*—*ἄκων* occur constantly.

⁷ I 5.

⁸ So we find in [Arist.] *Magn. Mor.* I 16 1188b 28, 37 *μετὰ διανοίας* as a synonym for *ἐκ προνοίας*.

just this point.¹ The section opens with the question *τίνος γε δὴ ἔνεκα τὸν ἄνδρα ἀπέκτεινα*; and goes on to argue that the accused could have no motive for the murder, whereas to make his guilt likely δὲ μεγάλην τὴν ἔχθραν ὑπάρχειν τῷ τοῦτο μέλλοντι ποιῆσειν, καὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐκ πολλοῦ φανερὸν εἶναι ἐπιβουλευομένην (57). Similarly in the first tetralogy the prosecution try to establish motive, the defence to deny it.²

Such a defence was only possible where the accused denied the charge of *φόνος ἐκ προνοίας* in toto. But it seems also to have been possible to admit the *φόνος*, to admit having caused death, but to deny *πρόνοια*, to deny having caused it intentionally. And in such cases the court would not inflict the death penalty, which was the penalty for a *φόνος ἐκ προνοίας*, but either acquit or inflict the lesser penalty (banishment) for a *φόνος ἀκούσιος*.³

1 (i) b. *φαρμακεία*. Here again an essential part of the charge was that the poison was administered *ἐκ προνοίας*, with intention to kill. The case of the woman acquitted by the Areopagus on the ground that the drug that caused death was not administered *ἐκ προνοίας* shows this.⁴ And in Antiphon's speech *Against a step-mother* the defence appears to be not that the drug was not given, but that it was given οὐκ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ φίλτροις,⁵ as against the prosecution's contention that it was administered *ἐκ προνοίας*, with intent to kill.⁶

1 (ii). *τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας*, wounding with intent to kill. That this was the meaning of this offence is made clear by Lysias' speech *Against Simon*: *πρόνοια* in the phrase *τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας* means the intention to kill.⁷ And for a verdict of guilty it was essential to prove this intention: whereas in murder circumstantial evidence may be so strong that the elements of motive and intention become negligible, in *τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας*, even though the assault be proved, it is still necessary to prove intention to kill, for unless this is proved the assault is not *τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας* but *ὑβρις* or *αἰκεία*.⁸ It is by the intention only that the *τραῦμα* is differentiated from ordinary assault.

So we find in Lysias' two speeches on the subject⁹ that in neither case is it denied that the blows were struck: what is denied is the intention to kill. In the speech *against Simon* it is argued that though the accused had grounds for enmity with the prosecutor, he had always in the past been careful to avoid a quarrel: and that the circumstances under which the injuries in question had been inflicted on the prosecutor show that there was no previous intention to inflict them and so no deliberate intention to kill.¹⁰ In the *Περὶ τραύματος* it is again argued that the circumstances of the assault exclude the idea of premeditation: and it is added that the accused had in fact no previous quarrel with the prosecutor.¹¹ The two speeches are interesting because they show the interpretation put on *πρόνοια* by the Athenian courts, at any rate in cases of *τραῦμα ἐκ προνοίας*. The court clearly demanded that a *previous intention* to kill should be proved, and that the assault should be shown to be *deliberately premeditated*: it was concerned not with the intention in the accused's mind when he actually struck the blow, but rather with the question, Was the assault deliberately premeditated with an intention to kill? The *πρό* in *πρόνοια* is emphasized. And so again it becomes important for the accused to insist if he can that he

¹ Ant. V 57-63: summarized by Jebb (*Attic Orators* pp. 59-60) in the words 'He shows that he could have had no motive for the murder.'

² v. especially α 5-8, answered in β 9, reinforced in γ 6-8, and answered again in δ 9.

³ So Lipsius p. 132. He quotes [Arist.] *Magn. Mor.* I 16 1188b 31, a case of *φαρμακεία*, where, though the accused admitted having caused death, she denied *πρόνοια*, and was acquitted.

⁴ *Magn. Mor.* loc. cit. Cf. Lipsius 608.

⁵ Ant. I 9.

⁶ Ibid. 5 τῆς δὲ ἐκ προνοίας ἀποκτείνουσης.

⁷ Lysias III 41, 42 ὅσοι ἐπιβουλευσάντες ἀποκτεῖναι τινὰς ἐπρωσαν 42. Cf. also Lysias IV 6, 7.

⁸ Cf. Lipsius 607: Sandys *Ath. Pol.* note ad loc. cit.

⁹ Lysias III and IV.

¹⁰ Lysias III 34, 41-42.

¹¹ Lysias IV 7, 1-4.

has no motive, as the speaker in the *Περὶ τραύματος* does when he says he had no previous quarrel with the prosecutor.

The factor of previous intention is further emphasized by the doctrine that the instigator of a homicide is as guilty of it as its actual perpetrator: τὸν γὰρ ἐπιβουλεύσαντα κελύει ὁ νόμος φονέα εἶναι.¹ ὁ βουλεύσας or ἐπιβουλεύσας θάνατον was no less responsible than the actual killer: a man was as guilty of φόνος if he had plotted and contrived another's death as if he had done the actual killing himself—a principle that held good both for deliberate homicide, φόνος ἐκ προνοίας and φαρμακεία, and, mutatis mutandis, for φόνος ἀκούσιος.² Here again intention is an essential element in guilt: and in fact in places we find ἐπιβουλεύω used of the deliberate intention or preconceived design of a defendant charged with the actual killing, and not confined to the contriver as opposed to the actual doer.³

2. φόνος ἀκούσιος, Involuntary Homicide: cases in which some action of accused has caused death without his intending or foreseeing that it would do so (μὴ ἐκ προνοίας). In such cases we should say that the accused was not guilty of murder, and should proceed to try to determine the degree of his responsibility for the victim's death, in some cases acquitting him of all blame and so of all punishment, in others convicting of some degree of blame and inflicting punishment that seemed appropriate. But the Athenian courts, though they distinguished φόνος ἀκούσιος clearly from murder, and punished it less severely, made no attempt to distinguish degrees of guilt or responsibility and consequent degrees of severity in punishment, but punished all offenders with the same penalty of banishment for a term of years. The power to mitigate the penalty (αἰδεσις) lay in the hands of the dead man's family, not of the courts.

It seems therefore that the question of the responsibility of the individual is in these cases to some extent ignored. And for this there appear to be two reasons. Firstly, the Greek attitude towards accidental homicide. 'The Greek view of accidental homicide . . . was mainly a religious one. The death was a pollution. Some person or thing must be answerable for that pollution and must be banished from the state, which would else remain defiled.'⁴ This comes out very clearly in Antiphon's second tetralogy. The supposed circumstances are these: two boys are practising javelin-throwing when one of them inadvertently walks across the course and is struck and killed by the other's javelin. The dead boy's father then institutes a prosecution against the other boy for φόνος ἀκούσιος. Under the circumstances the defence cannot deny that death was caused by the defendant's javelin, and therefore turns to examine the question, By whose mistake (ἁμαρτία) was the boy killed? οἱ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνοντες ὧν ἂν ἐπινοήσωσιν τι δράσαι, οὗτοι πράκτορες τῶν ἀκουσίων εἰσίν.⁵ The thrower of the javelin made no mistake: he threw the javelin straight down the course in a perfectly legitimate and deliberate way. The mistake was made by the

¹ Antiphon IV β 5. Cf. Andocides 4. 94 τὸν βουλεύσαντα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐτέχασθαι καὶ τὸν τῇ χειρὶ ἐργασάμενον.

² Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* loc. cit. says that cases of βούλευσις came before the Palladion. But it appears that there was no separate action βουλεύσεως earlier in the fourth century. The effect of the law quoted by Andocides was rather to lay the βουλεύσας open to the same charge, and in the same court, as the χειρὶ ἐργασάμενον. So Antiphon's *Περὶ τοῦ χορευτοῦ* was delivered before the Palladion, the case being one of βούλευσις φόνου ἀκούσιου: his speech *Against a stepmother* was delivered before the Areopagus, the case being one of βούλευσις φόνου ἐκούσιου, or, more precisely, φαρμακείας. For this and βούλευσις

generally v. Lipsius pp. 125 ff., 612-14.

³ Cf. especially Antiphon's first Tetralogy. E.g. II α 5 ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἀποθανόντα: ἐπιβουλεύειν II α 6, II β 3, 8. On the other hand II γ 5 ἐπιβουλεύειν is used in the narrower sense of instigating as opposed to doing: the prosecutor is arguing that the defender almost certainly did the killing himself, for even if he had had it done by someone else he would have been denounced as ὁ ἐπιβουλεύσας (and, the implication is, he might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb). Cf. also Lysias I 40, 44.

⁴ Jebb *Attic Orators* I 52.

⁵ Cf. *E.N.* V 8 1135b 12. It is interesting also to compare the remarks on ἁμαρτία in the *Poetics* 13 1453a 13 etc.

dead boy, who inadvertently ran across the course when a javelin was being thrown, and therefore the blame for his death is his own entirely.¹ Put quite simply the argument is one that might be used in any court of law to-day when the question of the responsibility for an accident was being argued—it is simply the argument that the accident was caused by a mistake on the part of the victim. But whereas we should conclude 'and therefore the defendant is innocent', the imaginary Athenian jury is asked to conclude 'and therefore *the victim is guilty*'. For there is a pollution attaching to the killer, and unless that pollution is removed by punishment it may infect the whole city. And so the prosecutor warns the jury that if they acquit the accused and he is guilty the pollution (κῆλος) of his guilt will attach to them:² while the defendant, arguing that the victim was guilty of his own death, maintains that by his death he has paid the penalty for his guilt and that the pollution consequent upon his death has therefore already been purged.³ The same idea is repeated in the third tetralogy and the *De Caede Herodis*.⁴ It was an idea deep-rooted at Athens, whatever its origin,⁵ and it accounts in part at any rate for the lack of interest shown by the Athenian courts in the degree of guilt of the involuntary homicide. Far from the point of view of getting rid of a pollution, all that matters is to establish guilt—degree of guilt is irrelevant.

The second reason for the Athenian courts' failure to distinguish degrees of responsibility in these cases is to be found in the powers assigned by law to the dead man's family. The right of prosecution in all cases of homicide remained with the family. Here we have a survival from times in which the family rather than the individual was the social unit. The killing of the dead man is an injury to the family, an injury which the family would in early times itself have avenged. And when the state stepped in to prevent private vengeance it still left the initiative in exacting punishment, i.e. the initiative in prosecution, in the family's hands. So the law of homicide remained at Athens part of private law, and the power of prosecution remained in the hands of the family; and so in cases of φόνος ἀκούσιος the power of mitigation of the sentence of banishment for the guilty belonged to the prosecuting family.

But though for these reasons the idea of degrees of responsibility for involuntary homicide remained undeveloped in Athenian law, yet we must not over-emphasize these more primitive ideas when dealing with the fourth-century view of responsibility in homicide cases. The mere distinction between φόνος ἐκ προνοίας and φόνος ἀκούσιος, which goes back in principle at any rate to Draco, was a great advance on more primitive ideas which recognized no such distinction.⁶ It meant the recognition of two degrees of guilt, and of two corresponding degrees of punishment: it curtailed the primitive power of the family to demand a life for a life,⁷ and in cases where the homicide was involuntary allowed only banishment for a term of years.⁸ In this way the responsibility of the individual is emphasized. And though we do not find the degrees of responsibility for involuntary homicide, yet in more than one passage we find Antiphon enunciating the principle, which Aristotle later states as a commonplace, that the ἀκούσιον ἀμάρτημα deserves pity or forgiveness rather than punishment;⁹ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσιον ἀμάρτημα . . . τῆς τύχης ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον τῆς γνώμης¹⁰—you cannot blame a man for what he did not intend.¹¹

¹ Ant. III β 6-8.

² Ant. III γ 11-12.

³ Ant. III δ 8 g.

⁴ Ant. IV γ 7. *De Caed. Her.* 80-83. Cf. Dem. XXIII 71-73. The idea is of course familiar in the tragedians: e.g. the opening of *Oed. Tyr.*

⁵ On this cf. Glotz *Solidarité de la famille*, pp. 228 ff.

⁶ The pollution attaches to any killer: and

the family demands vengeance for any death. Glotz *op. cit.* p. 218.

⁷ Glotz *op. cit.* p. 302.

⁸ Lipsius p. 611.

⁹ Antiphon I 27, V 92: cf. IV a 6, Aristotle *E.N.* III ch. I init.

¹⁰ Antiphon V 92.

¹¹ Remember also that the idea that punishment is corrective or deterrent, which d

The upshot is that though the Athenian attitude to involuntary homicide differed from ours, yet *φόνος ἐκούσιος* was recognized as a different and lesser crime than *φόνος ἐκούσιος* and less severely punished. And the defining element in *φόνος ἐκούσιος* was the intention to kill: the killing must have been done with intent, with the killer's volition and foreknowledge.

3. *φόνος δίκαιος*, Justifiable Homicide: homicide permitted, that is, not penalized, by law. This may be dismissed more briefly, because less relevant to my purpose. Under certain circumstances Athenian law recognized homicide to be justified. From an early date killing in self-defence was allowed (*ἀμυνόμενος ἄρχοντα χειρῶν ἀδίκων*): we find the defendant in Antiphon's third tetralogy trying to avoid a charge of murder by arguing that he killed in self-defence. Thieves and robbers might similarly be killed without penalty, and the husband who discovered his wife in adultery might kill the adulterer forthwith. Lysias' speech on the death of Eratosthenes was delivered by a husband who had killed an adulterer so discovered; and while the defence bases itself on the law permitting such killing, the prosecution seems to have tried to prove that Eratosthenes had been lured into the house and that the accused had deliberately planned to kill him (*ἐπιβουλεύειν*), and so by proving previous intention get a conviction for *φόνος ἐκούσιος*.¹ Finally we have two further cases of justifiable homicide. *ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ ἐν ἄθλοις ἄκων . . . ἢ ἐν πολέμῳ ἀγνοήσας*.²

The two elements of volition and foresight thus play an important part in the Athenian law of homicide: for it is by means of them that murder and attempted murder are defended and differentiated from involuntary homicide. The element of knowledge is also clearly implied; for *πρόνοια* is *foreknowledge*, and in one case at any rate ignorance justifies homicide. For an act causing death to be accounted murder the doer must be responsible for it in the sense that it was done of his own volition, that he knew what he was doing, and that he foresaw its consequences.

How far these ideas are to be found in Athenian law more generally, as opposed to the law of homicide in particular, I will not enquire here. The following evidence, however, seems relevant:

(1) In actions for *βλάβη* the penalty was double if the *βλάβη* was inflicted *ἐκούσιως*, single if *ἀκούσιως*.³

(2) Both Plato and Aristotle speak in places as if these ideas were commonplace of the Athenian courts. Plato is emphatic: *ἃ δὲ κατὰ πάσας τὰς πόλεις ὑπὸ νομοθετῶν πάντων τῶν πρότερο γενομένων ὡς δύο εἶδη τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὄντα, τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, ταύτη καὶ νομοθετεῖται*.⁴ And there are references in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to the antithesis *ἐκούσιος*—*ἀκούσιος* which make it seem not unlikely that it was familiar in the courts.⁵ The *Rhetoric* again gives us explicitly the connexion between volition and knowledge; *τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥριστα . . . ἐκούσιον εἶναι . . . καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσα εἰδότες*.⁶ *ἐκ προνοίας* occurs several times in the Aristotelian corpus, not always with specific reference to the law of homicide, but always in a definitely legal context;⁷ and occasionally *προαίρεσις* is used with a meaning very close to *πρόνοια*.⁸

widely from the more primitive idea of vengeance, was becoming a commonplace by the end of the fifth century: v. Glotz *op. cit.* pp. 414-15.

¹ Lysias I 37-46.

² Dem. XXIII 53. Cf. on the whole subject Lipsius 614-17.

³ Lipsius p. 654: cf. Dem. *Meidias* 527. 28.

⁴ *Laus* IX 860e. Plato disagrees with the distinction, as he holds, with Socrates, that *οὐδὲς ἐκὼν ἁμαρτάνει*—a Socratic paradox that stands out all the more sharply when seen against the back-

ground of current legal ideas.

⁵ 1368b 6 *ἔστω τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλέπειν ἐκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον*: 1369b 20: 1373b 28-36: 1397a 14: cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1427a 4, *Eth. Eud.* 1226b 38 *καλῶς διορίζονται οἱ τῶν παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια τὰ δ' ἐκ προνοίας νομοθετοῦσι*.

⁶ *Rhet.* 1373b: cf. 1368b 9.

⁷ *Pol.* IV 13 1300b 24, *Eth. Eud.* 1226b 38: *Magn. Mor.* A 16 1188b 35, *Rhet. ad Alex.* 1427a 4, *Problems* 951b 27, 30, 952a 2.

⁸ Most clearly in *Rhet.* 1374a 11 *ἐν γὰρ τῇ προαίρεσει ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν*

(3) Finally E.N. V 8 seems to me strong evidence. Aristotle is evidently writing from a legal standpoint, and we have the whole question of voluntary and involuntary discussed as if it were an important and integral part of the law.

(b) *Aristotle E.N. III chs. I-III.*

When we turn to Aristotle we find at once, in ch. I of Bk. III, two of the elements of our analysis, volition and knowledge.

1. He opens the chapter by saying that 'it is only voluntary feelings and actions for which praise and blame are given'; in other words, we only hold a man responsible for acts which he does of his own *volition*. And he remarks that a precise definition of voluntary and involuntary will therefore 'be of service to the legislator' (*χρήσιμον τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι* 1109b 34), thus showing from the first that he has the law in mind. His own definition of a voluntary act is, briefly, 'an act whose origin lies in the agent'.¹

2. Involuntary actions fall into two classes. Firstly, those done under compulsion (*τὰ βίβη*). It is unnecessary to enter into the details of Aristotle's argument on this point: but it is worth noticing the parallel to Clark's 'subject to physical compulsion or duress by threats'.² Secondly, there are acts done through ignorance (*δὲ ἄγνοια*), i.e. without *knowledge*: and here we have the second element of our analysis. Here there are two points I would notice:—(i) Aristotle distinguishes among acts done through ignorance two kinds, involuntary proper (*ἄκων*) and 'non-voluntary' (*οὐκ ἑκών*): if an action is done through ignorance and subsequently regretted (*ἐν μεταμελείᾳ*) it is involuntary, if not regretted it is 'non-voluntary'. To this Dr. Ross³ has objected that the distinction is not satisfactory: that there is no real difference between the two classes of action: and that the agent's subsequent attitude is not a satisfactory ground for differentiation. With the logical or philosophical validity of these objections I am not concerned; but I would suggest that Dr. Ross's line of approach here is a wrong one. Aristotle is thinking not in philosophical terms, but rather in terms of ordinary life and again, I think, of the law court. If a man does wrong 'involuntarily' the normal attitude to him is one of forgiveness or even of pity.⁴ But if he is not sorry for what he has done we are far less likely to forgive or pity him; we take repentance as an easy and obvious criterion of the involuntariness of the wrong done—'I am sorry, I didn't mean it.' We find it far more difficult to believe that wrong was really done involuntarily if the doer is not sorry for it; and we should be inclined, I think, with Aristotle, to say that such a wrong may not be strictly voluntary, but differs from the involuntary wrong for which the doer is subsequently sorry. But this unwillingness of ours to believe that such an act was really involuntary makes it all the more important for the law to assert that in some sense it was. If an involuntary wrong turns to our advantage or turns out to be the sort of thing we might well have done voluntarily, and so do not regret, we none the less cannot fairly be held responsible for it: this must be kept clear if the law is to operate justly. We are no more responsible for the consequences of an 'involuntary' action if they are pleasant for us than if they are unpleasant; this seems to be in brief what Aristotle means by his distinction of 'involuntary' and 'non-voluntary'. The distinction may be weak in strict logic; but

δυσκότων προσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν ('imply deliberate purpose' O.T.), *ὅλον ὄβρις καὶ κλοπή*: cf. 1374b 14, 1367b 21-26, 1366a 15: also *Eth. Nic.* V 8 1135b 26, *Magn. Mor. A.* 17 1189a 30. Lycurgus (*In Leocr.* 148) uses the phrase *τὰ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀδικήματα*.

¹ 1111a 23: cf. 1110a 1.

² 'Threats' cf. 1110a 4 *ὅσα διὰ φόβον* *μειζόνων κακῶν πράττεται*, *Rhet.* 1368b 9 (quoted

above) *ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζομενοι*.

³ Aristotle p. 168.

⁴ Cf. 1109b 32 *ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀκούσις συγγνώμη*, *ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλδοι <γυγνομένων>*: cf. also with what follows the passing remark in *Rhet.* 1380a 13, we easily pardon a man who is sorry for what he has done.

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it is not without practical application and might well prove useful in administering the law. (ii) There is a more specific and definite connexion with the law in Aristotle's enumeration of the different circumstances under which ignorance is excusable and in the examples he gives.¹ A man may, he says, be ignorant of (1) the agent, (2) the act, (3) the thing affected by the action, (4) the instrument, (5) the effect, (6) the manner.

(1) The agent Aristotle dismisses with the remark 'a man must know who he is himself'.

(2) The act: a man may be ignorant of what he is doing. And we have as examples (a) what Aeschylus said at his trial before the Areopagus for divulging the mysteries—'he did not know the matter was a secret'; (b) 'that "they only let it off to see how it worked", as the prisoner pleaded in the catapult case'.²

(3) The thing affected: a person might mistake his son for an enemy. Cf. Dem. XXIII. 53, quoting an Athenian law *ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ . . . ἐν πολέμῳ ἀγνοήσας . . . μὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα*.

(4) The instrument: if a man mistakes a sharp spear for one with a button on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice stone. Cf. Lysias IV, in which the defendant maintains that the wound he inflicted had been inflicted by a shell picked up on the road, and that there had been no intention to kill: in other words, he did not know a blow struck with a shell would kill.

(5) The effect: one might kill a man by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life. There are two speeches of Antiphon in which the defendant tries to prove that a dose that killed a man was administered without the knowledge that it would be fatal and without intention to kill.³

(6) The manner: in loose wrestling one might hit a man a blow when only meaning to grip his hand. This again is provided for by the law quoted by Demosthenes (XXIII 53) *ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ ἐν ἀθλοῖς ἄκων . . . μὴ φεύγειν κτείναντα*: cf. also the circumstances of Antiphon's second tetralogy.

The cumulative effect of these examples is to show how closely in mind Aristotle had the law and legal procedure throughout the discussion of ignorance.

3. There remains the third element of our analysis, in English, *foresight*, in Greek *πρόνοια*; and with foresight, as we have seen, *deliberate intention* is closely connected. This we find in Aristotle's *προαίρεσις*. In the discussion in Bk. III (chs. II and III) Aristotle confines *προαίρεσις* to choice of means. He supposes that you know what you want, and then proceed to look for the means to it; and the whole process of deliberation about, determination on, and choice of means he calls *προαίρεσις*. You think 'I want to do x, how am I to set about it?': you deliberate, determine on a course of action A, leading to x and starting with an act a, and proceed to choose and do a. *Προαίρεσις* then looks beyond the immediate action done: it *foresees* the results of the immediate action a up to the point x, the end desired. So Aristotle defines it at one point as 'voluntary action preceded by deliberation' (*τὸ ἐκούσιον προβεβουλευμένον* II 12a 15). An act *ἐκ προαίρεσεως* is a *deliberate* act, deliberation marking *beforehand*, as it were, the steps to be taken.

Aristotle's *προαίρεσις* is thus very close to the *πρόνοια* of the Greek courts; for *ἐκ προνοίας* was used of acts done *deliberately* and with *foresight* of their consequences. In the present passage Aristotle limits *προαίρεσις* to a deliberate choice of *means* to an end, and there is a similar limitation in Bk. V (II 39a 17-b 13), where he seems to have the discussion of Bk. III in mind. Elsewhere this limitation does not appear, and *προαίρεσις* means purpose or deliberate choice, as much of ends as of means.⁴

¹ II 12a 2 ff.

² This is not in the Greek, which has only *ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην*: but Mr. Rackham so translates in the Loeb.

³ Ant. I (administered as an aphrodisiac), Ant.

VI: cf. the *δίκη φαρμάκων* above.

⁴ Cf. Ross *Aristotle* p. 200.

This brings *προαίρεσις* even closer to *πρόνοια*, and, as we have seen, there are passages in which the word is used with a meaning very close to that of *πρόνοια*, and in which, with a very slight change of viewpoint, *πρόνοια* might be substituted. *προαίρεσις* means an act of *deliberate* choice, and so *purpose* more generally:¹ in *E.N.* III Aristotle is emphasizing the element of deliberation at the expense of the purpose for which the deliberation is made: in more normal usage both elements would be there. In either meaning it is very close to the *πρόνοια* of the Greek courts.

From this analysis the parallel between Aristotle's treatment of 'the voluntary' and *προαίρεσις* and the treatment of the question of responsibility for homicide by the Athenian courts is evident. The Athenian law required that for an individual to be responsible for his act, that act should be done of his own *volition*, that he should *know* what he is doing, and that he should have some *foresight* of the consequences of his action and so intend them. For Aristotle an act for which the agent is responsible must be *voluntary* in the sense that it must not have been done under compulsion, and that it must not have been performed in *ignorance* of the circumstances under which it was done; further, to make the agent fully responsible, his action must have been done *with due forethought* and must be one of a deliberate series of acts directed to a determined end, and in that sense must have been done with a due knowledge of its probable consequences.

I therefore conclude, in view of this general parallel and of the more specific connexions noticed in the course of my argument, that what Aristotle is discussing in these three chapters is the question, When is the individual responsible for his actions?, and that he has in mind throughout the legal aspect of the problem and is strongly influenced by Athenian legal practice. In fact, if we want an account of the theory underlying Athenian legal practice we shall not be far wrong if we look for it in these three chapters of the *Nichomachean Ethics*. Aristotle is not here examining the operation of the will: in so far as he makes any such examination it occurs rather in the account of *ἀκρασία* in Bk. VII. Nor is he discussing the problem of freewill: in so far as he discusses this in the *Ethics* his discussion is to be found in Ch. V of Bk. III, not in the first three chapters (and it should be noticed that even there the question is not Is the will free? or Are any actions free? but Are virtue and vice free, Are actions of a certain kind free?; that *some* actions are free is simply assumed). Similarly in the first three chapters the freedom of the will is never questioned: all that is asked is, For what actions do we in fact hold a man responsible?

H. D. P. LEE.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

¹ L. and S.⁹ s.v. Cf. the meaning of 'plan' or 'policy' which the word can bear.

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PLATO'S 'TECHNICAL TERMS.'

IN describing the account of the *εἶδη* in the *Phaedo*, Burnet says, 'they are explained in a peculiar vocabulary which is represented as that of a school. The technical terms are introduced by such formulas as "we say"'. Similarly Taylor has written of the 'characteristic technical nomenclature' used in the dialogues, of the 'technicalities' of the theory of *εἶδη*, of 'the technical phrases of the *Phaedo*'.¹ The validity of such language has been taken for granted by both these and many other Platonic scholars. But the assumption which it represents—that Plato employed certain words in a significance peculiar to his use of them—carries such wide implications for the history and interpretation of his philosophy that it can hardly be accepted without further investigation. In this article I shall examine the evidence in fifth- and early fourth-century literature about these words which Plato or Socrates is alleged to have transformed into 'technicalities': first, *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*, which I shall assume to be more or less synonymous²; second, the various terms used to describe the relation between *εἶδη* and particulars—*μετέχειν*, *κοινωνεῖν*, *παρεῖναι*, *ἐνεῖναι*, *μίμῃσις*, *ὁμοίωσις*, and so on.

The essential fact to start with in the case of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* is the one emphasized by Natorp, Wilamowitz, and Ritter, although ignored by Taylor in his essay in *Varia Socratica*; simply that both words are derived from the root *ἰδ* (the Latin 'video' and the English 'wit'), associated primarily with the notion of 'seeing' and perhaps, as *οἶδα* suggests, with perception in general; and that their original meaning must therefore have been 'that which is seen', 'appearance'—as Ritter more elaborately puts it, 'die augenfällige Äusserlichkeit'.³ It is in this sense that *εἶδος* occurs in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and *ἰδέα*, which is not used by Homer, in Pindar. When Herodotus tells us that *κάμηλον ἵππος φοβέεται καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται οὔτε τὴν ἰδέην αὐτῆς ὁρέων οὔτε τὴν ὁδμήν ὁσφραυνόμενος* (I, 80) he means that the horse cannot stand the camel's 'looks', not, as Taylor translates, that it 'cannot endure the sight of its figure'. The same interpretation is clearly correct in many passages from fifth- and fourth-century literature, often even in Plato himself. Authors are sometimes sufficiently conscious of the connection with *ἰδεῖν* to play upon the words. Obviously it is from this that study of the derivative senses must begin.

Any classification of the meanings of a Greek word must be inexact, because it assumes a precise correspondence with divisions peculiar to the language of the classifier. But in the case of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* certain main lines of demarcation do seem discernible, and within them certain specialized usages particularly relevant to the terminology of Plato.

First, in considering the 'appearance' of a thing primary attention may be paid to its 'shape', so that *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* could be roughly equivalent to *σχῆμα*. It is possible that Democritus described his atoms as *ἰδέαι* or *εἶδη* in this sense,⁴ and it was

¹ Burnet in *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 308; Taylor in *Varia Socratica*, pp. 179, 205, and 215.

² So Taylor in *Varia Socratica*, pp. 189 and 211; but in *The Parmenides of Plato* (1934) he translates *εἶδος* by 'form' and *ἰδέα* by 'figure'. Cf. G. C. Field ap. C.R. XLIX (1935), p. 19, and Burnet ap. *Euthyphro* 5d.

³ *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 323.

⁴ It seems to me equally possible that Demo-

critus used the words to mean 'sense-qualities', to which, as I shall show later, they were at least as commonly applied. We know from Sextus that he wrote a book *ΠΕΡΙ ΙΔΕΩΝ*, and Theophrastus refers to his doctrine *ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν* (unless Schneider's emendation *εἰδῶλων* is correct); while Simplicius reports of his cosmogony: *δύον ἀπὸ τοῦ παντός ἀποκρίσθαι παντοίων εἰδέων* (fr. 167). Kranz, following

certainly from this point of view that the terms were applied by Isocrates and probably by others to the arrangement of words or sentences or sections in a speech, like Gorgias' σχήματα λέξεως. Most relevant to Plato, however, is the way in which the Pythagoreans used εἶδος and ἰδέα of numbers, which they regularly represented by pebbles arranged in patterns—'shapes' comparable to the patterns of pips on dice or dominoes. The evidence is insufficient to determine when this usage first arose. But whether it was as old as the τετρακτύς or whether it originated only among the 'number-atomists' contemporary with Socrates, there can be no doubt that it was early enough to influence Plato.

Secondly, the words eventually came to mean 'kind' or 'type'. Some scholars have assumed that this use was an early one, and the principal one in Plato—that his εἶδος is the hypostatization of a concept corresponding to a class. But the only idea of 'type' easily derivable from the notion of 'seeing' is 'aspect'—for thinkers so inexact as most Greeks were in such matters, something closely akin to μέρος, and quite different from the concept reached by classification, in the strict sense of that word. As Gillespie says,¹ 'the classification is more properly division; it is not regarded as collecting things and arranging them according to their common qualities, but rather as taking a unity . . . and dividing it'. It is not till the later dialogues of Plato himself that the implications of classification—of συναγωγή as well as διαίρεσις—are discussed in connection with the 'one and many' problem.

Thirdly—although I include this for completeness rather than for its relevance to Plato—we may contrast a thing's 'appearance' with its 'real nature'. As Theognis says (I, 128), πολλάκι γὰρ γνώμην ἑξαπατῶσ' ἰδέαι. Hence comes the special meaning of 'pretext', common in Thucydides, and extended by him to motives and policies in general.

I have adduced little evidence in support of these three senses of εἶδος and ἰδέα, because they have already been fully considered elsewhere. But I wish to add to them a fourth usage which has not, so far as I know, been previously recognized—a usage perhaps roughly translatable by 'quality'. If it is possible to lay emphasis on a thing's shape, its formal appearance, it seems equally possible to stress its qualitative appearance. Εἶδος and ἰδέα were therefore sometimes used of all the qualities of an object or state collectively, practically equivalent to its 'character' or φύσις. Thucydides, for example, writes of τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου (II, 50). In addition to such general application, however, I believe the terms were sometimes employed

Diels, translates *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* by 'Über die Gestalten', and identifies it with *Περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων ἡσυχμῶν*. Taylor translates it 'On Primary Bodies'. Both they and other scholars assume that by *εἶδη* or *ἰδέαι* Democritus meant the atoms. But the three points on which this assumption rests seem by no means conclusive. First, Plutarch (*Adv. Col.* 1111a) has a statement: εἶναι δὲ πάντα τὰς ἀτόμους ἰδέας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καλουμένας, ἕτερον δὲ μηδέν. Diels inserted *ἡ* before *ἰδέας*, but admitted 'gewöhnlich ändert man ἀτόμους ἰδέας', a reading which makes good sense and is adopted by the Teubner editor from Wytténbach, and seems to me preferable to the MSS. version retained by Kranz. Secondly, Hesychius gives as one significance of *ἰδέα*: τὸ ἐλάχιστον σώμα. But there is no explicit reference to Democritus, and the definition might easily be derived from other sources such as the *Timaeus* (54d sq.). Thirdly, it seems probable that Democritus called the atoms σχήματα, and

therefore likely that he should have used *ἰδέαι* or *εἶδη* in the same sense. But Aristotle, writing of Democritus in the *Physics* (184b22), mentions σχήματα and εἶδος as two distinct things: καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος τὸ γένος ἐν σχήματι δὲ ἡ εἶδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας. This scarcely seems sufficient evidence to prove the meaning 'shape'. On the other hand, the implications in Sextus and Theophrastus about the contents of the *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* indicate that the book must have been concerned with the possibility of knowledge by sensation. Sextus' three quotations all refer to our lack of contact with reality, while Theophrastus is just embarking on his long account of Democritus' doctrine of the senses and the qualities they perceive—hot, cold, colours, etc. The meaning 'sense-qualities' suits this evidence better than 'atomic shapes', and fits equally well the vague use of *εἶδος* in fr. 167.

¹ C. Q. 1912, p. 183.

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in reference to some particular quality. Their derivation would of course make them most readily adaptable to the description of colour, the quality seen by the eyes. There is a riddle attributed to the seventh- or sixth-century poet Cleobulus, which illustrates this usage of *εἶδος* while still (as might be expected at such an early date) in close connection with its verbal root:

εἰς ὁ πατήρ, παῖδες δυοκαίδεκα · τῶν δὲ ἐκάστῳ
κούραι δις τριάκοντα διάνδιχα εἶδος ἔχουσαι ·
αἱ μὲν λευκαὶ ἔασιν ἰδεῖν, αἱ δ' αὖτε μέλαιναί ·
ἀθάνατοι δὲ τ' εὐοῦσαι, ἀποφθινύθουσιν ἅπασαι.¹

Later, Herodotus (IV, 185) writes of the country beyond the Atlantes: ὁ δὲ ἄλς αὐτόθι καὶ λευκὸς καὶ πορφύρεος τὸ εἶδος ὀρύσσεται, and in the Hippocratic *Περὶ αἵνων* we have: τὸ εἶδος λευκὴ καὶ οἶον φλέγμα.² The same terms, however, could easily be extended to qualities perceived by the other senses—touch, taste, and so on. And in some treatises of the *Hippocratic Corpus*, where 'the hot', 'the cold', 'the wet', 'the dry', and the list of tastes or flavours known as the *χυμοί* assume great importance as the constituents of the body and its nourishment, *εἶδος* and *ιδέα* are used alongside the more common *δύναμις* to describe them. An obvious example is *Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς* 24: εἰ γλυκὺς χυμὸς ὦν μεταβάλλοι ἐς ἄλλο εἶδος . . . ποῖός τις ἂν πρώτος γένοιτο, πικρὸς ἢ ἀλμυρὸς ἢ στρυφνὸς ἢ ὀξύς; οἶμαι μὲν, ὀξύς. The same usage recurs in chapter 19, and seems to me the correct interpretation in the much-debated sentence in chapter 15, which we shall need to consider again later: οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ἐξευρημένον αὐτὸ τι ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ εἶδει κοινωνεόν. There are yet other passages in the *Hippocratic Corpus* where both these qualities and colours are included in the meaning of the words. Thus the author of the first part of the *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*, when describing the monistic theory of change of quality without change of substance, illustrates *ιδέα* and *δύναμις* by sweet, bitter, white, and black (ch. 2): ἐν γὰρ εἶναι φασιν, ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βούλεται ὀνομάσας, καὶ τοῦτο μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ἰδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπὸ τε τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ γίνεσθαι γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ παντοῖον. The same application recurs a few lines later, while in chapter 5 the writer claims of his own four elements, blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile, that κατὰ φύσιν τὰς ιδέας κεχωρίσθαι. The next few sentences make it clear that *ιδέαι* here must mean 'qualities', especially colours and the four Opposites, rather than 'substances', as Taylor translates it: καὶ οὔτε τὸ φλέγμα οὐδὲν ἐοικέναι τῷ αἵματι, οὔτε τὸ αἷμα τῇ χολῇ, οὔτε τὴν χολὴν τῷ φλέγματι. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐοικότα ταῦτα εἴη ἀλλήλοισιν, ὧν οὔτε τὰ χρώματα ὅμοια φαίνεται προσορώμενα, οὔτε τῇ χειρὶ ψαύοντι ὅμοια δοκεῖ εἶναι; οὔτε γὰρ θερμὰ ὁμοίως ἔστιν, οὔτε ψυχρά, οὔτε ξηρά, οὔτε ὑγρά. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν, ὅτε τοσοῦτον διήλλακται ἀλλήλων τὴν ἰδέην τε καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, μὴ ἐν αὐτὰ εἶναι, εἴπερ μὴ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ἐν ἔστιν.

In all these instances *εἶδος* and *ιδέα* are still confined to the description of characteristics perceived by the senses. It was natural that in course of time their use should diverge a little further from the root meaning—that as abstract thought grew they should be applied to non-sensible properties, such as qualities of value. We have no evidence for this development before the fourth century, but then it

¹ Ap. Diog. I, 89. The answer is 'the year'.

² Ch. 1. A more doubtful instance is the beginning of *Περὶ τῶν ἐντὸς παθῶν* 21. If the text adopted there by Taylor (*ιδέην ἀλλοίην ἔχειν τοῦ ἐπιδημίου δοκεῖται ὡχρότερον*) is correct, *ιδέην* must refer to the colour of phlegm, not, as Taylor says, to its 'structure' or 'composition'. But f Littré was right in adopting the *θ* reading

(ὡχρότερος τέ ἐστι), the parallel in the opening sentence of the previous chapter (*ιδέας αὐτοῦ πολλὰς εἶναι κτλ.*) suggests that *ιδέην* means 'appearance' in general. In any case this parallel shows that the *ιδέην* referred to must be that of phlegm, not (as Littré seems to have thought) that of the patient.

occurs several times in the works of Isocrates. The easiest extension would be to beauty, which is primarily a matter of *visible* appearance; and in the *Helena* (dated by Blass about 390, and therefore almost certainly free from Platonic influence) there is a passage where *idéa* occurs twice with this significance. In the speech *To Nicocles* the word covers two characteristics partly, but only partly, to be judged by the eye: ἀστέιος εἶναι πειρῶ καὶ σεμνός. . . . δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι μὲν ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ιδέαις ταύταις, τὴν δὲ συμφορὰν τὴν ἐκατέρῃ προσοῦσαν διαφεύγειν. In the *Nicocles*, the meaning of the term has gone so far beyond the realm of sense that it refers to 'moderation' and 'justice': εὐρήσομεν τὰς μὴ μετεχούσας τούτων τῶν ιδέων μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίας οὐσας.¹ Both these passages, despite what Taylor calls 'the tell-tale word μετεχούσας' in the latter, read much more like commonly recognized usage than conscious imitation of 'technical' Platonic phraseology. Along with all the other quotations cited they may be adduced to show that *εἶδος* and *idéa* were not infrequently applied to qualities by Plato's predecessors and contemporaries.

What light does all this throw on Plato's own language and philosophy? οὗτος οὖν, writes Aristotle of Plato in *Metaphysics A*, τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ιδέας προσηγόρευσε, τὰ δ' αἰσθητὰ παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι πάντα. A little later he speaks of ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσαγωγή, while in book *M* he says οὐ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμούς. οἱ δ'—undoubtedly, as Ross has shown, Plato and his pupils—οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ιδέας προσηγόρευσαν. What do these statements about *idéa* and *εἶδος* mean? Obviously not that Plato invented the words, nor that he confined their application to τὰ καθόλου, since in the dialogues they are used in almost every possible sense: frequently of 'appearances' in this world, sometimes of visible 'shape', sometimes, as in *τρία εἶδη τῆς ψυχῆς*, of 'aspects' or 'parts' or 'kinds'. All that Aristotle *can* mean is that Plato was the first to use *εἶδος* and *idéa* for τὰ καθόλου—that he gave the terms a new application peculiar to his own philosophy. I believe this is exactly what happened.

It seems to me that the fundamental principle of Plato's metaphysics was reached by combination of what he had learnt from Socrates with ideas gained, possibly during his first visit to Italy and Sicily, from the Pythagoreans. Socrates, according to Aristotle and to the view most generally accepted today, had confined his attention to the discussion and definition of τὰ ἡθικά—of moral values like 'the brave' or 'the just' or 'the good'. The Pythagoreans had sought in numbers the ultimate explanation of the universe. To us there may seem to be little possibility of connection between the two; but when we remember the Greek tendency to regard value as a matter of symmetry or balance or form, and the Pythagorean habit of representing numbers by patterns, it becomes credible enough that Plato should have set 'the good' or 'the just' or especially 'the beautiful' alongside 'twoness', 'threeness', and so on, not at this stage identifying the numbers and the values, but looking on both alike as perfect patterns, different, as Socrates had shown values to be, from any of the phenomena of sense, but open to contemplation as objects of the mind. And to fit such 'quality-patterns' he could find no more suitable terms than *εἶδος* and *idéa*. For αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν and the rest as discussed by Socrates they had been scarcely appropriate: although they were used of sense-qualities in his time, we have seen that there is no evidence before Isocrates for their application to concepts so remote from the original notion of 'seeing' as goodness or justice. But if 'the good' was made something analogous to the number-patterns which the Pythagoreans had called *εἶδη* and *ιδέαις*, and if it was thereby transformed into a quality visible to the eye of the mind,² then there was a double reason for

¹ *Helena* chs. 54-8, *To Nicocles* ch. 34, and *Nicocles* ch. 30. *To Nicocles* was probably written soon after 374 B.C., and *Nicocles* between 372 and 365 B.C.

² Grube (*Plato's Thought*, p. 14) notes a similar transition from physical to mental vision in connection with the use of *εἶδος* in the *Cratylus*.

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speaking of an *ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*. And yet a third advantage of such terminology—though this shows itself chiefly in Plato's later works—was its connection with division into 'aspects' or 'parts'. I believe that when Plato τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων *ιδέας προσηγόρευσε*, he was exercising the greatest of his arts—*συνοπτική*.

The terms used by Plato to describe the relation between *εἶδη* and particulars I shall consider in two groups: first, *μετέχειν*, *κοινωνεῖν*, *παρεῖναι*, and *ἐνεῖναι*; second, *μίμησις*, *ὁμοίωσις*, and the like. Obviously the use of all of them in the dialogues is metaphorical. But from what source were the metaphors derived? In the case of the first group I believe that at least a partial answer is to be found by investigating fifth-century descriptions of the relation between things and their qualities or between qualities themselves. It is generally recognized, and can easily be proved by reference to the language of philosophers and medical writers, that the majority of fifth-century thinkers made no distinction between 'substances' and 'attributes', but vaguely regarded qualities as 'things', on the same level as other 'things'. They not only used the adjective *θερμός*, but combined it with the definite article and talked of τὸ θερμόν. And so when they wanted to describe the relation between heat and a substance, or, more rarely, between heat and some other quality like τὸ ξηρόν, to find an alternative phrase, in fact, for τοῦτό ἐστι θερμόν, they did not hesitate to use metaphors which imply that heat is something material, possessing parts and occupying space like other material things. Just as according to Diogenes (fr. 5) ἀἴρ δοκεῖ . . . ἐν παντὶ ἐνεῖναι. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἐν ὁ τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου—a notion which the author of the Hippocratic *Περὶ φισῶν* (ch. 3) supports with τί γὰρ ἄνευ τούτου γένοιτ' ἂν; ἢ τίνας οὗτος ἀπεστιν; ἢ τίς οὐ συμπαρεστιν; and other such phrases, so qualities were said to be 'in' things or 'present to' them or 'shared' or 'partaken of' by them—primarily, of course, sense-qualities like 'the hot'; but sometimes the metaphors were extended further to qualities of feeling, value, and the like. In illustration I will cite one or two of the numerous examples:

Μετέχειν occurs a number of times with this application. In *Περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἱητρικῆς* (ch. 19), for example, we have ὅποσα οὖν ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς θέμεως εἰλικρινέως ἢ ψύξιος γίνεται καὶ μὴ μετέχει ἄλλης δυνάμειος μηδεμίας. . . . And in *Περὶ σαρκῶν* (ch. 3): ὅποσα δὲ ἐτύγγανε κολλωδέστερα ἔοντα καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ μετέχοντα, ταῦτα δὲ θερμαινόμενα οὐκ ἠδύνατο ἐκκαυθῆναι οὐδὲ μὴν τοῦ ὑγροῦ γενέσθαι. διὰ τοῦτο ἰδέην ἀλλοιοτέρην ἔλαβε, and so on. Elsewhere it is used of non-sensible qualities, as in Isocrates' *Helena* (ch. 54): κάλλους γὰρ πλείστον μέρος μετέσχευ . . . τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρείας ἢ σοφίας ἢ δικαιοσύνης μὴ μετεχόντων. . . . As the first of these phrases suggests, sometimes μέρος or μοῖραν μετέχειν is used in a similar way—not only in Anaxagoras, where the interpretation is inevitably controversial, but also twice in Democritus, of moral qualities.¹

Of *κοινωνεῖν* in connection with qualities I know only two pre-Platonic instances, both of which I shall reserve for later quotation.

For *παρεῖναι* one may quote *Περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἱητρικῆς* (ch. 17): οὐδὲ πάρεστιν ἐνταῦθα ἔτι τὸ θερμόν ἢ τὸ ψυχρόν . . . συμπαρεστί δὲ καὶ τὸ θερμόν, and other such phrases. The writer of *Περὶ τέχνης* (ch. 9) applies the corresponding noun to conditions perceptible to sight or touch, which he exemplifies by hardness, wetness, heat and cold: ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐξανθεῖντα (sc. νοσήματα) ἐς τὴν χροίην ἢ χροίῃ ἢ οἰδήμασιν ἐν εὐδότη. παρέχει γὰρ ἐωντῶν τῇ τε ὀψεί τῷ τε ψαύσαι τὴν στερεότητα καὶ τὴν ὑγρότητα αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ἃ τε αὐτῶν θερμὰ ἃ τε ψυχρά, ὧν τε ἐκάστων ἢ παρουσίῃ ἢ ἀπουσίῃ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν. The use of the term with immaterial qualities may be illustrated from the *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι* (4, 5): ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῷ παρὶ τὸ ψεῦδος, ψεύστας ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθής.²

¹ Frs. 258 and 263. For μετέχειν cf. also *Περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἱητρικῆς* 14, *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου* 6, *Περὶ νοῦσων* IV, 40 and 54, *Diog. VIII*, 27-8.

Philolaus ap. Menon Anon. Lond. 18, 8.

² For παρεῖναι cf. also *Περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἱητρικῆς* 16 and 19, *Empedocles fr.* 114; Anon. *Iamb.* 3, 1.

The commonest of the four, however, is *ἐνεῖναι*. Thus *Περὶ παθῶν*—an entirely unphilosophical treatise—has (ch. 19): τὸ γὰρ αἷμα ὑπὸ πλῆθους τοῦ φλέγματος ὑδαρίστερον γίνεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐνὶ ὁμοίῳ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ εὐχρουν. Another typical example is to be found in *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου* (ch. 6): ἔλκει ἕκαστον τὸ κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῷ ἐνεδν ἐν τῇ γῇ, ἐνὶ δὲ καὶ ὀξύ καὶ πικρὸν καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ ἄλμυρον καὶ παντοῖον. Besides many instances for sensible qualities there are some connected with values or emotions, such as Antiphon the Sophist's ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ . . . τούτῳ, ἐνθα τὸ ἡδύ, ἐνεσσι πλησίον που καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν.

Such use of these terms with reference to qualities may seem to have little to do with Plato. But if it is true that these qualities were sometimes called *εἶδη* or *ιδέαι*, then a new thought inevitably suggests itself: perhaps in his metaphysical terminology Plato was only introducing new meanings into old phrases. The sentence τοῦτο μετέχει τῆς ιδέας τῆς τοῦ θερμοῦ never actually occurs in our scanty fragments of fifth-century literature, but we may be sure that it would have been intelligible to Socrates' contemporaries. We do find in the *Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἡτρικῆς* the sentence which I have already quoted asserting that each Opposite must be combined with some other quality: οὐ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ἐξευρημένον αὐτὸ τι ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ εἶδει κοινωνέον. And in Isocrates' *Helena*: πλὴν ὅσα ταύτης τῆς ιδέας (sc. τοῦ κάλλους) κεκοινωνήκεν; and in his *Nicocles*: εὐρήσσομεν τὰς μὴ μετεχούσας τούτων τῶν ιδεῶν μεγάλων κακῶν αἰτίας οὕσας.

The second group of terms—*μίμησις* and its kin—need not detain us for long. They are metaphors which seem specially suitable to mathematics and geometry—to the relation, for example, between the Y.M.C.A. sign and the abstract triangle which it 'resembles'; and it is generally agreed, on the evidence of Aristotle and others, that they were used by the Pythagoreans to describe the connection between things and numbers. The dispute over the date of the usage is fortunately irrelevant to our present purpose: the essential point is that since the Pythagoreans sometimes called numbers *εἶδη* or *ιδέαι*, they may well have described the relation between a thing and, say, the number two by a phrase like *μίμησις τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ τῆς δυάδος*. Despite its Platonic ring, such an expression must have been readily intelligible before Plato used it, at least within the circle of the Pythagoreans and their friends and critics.

This account leaves two important questions unsolved about both our groups: first, why should these particular words have been used for the relations between things and qualities or numbers? And second, why should these particular words have been adopted by Plato? I believe that the answer to the first problem, though it is only a matter of conjecture, has been correctly found by Cornford in primitive religious belief.¹ The ultimate prototype of the connection between thing and quality, for example, may well have been the 'participation' of the human in the divine, or perhaps of the natural object in the mysterious 'powers' which were supposed to be 'present to' it. But I cannot agree with him in seeking in this remote background the answer to the second question—in supposing that such primitive conceptions had any important influence on Plato himself. Even the few examples I have selected from fifth- and early fourth-century literature show that any derivation of *μετέχειν* and the rest from religious sources was completely, or almost completely, forgotten. The reasons for Plato's use of such terminology must surely be sought in ideas with which he had more direct contact.

To account for his use of the *μίμησις* group is not difficult. Not only had his Pythagorean friends found it peculiarly suitable for the relation between things and

¹ In *From Religion to Philosophy*.

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the number-patterns which provided one principal aspect of his εἶδη, but also it harmonized well with Socrates' favourite similes and metaphors from craftsmanship—with his view of 'the good', for example, as the παράδειγμα which each individual should copy in moulding his own life and character.¹ Here, as with the word εἶδος itself, linguistic usage facilitated the blending of the two chief strains in Plato's metaphysic. But to explain his adoption of μετέχειν and its like yet one more glance is necessary at his immediate predecessors.

I have already pointed out that the earliest Greek thinkers regarded qualities as things roughly on the same level with other things. They assumed the Opposites, for example, to be no less substantial than anything else, using τὸ θερμόν as an equivalent term for τὸ πῦρ, or treating τὸ ψυχρόν, τὸ ὑγρόν, and τὸ ξηρόν as constituents of the human body more or less corresponding to breath, flesh and blood, and bone. In some treatises of the *Hippocratic Corpus* the same belief reappears in all its naïveté down to the end of the fifth century or even later, so that the δυνάμεις in plants, for example, can be light or heavy, can be 'nourished', and can even turn into leaves. Yet obviously by the time of Democritus some philosophers at any rate had abandoned this simple assumption. I believe that study of the manner in which the change took place can throw a good deal of light on Plato.

The concept of quality can only become clear by contrast with the concept of substance. And it seems likely that Parmenides himself, with whom the history of οὐσία as a rational concept may be said to begin, was the first to make or imply any distinction between the two. His εἶν has shape, but no qualities in the narrower sense of the term. Fire and night—evidently the same as the Pythagorean light and darkness, and called, one notices, μορφαί—along with the various δυνάμεις, are only the erroneous additions of mortals to τὸ εἶν. As Cornford says,² 'all the attributes . . . of Being in the Way of Truth belonged to the category of quantity. The attributes which mortal error has set up . . . on the Way of seeming are the Opposites of sensible quality. . . .'. The arguments put into the mouth of Zeno in Plato's *Parmenides*, to the effect that one thing cannot have two opposite attributes, suggest the same distinction. It was implicit in the whole Eleatic critique of contemporary thought.

For Parmenides' purpose it was sufficient to deny the existence of qualities. Their supposed nature or status in the scheme of things was irrelevant to his criticism, and in referring to them he accepts the normal assumptions of his contemporaries, making no attempt to distinguish the Opposites from other 'things' which he regards as equally unreal. But later thinkers who aimed at reconciling the phenomenal universe with his strictures rather than disproving it altogether were faced with a new problem. For while the fundamental Eleatic rule of immutability might apply as far as the quantity and essential nature of elements or 'seeds' or atoms were concerned, the alteration of things from hot to cold, wet to dry, and so on was undeniable. The most logical explanation would doubtless have been to assert, as the Atomists eventually asserted, that these changing qualities were products of perception rather than objective realities. But at first the primitive assumption that there is an external object corresponding to every sense experience retained a strong hold, with the result that the view of qualities as material things still seems to have been accepted: only the other hall-mark of their substantiality, their separateness, appears to have been questioned. Pluralists, monists, and Protagoras and his followers seem all to have arrived by different routes at the same conclusion—that the Opposites, although material, must 'inhere' in things and

¹ There is no justification for the assumption of Burnet (ap. *Euthyphro* 5d) and Stewart (*Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*, p. 17) that Socrates' use of the

word παράδειγμα proves his acquaintance with the developed 'theory' of εἶδη.

² *C.Q.* XXVII (1933), p. 108.

cannot exist by themselves. It is in their various statements on this point that the use of *μετέχειν*, *κοινωνεῖν*, *παρεῖναι* and *ἐνείναι* deserves particular notice.

The pluralist postulate of a limited number of unchanging elements leaves no room for qualities, except as fixed properties or constituents of the elements themselves; and this view seems to have been held somewhat vaguely by Empedocles, more definitely by the medical writer Menecrates and by Plato's contemporary Philistion.¹ Such distribution of qualities among the elements left them no longer separate from things, but still separate from each other: the author of the first part of *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*, who attributes *ιδέαι* or *δυνάμεις*, fixed 'by nature', to the four constituents of the human body, adds *φημί . . . κατὰ φύσιν τὰς ιδέας κεχωρίσθαι*. But as Aristotle points out, even this *χωρισμός* really constitutes a denial of alteration in quality: 'If water cannot come into being out of fire nor earth out of water, neither will black come out of white nor hard out of soft'.² It must have been at least partly to account for such alteration that Anaxagoras formed his puzzling doctrine, 'everything is in everything': qualities—the Opposites—must not only be 'in things'; they must be combined inseparably with each other: *οὐ κεχωρίσται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκείσθαι πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ* (fr. 8). Fragment 6, which, whatever other implications it contains, must surely refer in part to this inseparability of qualities, is full of suggestive terminology: *καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ πλήθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ πάντα· οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοῦλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ εἵνεσσι καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ἴσα πλήθος ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι*. Later, in the *Περὶ διαίτης* (ch. 4), we find what seems to be a strange combination of the Anaxagorean theory with a more Empedoclean doctrine of two elements, fire and water: *τούτων δὲ προσκείμεται ἑκατέρῳ τὰδε· τῷ μὲν πυρὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν, τῷ δὲ ὕδατι τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν· ἔχει δὲ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ὑγρόν· ἐνὶ γὰρ ἐν πυρὶ ὑγρότης· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ ξηρόν· ἐνὶ γὰρ ἐν ὕδατι ξηρόν*.

Monism after Parmenides, which I believe to have been much more widespread than is generally supposed, led inevitably to the distinction between quality and substance. If only one kind of matter exists, all change is reduced to 'alteration': 'he primary stuff possesses Opposites 'within it', and these fluctuate while its quantity and essence remain the same. I may perhaps cite once more the sentence in *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου* on the monists: *ἐν γὰρ εἶναι φασιν, ὅτι ἕκαστος αὐτῶν βούλεται ὀνομάσας, καὶ τοῦτο μεταλλάσσειν τὴν ιδέην καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, ἀναγκαζόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, καὶ γίνεσθαι γλυκὲν καὶ πικρὸν καὶ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ παντοῖον*. Diogenes wrote of *ἀήρ* (fr. 5): *ἔστι γὰρ πολύτροπος, καὶ θερμότερος καὶ ψυχρότερος καὶ ξηρότερος καὶ ὑγρότερος καὶ στασιμώτερος καὶ ὀξυτέρην κίνησιν ἔχων, καὶ ἄλλαι πολλὰ ἑτεροιώσεις εἵνεσι καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ χροῆς ἄπειροι*. A similar distinction between changing qualities and unchanging substance is implied by Hippon.

As for Protagoras and his followers, a thoroughgoing application of the *πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος* principle would clearly have denied to all phenomena alike any existence independent of the perceiving subject. As Cornford has shown,³ however, it is not likely that Protagoras made any such complete break with the normal assumptions of his time: he still presupposed the existence of external objects, but held that each such object contained many characteristics, perceptible some by one observer, some by another. His position was a direct reply to the argument of the Eleatics:

¹ For Empedocles, cf. Diels-Kranz 194 and 221, but contrast 290. For Menecrates and Philistion, Menon ap. Anon. Lond. 19 and 20. The reason why Philistion called his elements *ιδέαι* must remain uncertain. It may have been

that they were different 'kinds' of matter, or that they were associated with quality-things.

² *De Gen. et Corr.* A 1. 314 b25-6.

³ *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 33 sq.

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one thing can have two opposite attributes; the same wind—to take an example from the *Theaetetus*—has in itself both 'the hot' and 'the cold'. Once again qualities are deprived of their separateness, although not of their status as things. The same point is at issue in the Protagorean *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι*, which discusses whether good and bad, beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, true and false, are separate 'by nature' or relative to the man perceiving or judging them—whether they are separate *πράγματα* or merely different *ὀνόματα* attached to the same *πᾶγμα*. In the medical sphere use is made of a similar semi-relativist doctrine, with similar implications, by the author of a section of the Hippocratic treatise *Περὶ τόπων τῶν κατ' ἀνθρώπων*.¹ Each thing, he seems to believe, has certain attributes (called *εἶδεα*) φύσει or κατὰ φύσιν, but they only work correctly under the right circumstances. Thus a food only exercises its natural properties when the body 'masters' it: if it is too 'strong' for the body, it may have the opposite of its natural effect. A physician's first duty is to know τὰ εἶδεα καὶ τὰ μὴ εἶδεα—when a property is not a property, when it will work and when it will not.

Not only, however, did the attempt to reconcile phenomena with Parmenides' logic lead pluralists, monists, and relativists to question the status of qualities in the realm of things. Even without Eleaticism the problem was inevitable in an age that paid so much attention to observed fact. As Aristotle says (*Phys.* 189a29-30), 'we never see the Opposites themselves constituting the substance of any of the things that are'. It is just this point that the author of *Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἱητρικῆς* is making in the attack I have already quoted on physicians who claim to cure their patients by application of 'the hot', 'the cold', 'the wet', and 'the dry'. None of these Opposites, he points out, can exist by itself. It must be combined with some other quality or qualities, viz. with one or more of the *χυμοί*, to form one of 'the same foods and drinks as we all use': οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς, οἶμαι, ἐξευρημένον αὐτό τι ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ ξηρὸν ἢ ὑγρὸν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ εἶδει κοινωνέον. ἀλλ' οἶμαι ἔγωγε ταῦτά βρώματα καὶ πόματα αὐτοῖσι ὑπάρχειν, οἷσι πάντες χρῶμεθα.

It was with this background of discussion, whether qualities could be *separate* things, that the Atomists went a step further and questioned whether they could be things at all—a discussion, if my analysis of the use of terms has been correct, of the *χωρισμός* of εἶδη, with *μετέχειν*, *κοινωνεῖν*, *παρεῖναι*, and *ἐνεῖναι* as part of its habitual phraseology. Amid this discussion Plato grew up. And here, I think, rather than in remote primitive belief, is to be found the reason for his adoption of such terms in his own metaphysics. His predecessors and contemporaries denied the separability of material sense-qualities and attached them to things. His own doctrine was superficially comparable: he separated immaterial value-qualities from the things to which they were supposed to belong. It was a matter of putting new significance into old language.

I will briefly summarize the somewhat disconnected conclusions which I have suggested. I believe that Plato acquired from Socrates an interest in qualities of value, and learned to differentiate them from their particular examples; that he perceived an analogy between them and numbers, represented as patterns by the Pythagoreans, and combined the two to form the notion of quality-patterns, not only logically 'different', but substantially 'separate' from particular phenomena; that because they were both 'shapes' or 'forms' and 'qualities visible to the eye of the mind', he was doubly justified in calling them εἶδη or ἰδέαι; that he adopted from the Pythagoreans the term *μίμησις* and its like to denote their relation to particulars;

¹ *Περὶ τόπων τῶν κατ' ἀνθρώπων*, chs. 41-6, which are clearly not by the same hand as the rest of the treatise. The author cites three views, but

it seems evident that the last (the one I have described) is his own.

that he further described this relation in language already used by others for the connection between qualities and things—*μετέχειν*, *κοινωνεῖν*, *παρεῖναι*, and *εἶναι*; and that he was particularly led to employ these by an analogy between the *χωρισμός* of his own transcendent objects of knowledge and the disputed *χωρισμός* of the sensible *εἶδη* to which such words were applied. The nice question whether all this constitutes a use of 'technical terms' I leave for others to decide.

H. C. BALDRY.

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C. BALDRY.

THE ATTACK ON ISOCRATES IN THE *PHAEDRUS*.

THE most famous and successful teacher of rhetoric at Athens in the fourth century was Isocrates, and he claimed for rhetoric an educational importance which Plato considered to be unmerited and misleading. He made rhetoric the basis of his whole educational system and claimed to teach his pupils to become not only good rhetoricians but good citizens. Plato attacked both aspects of this theory of education. In the *Gorgias* he exposed the claim of rhetoric to be considered valuable as an instrument of education by showing that rhetorical excellence had no necessary connection with moral excellence. In the *Protagoras* he exposed the inconsistency of those who claimed to teach men to be good citizens—to teach πολιτική τέχνη—without an absolute standard of moral values. Even if we believe that in the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras*, as in other dialogues, Plato is representing faithfully the constructive views of the historic Socrates, we can hardly believe that he was unaware of the contemporary relevance of those views, and it is significant that he thought fit to publish them in the form of an attack on a teacher of rhetoric and an attack on a teacher of πολιτική τέχνη. At any rate it is reasonable to suppose that the Athenian reading public would expect to find such a contemporary relevance and that they would interpret these attacks as being, in some measure at least, directed against Isocrates.

As far as the *Gorgias* is concerned it would probably be generally admitted that the attack on rhetoric is intended to refer to Isocrates as the most influential contemporary teacher of it. It is perhaps not so easy to allow that the *Protagoras* is also largely directed against Isocrates, as a teacher of πολιτική τέχνη; but at least the *Protagoras* had this effect, that it drew a counter-attack from Isocrates. For it seems to me that the irrelevant introduction to the *Helen* can best be explained as primarily (though not exclusively) an attack on Plato, and in particular on the *Protagoras*. It opens with the statement that there are certain persons who pride themselves on maintaining obscure and paradoxical hypotheses, and that there are some who have spent their lives (καταγεγηράκασιν) showing that Courage and Wisdom and Justice are one and the same (208 B1) and that men do not possess these virtues φύσει, μία δ' ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἁπάντων ἐστίν (208 B2). Now this is a very fair summary of the suggestions of many of Plato's earlier dialogues and epitomizes accurately the positive doctrine of the *Protagoras*, where the unity of the virtues is first formulated and proved. Isocrates then goes on to ask whether there is anyone whose education has been so neglected (τίς ἐστιν οὕτως ὀψιμαθής) that he does not know that Protagoras and the sophists of his day have left us τοιαῦτα καὶ πολὺ τούτων πραγματωδέστερα συγγράμματα (208 C2). He adds Gorgias, and then Zeno and Melissus, as masters of paradoxical obscurities, and it is significant that Protagoras heads the list and has a sentence to himself, although he is certainly not such a good example as Zeno or Melissus. The point that Isocrates is making is this. An historically accurate portrait of the great sophist should have allowed him this kind of skill. By showing Socrates as superior in this type of argument Plato has been guilty of gross misrepresentation, and he certainly cannot claim for himself any distinction for spending so much time in doing what others had done better—and 'better' here means 'πραγματωδέστερα', for obscurity and difficulty are the only merits which such exercises can claim. Persons who are inclined to this type of argument, however, ought to abandon such nonsense and educate their associates (παιδεύειν τοὺς συνόντας 209 A4) in matters of

practical importance. Isocrates indicates that it is those who profess to be educators whom he has mind, and he makes this quite clear a little later (209 c4) when he says that men can be forgiven if they delight in these useless arguments, but τοῖς παιδεύειν προσποιουμένοις ἄξιον ἐπιτιμᾶν because τοὺς συνόντας μάλιστα βλάπτουσιν (209 d1). They ought, he says, τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν . . . ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι πολλὸν κρεῖττον ἔστιν περὶ τῶν χρησίμων ἐπεικῶς δοξάζειν ἢ περὶ τῶν ἀχρήστων ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ μικρὸν προέχειν ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις μᾶλλον ἢ πολλὸν διαφέρειν ἐν τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ τοῖς μὲν πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφελοῦσιν. This is surely a direct criticism of the Platonic thesis of the superiority of ἐπιστήμη to δόξα, and even if it is not specifically directed against the *Protagoras* it has at least a distinct relevance to that dialogue. It is somewhat vitiated, of course, by its opening words, which urge the necessity of τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν, and this inconsistency is thoroughly exposed in the *Phaedrus*, where the whole passage is subjected to a relentless criticism.

But whatever we may believe to have been Isocrates' object in the introduction to the *Helen*, it certainly seems that Plato considered it to refer to himself, and he makes an exhaustive reply in the *Phaedrus*. The attack on Isocrates in this dialogue takes the form of an attack on the principles and teaching of rhetoric. Several commentators¹ have noticed in the *Phaedrus* polemic against Isocrates and verbal reminiscences of his writings; but there is more to it than that. The whole dialogue must be considered primarily as a direct and comprehensive attack on the educational system of Isocrates, in which Isocrates' own words and methods, particularly those which he uses in the *Helen*, are turned against himself. The following analysis will, I hope, make this clear.

The dialogue opens with a meeting between Socrates and Phaedrus. Phaedrus has just heard and been much impressed by a discourse of Lysias, a rhetorical exercise on the theme that it is better to grant favours to a suitor who is not really in love than to the true lover, on the ground that the true lover is a madman and must therefore be harmful to the object of his affection. Phaedrus is persuaded to give Socrates an account of it, though he protests that he cannot do more than give a summary. Socrates then discovers that Phaedrus has a written copy of the discourse with him, and the important point is thus established that the discourse, although it may be read or delivered as a speech, is in reality a written work.

Before the discourse is read a discussion of the charm of the scenery and the legend connected with the place leads to the remark of Phaedrus that Socrates is a strange creature in that he never leaves the city. Socrates replies (230 d3) Συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε. φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι. Only men in the city and not trees and the countryside can teach him anything. Now there is a tradition that Isocrates (in the words of Roger Ascham) 'did cause to be written at the entree of his scholae in golden letters this golden sentence 'Εὖν ἥς φιλομαθὴς, ἔσει πολυμαθὴς', and whether this tradition is founded upon fact or not this sentence does actually occur in the *Ad Demonium* of Isocrates. The Athenian public would be reminded by the phrase φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι of Isocrates' 'golden sentence', particularly if it attained the prominence which tradition asserts, and it is a most appropriate excuse for Socrates to give to Phaedrus, who throughout the dialogue represents the intelligent follower of Isocrates.

The discourse of Lysias is then read.

Socrates says that he was impressed, but as much by the enthusiasm of the reader as by anything else. The suggestion is that the written discourse needs a vivid presentation in order to make its effect. Phaedrus asks (234 e3) whether Socrates thinks that anyone else could have said ἔτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος. Socrates expresses surprise that they are expected to praise the

¹ Especially L. Robin in his introduction to this dialogue in the *Budé* collection (Paris, 1933) (vide particularly pp. clx-clxxv). Cf.

Raeder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1905), pp. 265-279.

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discourse (234 E5) ὡς τὰ δέοντα εἰρηκότος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνη μόνον ὅτι σαφὴ καὶ στοργγύλα καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀποτετόρνενται. He means that he thought he was only expected to pay attention to those aspects of the discourse which he imagined that Phaedrus, as a pure rhetorician, would consider important.

We shall probably be right in recognizing here, as Raeder suggests, a reference to a passage in the *κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν* (294c), where Isocrates, speaking of the aspects of oratory which the pupil has to learn, says that he must be able τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν πρεπόντως ὅλον τὸν λόγον καταποικίλαι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμως καὶ μουσικῶς εἰπεῖν. The continuation of this passage has also an important, though indirect, bearing on the *Phaedrus*. Isocrates proceeds immediately (294 D2) to summarize the essential characteristics of the good pupil and the good teacher. The attributes of the pupil are distinctly referred to later in the *Phaedrus* (269 D), and we may pass them over for the moment. As for the teacher, he must be able to expound everything that can be taught, and for the rest set such an example to his pupils that they may improve their own style by imitating his (294 E). The teacher of rhetoric, therefore, must be able to practise what he preaches and to show his pupils how it should be done. Now Isocrates has extended the scope of this precept and employed it in the *Busiris* and the *Helen* as a method of literary criticism. In those works he first of all offers a few general comments on the encomia by other authors and then produces his 'fair copy', ἵνα μὴ δοκῶ τὸ ῥῆστον ποιεῖν, as he says in the *Helen* (211 A2). (The formula is the same in the *Busiris* except that *προχειρότατον* is substituted for *ῥῆστον*.) This is a form of criticism which perhaps shows more courage than critical ability, but the point of immediate importance is that Plato has imitated it exactly in the *Phaedrus*. The discourse of Lysias is briefly criticized and Socrates produces a 'fair copy' on the same theme.¹ The whole procedure is then in its turn examined, and the critical method itself is found to be defective because it assumes the possibility of producing a good discourse on a given theme. Socrates has meanwhile produced the real 'fair copy' on the subject of Ἔρως, in which the theme is exactly the opposite of that of the two preceding discourses, whose thesis is shown to be tenable only if the canons of correct discourse are not observed.

To return to the discourse of Lysias. Socrates offers his apologies if he is guilty of having paid attention to the wrong aspects of the speech. He was only paying attention to τὸ ῥητορικόν and he thought that in this respect the discourse was not quite up to the standard which Lysias himself would approve (235 A2). The author appeared to repeat himself and to take a beginner's delight (*νεανιεύεσθαι*, 235 A6) in saying the same things in two different ways, both equally excellent. Phaedrus says that this is really the merit of the speech; nothing has been omitted. Socrates does not accept this favourable view. He thinks he has heard better discourses on the subject and feels that he could do better himself. Of course he would derive all he could say from other sources, for he could not invent anything himself *συνειδώς ἐμαντῷ ἀμαθίαν* (235 C8). Apart from the general irony of the suggestion that Socrates has nothing original to say about Ἔρως it is perhaps admissible to see here an ironical reference in the word *ἀμαθία* to the *πολυμαθία* which is promised to the pupils of Isocrates.

Phaedrus insists that Socrates should make a speech on the same theme, τῶν ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ βελτίω τε καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ὑπόσχεσις εἰπεῖν, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος (235 D6). Again there is emphasis on the fact that Lysias' discourse is written, but it is the phrase τούτων ἀπεχόμενος—avoiding τὰ ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ—which is important. Socrates says that this is an impossible condition and that anyone speaking on this theme must be

¹ It is perhaps worth pointing out that Plato had already done something of the kind before (though the imitation is not there so obvious or specific) in the *Symposium*, where the interroga-

tion of Agathon is in fact a criticism of his encomium of Ἔρως and leads up to the discourse of Diotima, which is the 'fair copy'.

allowed to say the obvious and essential things (*ἀναγκαῖα*). He then proceeds (236 A4) καὶ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων οὐ τὴν εὐρεσιν ἀλλὰ τὴν διάθεσιν ἐπαινετέον, τῶν δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ χαλεπῶν εὐρεῖν πρὸς τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τὴν εὐρεσιν. Here we have a double criticism of Isocrates and the reference is to the *Helen*. In the first place Plato would surely not have argued in such detail about the absurdity of this condition if it had not been necessary. But it was necessary because Isocrates had actually imposed it on himself in the *Helen* (211 A4), where he says that he will make his encomium παραλιπὼν τὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰρημένα.¹ In the second place the proof of the absurdity of the condition is itself a criticism of another statement of Isocrates in the *Helen* (210 B2) οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ καὶ τοιούτοις ὅμοιοι τῶν λόγων διὰ πολλῶν ἰδεῶν καὶ καιρῶν δυσκαταμαθήτων εὐρίσκονται καὶ λέγονται καὶ τοσοῦτῃ χαλεπωτέραν ἔχουσι τὴν σύνθεσιν, ὅσῳ περ τὸ σεμνύνεσθαι τοῦ σπῶπτειν καὶ τὸ σπουδάζειν τοῦ παίζειν ἐπιπονιώτερόν ἐστιν. The passage in the *Phaedrus* shows that Isocrates has here failed to distinguish between two types of argument, those which owe their merit solely to their method of presentation (*διάθεσις* Plato, *σύνθεσις* Isocrates) and those which owe it to their originality as well (*εὐρεσις*). It is this confusion of thought on the part of Isocrates which has led him to impose on himself such an absurd condition.

Socrates then summons the Muses to his aid and makes his discourse. He proves that it is bad to grant favours to the lover who is really in love but cannot quite bring himself to draw explicitly, as Lysias had done, what Phaedrus believes to be the necessary conclusion. The arrangement of the matter in this discourse is better, and the haphazard arguments of Lysias are reduced to something like order.

Socrates has done as much as Phaedrus expects and is about to make his way home when he is stopped by τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ εἰώθης σημεῖον (235 B7), a sure indication that we are now coming to the essentially Socratic or Platonic part of the dialogue. The discourse of Lysias and what Socrates afterwards calls the discourse of Phaedrus (the attribution is significant) have blasphemed against the god Ἔρως and restitution must be made. Fortunately there is a καθαρμοὺς ἀρχαῖος (243 A4), ὃν Ὀμηρος μὲν οὐκ ᾔσθετο, Σησίχορος δέ. τῶν γὰρ ὁμμάτων στερηθεὶς διὰ τὴν Ἑλένης κακηγορίαν . . . καὶ ποιήσας δὴ πᾶσαν τὴν καλουμένην παλινωδίαν, παραχρῆμα ἀνέβλεψεν. Athenian readers would appreciate the ingenuity with which Plato has designed the dialogue so that his real views on Ἔρως are expressed in the form of a palinode, and the subtlety with which the direct reference to Helen is introduced. Moreover the subject-matter, Ἔρως, of the palinode, as, of course, of the preceding discourses, has a relevance to the *Helen*. At 212 B6 Isocrates says that he will praise Helen by showing the superiority of τοὺς ἀγαπήσαντας καὶ θαυμάσαντας ἐκείνην. Ἔρως is therefore to a large extent the subject of the encomium; but the subject is treated in a muddled way. The δύναμις of Helen over Stesichorus, for instance, which is mentioned at the end of the encomium, is certainly not love, though that is what her δύναμις has meant up to that point (218 D5). Isocrates says that Stesichorus ἐβλασφήμησέν τι περὶ αὐτῆς (218 E1) and then made a recantation. Plato is unkind enough to quote the opening lines of the palinode, to show that Stesichorus' recantation was a denial of the usual story about Helen. Apparently his blasphemy had been to accept the common tradition; but Isocrates has also done this, and we are meant to notice that he has therefore by implication referred to a great part of his own encomium as blasphemy. It is perhaps not much more than a 'debating point', but Plato does not let Isocrates off, and I think his readers would have appreciated it.

¹ Isocrates did not apparently always insist on this condition, and he does not do so in the *Busiris*, so that perhaps the reference here to

the *Helen* may be considered to be the more explicit.

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Socrates then proceeds to his recantation (244 A1), ὁ μὲν πρότερος ἦν λόγος Φαῖδρον τοῦ Πυθοκλέους ὃν δὲ μέλλω λέγειν Στρησίχου τοῦ Εὐφύμου.¹

Phaedrus admires the discourse and says that he is afraid that Lysias will not be able to compete, and that in any case he may not want to do so. In fact it is quite likely that he will refrain altogether from writing discourses in the future because he has recently been insulted by someone who persistently called him a λογογράφος (257 C6). It is difficult to see the point of this remark if we take it to refer exclusively to Lysias. Lysias can hardly have taken umbrage at being called a λογογράφος because that is precisely what he had been and professed to be. On the other hand Isocrates had also at one time been a λογογράφος and the absence of all mention in his writings at this stage of his career and his derogatory remarks about law-court oratory in general are usually taken to mean that he was ashamed of the fact.² But Socrates goes on to show that Lysias (or Isocrates) is in what he would consider good company, for all those who introduce laws are in a sense λογογράφοι. They prefix their names to the decrees they bring forward and the name of those who approve of it (the βουλή or the δῆμος or both) and are proud rather than ashamed of being λογογράφοι. It is not true, as Phaedrus has suggested (257 D7), that the greatest men in the state refrain from publishing λόγοι for fear of being called σοφισταί by posterity. Of course Plato has shamelessly made use of the etymology of the word λογογράφος and does not allow it the more specific meaning of 'writer of speeches for the law-courts', which is what it would normally mean to the Athenian public. The implication is that even if Isocrates confines his attention to broad political issues, and becomes as eminent as Solon or Lycurgus or Darius, he is still a λογογράφος and his art is generically the same as that which he practised when he was a λογογράφος in the narrower and idiomatic sense. He is, in fact, in the same class as Lysias and cannot despise his type of oratory.

After thus mildly ridiculing Isocrates Plato goes on to make his point, which is this (258 D1): τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα παντὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν αὐτό γε τὸ γράφειν λόγους. ἀλλ' ἐκείνο οἶμαι αἰσχρὸν ἤδη, τὸ μὴ καλῶς λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν ἀλλ' αἰσχρῶς τε καὶ κακῶς. It is not said that the writing of discourses is in any way praiseworthy, but only that there is nothing αἰσχρὸν in writing them unless they are written αἰσχρῶς. A more positive estimate of the value of such an exercise comes later.³

So much then for the preliminaries. We now come to the first of the two chief topics of this part of the dialogue: (258 D7) τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν; Phaedrus asks what object men can have for living if not for the pleasures of discourse. 'There is time for that', says Socrates (258 E6), and that is, in fact, the second topic of this part of the dialogue. Plato prepares us for it here but puts off discussion of it until the first question has been dealt with.

The answer to this question is, first of all, that a man must know τάληθες ὃν ἂν ἐρεῖν περὶ μέλλῃ (259 E5). He must know the truth about his subject. Phaedrus says that he has heard that it is not necessary to know τὰ τῷ ὄντι δίκαια (260 A1) but only τὰ δόξαντα ἂν πλῆθει οἷπερ δικάσουσιν. Socrates easily disposes of this argument. If he persuaded Phaedrus to equip himself for war by obtaining a horse and was aware that Phaedrus did not know what a horse was, except that he thought it had

¹ About this discourse of Socrates there is one small point which is of interest if not of great significance. The comparison of the soul with a chariot had already been made by Isocrates. It may be a case of unconscious plagiarism and Plato has certainly made the simile his own, but the following passage does occur in the *Ad Demonium* (9 A3), where Isocrates is talking of the evil effects of wine: ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ὑπ' οἴνου διαφθαρῇ, ταῦτά πάσχει τοῖς ἄρμασι τοῖς τοῦ ἡνιόχου

ἀποβαλοῦσιν. ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ ἀτάκτως φέρεται διαμαρτάνοντα τῶν εὐθυνόντων, ἥ τε ψυχὴ πολλὰ σφάλματα διαφθαρείσῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ.

² Alternatively, the ἐναγχος τῶν πολιτικῶν who insulted Lysias by calling him a λογογράφος may represent Isocrates. The effect is the same, namely that Isocrates is not entitled to distinguish himself from λογογράφοι.

³ 276 E.

longer ears than any other animal, Phaedrus would be in a pretty plight if, being under this misapprehension, he acquired a donkey and called it a horse. That is γελοῖον, but it is a serious matter if an orator who is persuading an audience panders to their misapprehension to such an extent that he persuades them to do evil instead of good. It seems a fairly obvious point and it is reasonable to ask why Plato thought it necessary to argue it in such detail. Once again the explanation is that Isocrates did actually put forward the suggestion that Phaedrus says he has heard. In the *Ad Nicoclem* (23 D2-24 D3) he says that men do not like the most salutary counsels any more than they like the foods which are best for them, and the orator who wishes to carry his audience with him must imitate Homer and the tragedians who recognized the importance of making their work as attractive as possible. His conclusion is this: τοῦτων οὖν παραδειγμάτων ὑπαρχόντων δίδεικται τοῖς ἐπιθυμοῦσιν τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ψυχαγωγεῖν, ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ συμβουλευεῖν ἀφεκτέον, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον ὅς ὁρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χαίροντας.¹ Plato interprets this, not without some justification, as meaning that the function of rhetoric is to please the audience and that the successful orator has to know how to do this rather than to know τἀληθές.

Socrates then suggests that rhetoric is perhaps not a τέχνη at all but only an ἄτεχνος τριβή (260 E5). "Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἢ ῥητορικὴ ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων; (261 A8) he says, recalling, I think, the ψυχαγωγία of Isocrates. Rhetoric, however, Socrates continues, is generically the same whether it is employed in public or in private, about important or unimportant matters (μεγάλα or σμικρά). It is not possible to differentiate, as Phaedrus wants to do, between speeches in the law courts or περὶ δημηγορίας and other kinds of discourse. Palamedes employs rhetoric as much as Nestor or Odysseus, and the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno) as much as Gorgias and Thrasymachus, the modern counterparts of Nestor and Odysseus. It is a good point and Isocrates has laid himself open to it. At the beginning of the *Helen* he has bracketed Gorgias and Zeno as masters of sophistic obscurities, and now Plato replies by bracketing them as employers of rhetoric. Plato, however, is still not prepared to admit the existence of an art of rhetoric, but he insists (261 E1) περὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα μία τις τέχνη, εἴπερ ἔστιν. The point is then elaborated that knowledge is the essential requisite of the orator. It is only the man who has accurate knowledge who can make or notice those slight deviations from the truth which are the hardest to detect and the most likely to win over an audience by their verisimilitude. The conclusion is (262 B10) λόγων ἄρα τέχνην, ᾧ ἔταιρε, ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελοῖαν τινά, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἄτεχνον παρέξειται. Isocrates' contention in the *Helen* (269 A5) that it is better δοξάζειν about important matters than ἐπίστασθαι about unimportant matters is thus thoroughly refuted on two counts. Firstly, it is not legitimate to distinguish, as far as the employment of rhetoric is concerned, between μεγάλα and σμικρά, for the art, if there is one, is independent of the nature of the theme; and secondly, knowledge is always better than opinion.

Phaedrus feels that they are arguing ψιλῶς πως, in the abstract. They need παραδείγματα. κατὰ τύχην γέ τινα (262 C10) the discourses of Lysias and Socrates (that is to say the discourse of Lysias and the discourse proper of Socrates, not that which has been called the discourse of Phaedrus) offer us an example of the way in which muddled thinking can lead us into error, and clear thinking can lead us to the truth. Ἔρως is one of those words which require a definition when we use it. All men, for instance, know exactly what is meant by silver or iron, but they do not know exactly what is meant by words like δίκαιον and ἀγαθόν. Such words need a definition before we can know what is meant by them, and Ἔρως is a word like that. Lysias made a mistake in not defining what he meant by Ἔρως. Socrates, under the influence of the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, did better and

¹ Cf. *Evagoras* 191 A-B.

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defined *Ἔρως* fully. Φεῦ, ὅσῳ λέγεις τεχνικωτέρας Νύμφας τὰς Ἀχελφῶν καὶ Πάνα τὸν Ἑρμοῦ Ἀντίου τοῦ Κεφάλου πρὸς λόγους εἶναι (263 D5). The nymphs were technically more correct than Lysias.

It is important to emphasize that the discourse of Lysias is in this part of the dialogue criticized not for the immorality of its theme but for its technical defects. Some of these defects were remedied by the so-called discourse of Phaedrus, but not all of them, notably the failure to define *Ἔρως*. The fact is that neither of these discourses could have been made if *Ἔρως* had been defined. It is not possible to make a good discourse on a theme which can only be maintained, as in this case, on the basis of a confusion of thought in the mind of the author or his audience. Isocrates' method of criticism, whereby he undertakes to produce a 'fair copy' on a given theme, cannot be effective, or rather can only be effective so long as it is incomplete. It is only when we clarify our ideas and define our terms that we can know whether the theme can be maintained. In this case it cannot, and Plato of course implies that no immoral theme can be successfully maintained, if the author has the requisite knowledge and makes his knowledge clear in the discourse. The way to dispose of an immoral argument, therefore, is not to rant against its immorality but to point out the technical fault, for there must inevitably be one, upon which the thesis rests. The only man who can make a good discourse is the man who knows the truth, and if a discourse is founded on truth it will be good. Even in the realm of literature knowledge is goodness and is the first essential for the making of good literature.¹

Socrates then goes on to show how his strictly correct technique enabled him to make his discourse. The arguments were put together in a logical order so that the discourse had a proper organic structure. *Ἔρως* was defined and he emphasizes the manner in which the definition was made. It was done by a process of division, by dividing *μανία* into several kinds and identifying *Ἔρως* with one of them, and this method foreshadows that which was later to be so fully illustrated in the *Sophistes*. The examination of the way in which *Ἔρως* was defined leads to the conclusion that there are two things which the maker of discourses must be able to do. He must firstly be able *εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα* (265 D3) and secondly *πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν* (265 E2). But this is dialectic. What is τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς? (266 D4).

Phaedrus says that there is a great deal in the textbooks about the *προοίμιον*, the *διήγησις μαρτυρίας* and so on. Socrates calls these *τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης*. There is considerable discussion of them because they were generally thought to be important, but they are ultimately dismissed as of little value. There is one passage (267 A6 ff.) which concerns us because most commentators, quite rightly, see in it a reminiscence of a passage in Isocrates. Socrates says *Τισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εἶδεν* (a sufficiently contemptuous dismissal) who make small things appear great and great things small *διὰ ῥώμην λόγον* and who say *καινὰ τε ἀρχαίως τὰ τ' ἐναντία καινῶς* and can speak very briefly or at length on all subjects. Isocrates makes exactly this claim for oratory in the *Panegyricus* (42 c), and whether it is an original claim of Isocrates, which is probable, or is taken from Gorgias, as some commentators think, the point is that Isocrates claims it as a merit whereas Plato ridicules it. Finally (267 D8) Socrates says that that is all he has to say even if Phaedrus has anything to add. Phaedrus says that he could only add *Σμικρὰ γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν*. *Ἐὼμεν δὴ τὰ σμικρὰ* says Socrates, in ironical deference to Isocrates.

A knowledge of those technicalities, however, is of no real use. You do not become a tragedian like Sophocles or Euripides (268 C6) because you can *περί*

¹ The relevance of the discourse of Socrates, and of its myth, to the rest of the dialogue now becomes more evident. It is an outstanding ex-

ample of Plato's thesis that knowledge of the subject and a strict regard for essential truth result in a fine discourse.

σμικροῦ πράγματος ῥήσεις παμμήκεις ποιεῖν καὶ περὶ μεγάλων πάντων σμικρὰς and so on. (It is worth noticing how the contrast between τὰ μεγάλα and τὰ σμικρά occurs again and again. It is never allowed to stand and is generally ridiculed.) Perhaps they are necessary for the complete orator, but the essential points are these: (269 D6) εἰ μὲν σοὶ ὑπάρχει φύσει ῥητορικῶς εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλόγιμος (perhaps the form of the sentence is intended to recall Isocrates' ἔσει πολυμαθής) προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ μελέτην ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλίπης ταύτων, ταύτῃ ἀτελὴς ἔσει. Now this is exactly what Isocrates says in the passage from the κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν (294 D3), to which I referred above, when he speaks of what is necessary for the pupil who is learning rhetoric. δεῖν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν, πρὸς τῷ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οἷαν χρῆ, τὰ μὲν εἶδῃ τὰ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν (Plato's ἐπιστήμη), περὶ δὲ τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν γυμνασθῆναι (Plato's μελέτη). The correspondence is quite remarkable, particularly if, passing over the essentials of the good teacher which have already been dealt with, we proceed to the last sentence of Isocrates' paragraph (295 A1) καθ' ὃ δ' ἂν ἐλλειφθῇ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀνάγκη ταύτῃ χεῖρον διακείσθαι τοὺς πλησιάζοντας. (Plato's ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλίπης τούτων etc.)

Socrates continues (269 D6) ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη does not lie in the direction of Tisias or Thrasymachus (or, by implication, of Isocrates). We must take as our example Pericles, the greatest of orators (269 E1). He devoted himself to scientific study under Anaxagoras, and Socrates with his usual irony claims that this was the cause of his rhetorical excellence. Ironical as this may appear to be, however, it remains true that the orator must study φύσις. As the doctor studies the φύσις of the body, so the orator must study the φύσις of the soul, to find out how he may best work upon the souls of those who listen to him. Once again Isocrates is made to pay for his use of the word ψυχαγωγεῖν (271 C10). Ἐπειδὴ λόγον δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οἷσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ψυχὴν ὅσα εἶδη ἔχει. Whatever the experts may say about persuasiveness rather than truth being the virtue of the orator, we cannot agree with them. There is no other way by which a man can become a successful orator than by a long and exhaustive study of souls. That is enough about the τέχνη τε καὶ ἀτεχνία λόγων (274 B2).

What it comes to is this. Taking his own account of the qualities required by a learner of rhetoric, Isocrates is working on wrong lines. He is not teaching them ἐπιστήμη or emphasizing its importance; or at best he is teaching them ἐπιστήμη of entirely unimportant matters (σμικρά), a procedure which he has himself condemned. The refutation of Isocrates' arguments in the *Helen* is complete.

We come now to the second of the two chief topics of this part of the dialogue. Is the writing of discourses a valuable exercise, and is it a subject worth teaching? The story of Theuth, who invented writing for the Egyptians, shows that writing is harmful rather than helpful because it implants λήθη in the soul and makes men δοξόσοφοι ἀντὶ σοφῶν (275 B2). Written discourses, too, are like paintings; they look real enough but they cannot answer questions about themselves. The only discourse which is of value is that ὃς μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῇ (276 A5). As far as the writing of discourses is concerned we may assess its positive value thus. It is a splendid recreation, far superior to symposia and the like, a παγκαλὴ παιδία (276 E1) but infinitely inferior to the καλλίων σπουδὴ (276 E5) which makes a man write his discourses in the soul of a kindred spirit, using the art of dialectic.

There are thus two general criticisms of Isocrates. First, that he does not teach rhetoric properly because he does not make ἐπιστήμη the essential basis of it (in fact he does not teach dialectic), and second, that rhetoric, the art of writing discourses, is of no serious value, because at best it is a παιδία and not a σπουδὴ.

Phaedrus then asks for a summary of the argument—πάλιν δὲ ὑπόμνησόν με πῶς (277 B4)—and Socrates sums up the matter. Firstly the man who does not understand the nature of the souls of men and how to make his discourses fit those souls,

ποικίλη μὲν ποικίλους ψυχῇ, . . . ἀπλους δὲ ἀπλῇ (277 c1)—a further criticism, I think, of the statement of Isocrates in the κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν quoted above, that the orator must be able always δλον τὸν λόγον καταποικίλαι (214 d1)—will not be δύνατος τέχνη οὔτε πρὸς τὸ διδάξαι οὔτε τι πρὸς τὸ πείσαι (277 c4). Secondly (277 d6) if Lysias ἢ τις ἄλλος πώποτε ἔγραψεν ἢ γράψει, ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, σύγγραμμα πολιτικὸν γράφων καὶ μεγάλην τιὰ ἐν αὐτῷ βεβαιότητα ἡγούμενος καὶ σαφήνεια, οὕτω μὲν ὄνειδος τῷ γράφοντι εἴτε τίς φησιν εἴτε μὴ, for ignorance about the nature of justice and injustice, good and evil, is disgraceful to a man even if ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ (another reference to the passage in the *Ad Nicoclem* (24 d3) where Isocrates says τὰ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον οἷς ὁρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χαίροντας).

There is nothing disgraceful, therefore, in writing discourses if we realize that this is only a παιδία. The σπονδαῖος knows that discourses about justice and beauty and goodness implanted first in his own soul and then in the souls of others are the only valuable and lasting discourses. The man who realizes this we will call, not σοφός, for that title belongs to God alone, but φιλόσοφος (278 d). In other words Plato's teaching, and not Isocrates', is φιλοσοφία. Anyone who has nothing better to offer us than his writings we shall be justified in calling (278 e1) ποιητὴν ἢ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον. The objectionable word λογογράφος is avoided, because Plato does not want the association of the word with the law-courts to obscure the issue, but the use of νομογράφος is a stroke of genius.

Finally, so that there may be no doubt about the object of all this criticism, Isocrates is mentioned by name (278 d8). Quite likely, says Socrates, he may make a name for himself as a writer of discourses, if he persists in that occupation, for he has better talent than Lysias. But in fact he might progress to even greater things φύσει γὰρ, ὃ φίλε, ἐνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ (279 a9). Some scholars appear to take this as a friendly reference; but when it was published,¹ which is the relevant point, Isocrates was the world-famous head of a world-famous school and had for years claimed that his teaching was φιλοσοφία. Plato allows that φύσει he has φιλοσοφία τις. Even if we take this as the expressed view of the historic Socrates, it only adds to the sting that Plato thinks fit to recall and publish it now. It is surely the most comprehensive damnation with the faintest possible praise.

R. L. HOWLAND.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

¹ The *Phaedrus* is certainly not an early work. It must have been published after the *Ad Nicoclem* of Isocrates, to which it refers (v. supra), and the *Ad Nicoclem* cannot have been published before 374, the year in which Nicocles succeeded his father Evagoras, and probably appeared about 372. The *Nicocles*, published a few years

later, opens with a long attack on those who decry oratory, and this may be Isocrates' attempt to reply to the *Phaedrus*. The date of the *Phaedrus* would then fall between the dates of these two works of Isocrates, that is approximately between 372 and 368.

THIS pretty little work of the obscure Tymnes has recently¹ been examined by A. Wilhelm in the course of a learned attempt to explain the puzzling phrase *πολλὰ πολλῶν* (if that is how it should be divided and accented). With the result of his research in general I am not now concerned and the interpretation of this epigram does not greatly affect the value of his conclusions; but it seems worth while to point out what I believe to be the right explanation of a curious and much-emended phrase in the second couplet.

As given by our MS. authorities, the four lines of which the poem consists run thus:

εὐθηστρυτωνοσ ἐπ' οὐκ* ἀγαθαῖς ἐλοχεύθη
κληδόσιν· οὐ* γὰρ ἂν ὦδ' ὤλετο δαιμονίη
ἀρτιτόκος· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατήγαγεν ἐν βρέφος Ἄϊδην
σὺν κείνῃ, δεκάτην δ' οὐχ* ὑπερῆρεν ἔω.

* For accentuation see Postgate, *Greek Accent.*, p. 63.

The general sense is clear; the woman died in childbirth, or rather immediately after delivery, and her child survived her less than ten days. In the string of letters which begin the first line (they are variously divided and accented in our authorities, see Stadtmueller's notes in the Teubner edition) it is reasonable to see the name of the woman herself and of her father; I agree here with Wilhelm, who would read, combining older suggestions, *Εὐθήτη Γρύτωνος*, though, like him, I do not regard this restoration as certain in its details. We thus have the full name of the deceased, as a real epitaph would give it, and I see no reason why these lines should not have been inscribed on an actual tomb. The first couplet then means, 'In evil hour was Eue the daughter of Gryton (?) brought to bed; else had she not, hapless one, died with her child just born.' The chief difficulty lies in the following words.

Setting aside a number of more or less wild conjectures, I now examine Wilhelm's own reading and interpretation, which are at least sober. He supposes that *τὰ δὲ πολλὰ* means 'und was viel, zu viel ist,' and emends the rest of the line to *κατήγεν ἰδὼν βρέφος Ἄϊδης*. It seems to me that his explanation, whether possible in itself or not, is inapplicable here and all emendation unnecessary.

If we take the words as they are handed down to us, they are unobjectionable in grammar at all events, and mean 'and the one baby brought down the many to Hades with her (the mother), and did not outlive the tenth dawn.' The difficulty is to explain what 'the many' are. That they are meant to be contrasted with 'the one' is, however, clear both from the juxtaposition of the words and the good epic use of the article to indicate contrast.² It seems therefore inevitable that we should supply *βρέφη*, and understand that 'the one babe was the death of the many babes.' These 'many' other children I take to be those whom the mother would have borne later if she had lived. We know nothing about her; it is quite possible that the poet did, and had heard that she belonged to a healthy and fertile stock, so that several children were a reasonable prospect when she married. If we so understand the words, not only is no alteration of the text called for but we get that favourite figure of all ancient rhetoric, the triad. There were three disasters which befell that sorely tried house: first, the wife herself died; second, all hopes of the family her husband had looked forward to vanished; and, last and (to a Greek with the racial desire for posterity) worst, the one child whose life had cost hers proved but a feeble little creature and died soon after her; a veritable *τρικυμία*.

H. J. ROSE.

THE UNIVERSITY, ST. ANDREWS.

¹ A. Wilhelm in *Symbolae Osloenses*, fasc. xiv (1935), 1-21; the epigram is discussed on pp. 15-17.

² See Monro, *Homeric Grammar*, ed. 2, p. 223, par. 260.

NOTES ON SOME ASTRONOMICAL PASSAGES OF CLAUDIAN.

Carm. VII. 162-171 (De Tert. Cons. Honor.):

nec plura locutus,

sicut erat, liquido signavit tramite nubes,
ingrediturque globum Lunae limenque relinquit
Arcados et Veneris clementes advolat auras.
hinc Phoebi permensus iter flammamque nocentem
Gradivi, placidumque Iovem : stetit arce suprema,
algenti qua zona riget Saturnia tractu.
machina laxatur caeli rutilaeque patescunt
sponte fores. Arctoa parat convexa Bootes,
Australes reserat portas succinctus Orion.

THEODOSIUS, having entrusted his son Honorius to the care of Stilicho, is imagined as mounting to heaven for apotheosis. His route is in accord with the conception of the Universe held by Claudian, i.e. the Ciceronian view—that the earth lies motionless at the mid-centre of an enveloping and revolving celestial sphere to the inner surface of which are attached the *fixed stars*. Between the circumference of this sphere and the central earth are the spheres of the seven *planets*. These are seven spheres of different sizes, one inside the other, having a common centre in the earth, rotating on an axis slightly inclined to the celestial axis, and moving contrary to the motion of the celestial sphere. Each planet was fixed at a point on the equator of its own sphere which carried it round at a uniform speed. These equators therefore mark the orbits of the planets and may be viewed as seven concentric rings laterally girdling the earth in a plane slightly inclined to the plane of the celestial equator. In descending order, the planets are Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon. For Theodosius they make convenient stages in his journey. Cf. Cicero, *Somnium Scipionis* IV. 1-3, novem tibi orbibus vel potius globis conexas sunt omnia, quorum unus est extumus qui reliquos omnes complectitur, summus ipse deus, arcens et continens ceteros, in quo sunt infixi illi qui volvuntur stellarum cursus sempiterni. cui subiecti sunt septem qui versantur retro contrario motu atque caelo. e quibus unum globum possidet illa quam in terris Saturniam nominant, deinde est hominum generi prosperus et salutaris ille fulgor qui dicitur Iovis, tum rutilus horribilisque terris quem Martium dicitis, deinde subter mediam fere regionem sol obtinet . . . hunc ut comites consequuntur Veneris alter, alter Mercurii cursus, in infimoque orbe luna radiis solis accensa convertitur. For the same journey described in the reverse direction to that taken by Theodosius, cf. Manil. V. 1 seq., hic alius finisset iter signisque relatis | . . . non ultra struxisset opus caeloque rediret | ac per descensum medios percurreret ignes | Saturni Iovis et Martis Solisque, sub illis | post Venerem et Maia genitum te, Luna, vagantem.

In describing the planets Claudian varies his language, using phrases which are sometimes applicable to the spheres of the planets and sometimes to their orbits. When he speaks of *globum Lunae*, he means not the disc or even the orbit of the Moon, but the sphere such as I have described above (cf. Cic. *N.D.* II. § 47, ex solidis globus, sic enim σφαῖραν interpretari placet : ex planis autem circulus aut orbis, qui κύκλος Graece dicitur). So *Phoebi iter* means the orbit of the Sun : *zona Saturni*

means the space or διάστημα between the celestial sphere and the sphere of Jupiter : and *limen Arcados* in this context means the upper boundary of the διάστημα of Mercury where it marches with the zone of Venus.

As Theodosius nears the end of his upward journey, he reaches the revolving sphere of the fixed stars which the poet terms *machina caeli*. Here (like Nero in Lucan I. 53-54) he has the choice of the Northern or Southern hemisphere in which to fix his celestial abode : the constellations Bootes and Orion, as a deputation representing the Northern and Southern sky respectively, invite him to say in which hemisphere he may prefer to be stellified—ll. 172-174, *invitantque novum sidus pendentque vicissim | quas partes velit ipse sequi, quibus esse sodalis | dignetur stellis aut qua regione morari*.

LIMEN . . . ARCADOS : The Delphin edition makes the error of referring *Arcas* here to Callisto's son Arcas, who was transferred to heaven as Arctophylax, the Bear-Warden. But, of course, Claudian means Mercury, who because born on Mt. Cyllene in Arcadia is by poets called *Cyllenius* or *Arcas*. Cf. Claudian, *c.m.* 44. 4, *debilis Arcas*.

VENERIS CLEMENTES AURAS : Cf. Servius on Virg. *Georg.* I. 335, *sciendum est . . . de quinque planetis duos esse noxios, Martem et Saturnum, duos bonos, Iovem et Venerem : Mercurius vero talis est qualis ille cui iungitur*.

STETIT ARCE SUPREMA, ARGENTI QUA ZONA RIGET SATURNIA TRACTU : Birt in his index (s.v. *zona*) makes the mistake of explaining *zona* here as a zone of the earth, like *Carm.* 15. 148, *zona rubens crescat* or *c.m.* 28. 9, *flammiferæ patiens zonæ*. But the poet only means that the zone of Saturn, as the outermost, is the coldest. Cf. *Vitr. de Arch.* IX. 1. 16, *Saturni autem (stella) quod est proxima extremo mundo et tangit congelatas caeli regiones, vehementer est frigida*. Cf. *Cic. N.D.* II. 119, and *Macrobi. Somn. Scip.* I. 20. 8.

ARCTOA PARAT CONVEXA BOOTES : Here Crépin, the latest French translator, has a note (vol. i, p. 321, note 35) which makes an astonishing error in astronomy—'Bootes, le Bouvier, constellation boréale qui n'évolue que lentement puisqu'elle pivote autour de l'Arcture.' Bootes like all Northern constellations circles round the Pole Star and moves slowly because he has only a small circuit to make as compared with the much wider circle made in the same time by constellations near the equator. As for his pivoting round Arcturus, it is only necessary to say that Arcturus is itself a star in the constellation of Bootes.

Carm. XV. 223 (*Bell. Gildon.*):

*circulus ut patuit Lunae, secuere meatus
diversos.*

The two deified Theodosii (ll. 215-216, duo divorum proceres, maiorque minorque Theodosii) are descending from heaven to bring peace and reconciliation to their distracted Empire, now divided by the jealousies of the Eastern and Western rulers, Arcadius and Honorius. Coming from the celestial sphere, they must of course pass the orbits of the seven planets. Claudian with characteristic rapidity shortens the journey which he had already fully described in the outward direction, and brings them to the Moon, which is *προσγειωτάτη τῶν πλανήτων*. 'When the orbit of the moon extended before them', they parted company, the grandfather passing along the orbit westwards so as to approach Rome, the father making eastwards for Constantinople. *circulus* here cannot mean the globe or disc of the planet, but is used of the planetary orbit as at *Macrobius, Somn. Scip.* I. 19. 6, *circulus per quem sol discurrit*—a usage which is very frequent.

Carm. XXIV. 135 (*De Consul. Stilichonis III.*):

Quae septem scopulis zonas imitatur Olympi.

Ro
seven :
273-274
not be
And Ba
zones o
solas.
Fo
iret per

Ra

Pl
(globus)
the ter
eternal
modern
21. 33.
divina
sicut a

Ca

I a
the poe
in Stilic
argume
Clemen
elemen
Ovid. M
nonne
per aev

Bu
Iovis zo
Jupiter
who is
and fie
Cic. N.
interiec
rigentis
ideoque
Iovem
circum
temper
shall sh
abode f

Rome imitates the planetary zones of heaven only in that her hills also number seven: it is only the numerical parallel that interests Claudian. Cf. Manil. III. 273-274, Nilus . . . erumpens imitatur sidera mundi per septem fauces. There cannot be any reference to the *septizonium* or *septemzodium*, as was suggested by Claverius. And Barthius seems confused between the seven orbits of the planets and the five zones of the sky when he writes: tot numero zonas statuunt nonnulli, alii quinque solas.

For *scopuli* = hills, cf. *In Rufin.* II. 122 (of Xerxes crossing Athos), cum classibus iret per scopulos.

Rapt. Proserp. II. 297-299:

cuncta tuis pariter cedent animalia regnis
lunari subiecta globo, qui septimus auras
ambit et aeternis mortalia separat astris.

Pluto will grant Proserpine full sovereignty over all that lies within the sphere (*globus*) of the Moon, which as the seventh (*septimus*) of the planetary spheres encloses the terrestrial atmosphere (*auras ambit*) and therefore is the frontier between the eternal and the mortal. This explanation of *auras ambit* (which one of the ablest of modern editors translates as 'etherial journey') is supported by Macrobius. *Somm. Scip.* I. 21. 33, omnia haec, quae de summo ad lunam usque perveniunt, sacra incorrupta divina sunt; . . . infra lunam et aer et natura permutationis pariter incipiunt, et sicut aetheris et aeris ita divinorum et caducorum luna confinium est.

Carm. XXII. 6-8 (*De Cons. Stil.* II):

principio magni custos Clementia mundi,
quae Iovis incoluit zonam, quae temperat aethram
frigoris et flammae medio.

I agree with Gesner and with the Loeb editor that, in speaking of Clementia, the poet has in mind partly the personification of the *Clementia Caesaris* now residing in Stilicho, and partly (as Gesner puts it) 'illud *νείκος καὶ φιλία*, illa discordia concors, argumentum primum physicae Empedoclis, Heracliti etc.', and again 'puto Clementiam poetae nostro hic esse illam virtutem dei, quae pugnantia inter se elementa veteris Chæti moderatione et temperamento indicto concordie pace, ut ait Ovid. *Met.* I. 25, ligavit'. The same idea is expressed by Claudian at VIII. 284-286, nonne vides, operum quod se pulcherrimus ipse | mundus amore liget, nec vi conexa per ævum | conspirent elementa sibi.

But why is this moderating peace-maker represented as having once inhabited *Iovis zonam*? I think that Claudian quite arbitrarily places Clementia in the zone of Jupiter because he thinks that this is the appropriate part of heaven for a goddess who is not an extremist but a conciliator. Jupiter as coming between cold Saturn and fiery Mars is often described as a mean between the characteristics of each. Cic. *N.D.* II. 118, cum summa (stella) Saturni refrigeret, media Martis incendat, his interiecta Iovis illustret et temperet. Pliny *N.H.* II. 8, Saturni sidus gelidae ac rigentis esse naturae, . . . tertium Martis ignei, ardentis a solis vicinitate, . . . ideoque huius ardore nimio et rigore Saturni, interiectum duobus ex utroque temperari Iovem salutaremque fieri. Vitruvius, IX. 1. 16, Iovis (stella) cum inter utriusque circumitiones habeat cursum, a refrigeratione caloreque earum medio convenientes temperatissimosque habere videtur effectus. Similarly at *Carm.* III. 363-366, as I shall show later, Claudian selected the zodiacal sign Virgo as the appropriate celestial abode for the maiden Justitia.

Carm. XXI. 174-180 (*De Cons. Stil.* I):

tu si glaciale iuberēs
vestigare fretum, securo milite ducti
stagna reluctantēs quaterent Saturnia remi:
si deserta Noti, fontem si quaerere Nili,
Aethiopum medios penetrassent vela vapores.

Claudian, as so often, is contrasting for rhetorical effect the extremes of Northern and Southern climate. But what is the meaning of *Saturnia*, a usage which in a context of this kind is (I believe) without parallel?

Housman's note on *Manil.* IV. 501, *Saturnusue suam glaciem*, shows that the quality which the ancients generally attributed to the planet Saturn was coldness. Claudian has already at VII. 168 said, *argenti qua zona riget Saturnia tractu*; and perhaps he has also in mind such a passage as *Germ. Aratea*, Frag. III, ll. 23-28 (*P.L.M.* vol. i, p. 189), describing the general influence of Saturn in whichever sign of the Zodiac he happens to be: *haec ut quisque deus possedit numine signa, | adiungunt proprias vires. torpere videntur | omnia Saturno: rarus ille exprimit ignes | et siccas hiemes adstrictis perficit undis. | grandine durantur pluviae, nive grando putrescit | et rigor accedit ventis*. So Claudian, in describing the *glaciale fretum*, by a bold association of ideas applies to the remotest and coldest sea the chief characteristic of the coldest and remotest planet, and coins the phrase *Saturnia stagna* in the sense of 'waters as cold as Saturn'.

This is the only explanation that is feasible. It is hinted at by Birt in his Index. But the notes of other editors and translators are misleading and unsatisfactory. Gesner: 'mare illud ad septentriones glaciale . . . quod idem Κρόνιον vocabant, hoc est Saturnium.' But the only instance I know of Κρόνιος applied to a sea is with ἄλς at *Ap. Rhod.* IV. 327 and 509, where it means the Adriatic. Delphin: 'Cronium seu Saturnium ob planetam Saturnum ibi potentius dominantem': but there is no evidence whatsoever to support this statement. Crépin (vol. ii, p. 361, note 4): 'la mer hyperboréenne ou glaciale, que le poète appelle *stagna Saturnia* parcequ'elle est placée sous l'astre de Saturne.' This is utterly wrong, for Saturn, though the outermost of the planets, never leaves the plane of the ecliptic and never moves further North or South than the two tropics. Cf. *Macrobius Somn. Scip.* I. 21. 9-10, *Aegyptorum enim retro maiores . . . deprehenderunt, universis vel stellis vel sideribus infixis caelo, solas cum sole et luna quinque stellas vagari, nec has tamen per omnes caeli partes passim ac sine certa erroris sui lege discurrere, nunquam denique ad septentrionalem verticem deviare, nunquam ad australis poli ima demergi, sed intra unius obliqui circi limitem omnes habere discursus*.

Carm. XXII. 433-440 (*De Cons. Stil.* II):

mansura verendus
scribit iura senex, numeros qui dividit astris
et cursus stabilesque moras, quibus omnia vivunt
et pereunt fixis cum legibus. ille recenset,
incertum quid Martis iter, certumque Tonantis
prospiciat mundo; quid velox semita Lunae
pigraque Saturni; quantum Cytherea sereno
curriculo Phoebique comes Cyllenius erret.

NUMEROS QUI DIVIDIT ASTRIS ET CURSUS STABILESQUE MORAS: What is the meaning of *numeros*? If no special sense is given to *astris*, I think that *numeros* here means 'rank', 'rating', 'classification', 'degrees of magnitude'—an interpretation somewhat akin to the second half of Servius' note on *Virg. Georg.* 1. 137, *navita tum stellis numeros et nomina fecit*, where he says, 'aut certe re vera ait numeros, nam Hip-

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parchus scripsit de signis et commemoravit etiam unumquodque signum *quot claras, quot secundae lucis, quot obscuras stellas habeat*. This view would seem to be supported by Claudian's own use of the verb *numero* at *Carm.* VIII. 136, *quantus numeratur nocte Bootes*, where a bright new star visible by day is said to be 'as large as Bootes is classified as being by night'.

What then of *cursus stabilesque moras*? Possibly the words are used to make a distinction between the *planets* which revolve independently in their orbits and the *fixed stars* which, though carried round by the diurnal motion of the celestial sphere, yet do not change their position in relation to each other. The celestial sphere is therefore called *ἀπλανής* as in Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* II. 4. 8, *prima illa stellifera (sphaera) quae proprio nomine caelum dicitur et ἀπλανής apud Graecos vocatur*.

But another interpretation of these words seems possible. It is to be noticed that the tone of the passage is astrological and that *only planets* are mentioned by name. This is appropriate, for it is largely owing to the changing position of the planets in the zodiacal circle that different conjunctions and *mixturae* are created for astrologers to interpret. This is particularly true of the five planets proper, apart from the sun and moon. Cf. Seneca, *Cons. ad Marc.* 18, *videbis quinque sidera diversas agentia vias et in contrarium praecipiti mundo nitentia: ex horum levissimis motibus fortunae populorum dependent, et maxima et minima perinde formantur, prout aequum iniquumve sidus incessit*. I think therefore that the *astra* here referred to are the planets. (That this is a permissible use of *astra* is shown by Housman, *Manil.* V, p. 119, note 58.) What of *numeros*? It must be remembered that the poet is describing the cave of Time and I suggest that perhaps he may have in mind such a passage as Plato, *Timaeus* 36b and 38c, where the narrator describes how God resolved to form a movable image of eternity on the principle of numbers which we call time: *ἡλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα ἄστρον, ἐπὶ κλῆν ἔχοντα πλανῆται, εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνον γέγονε*. Plato makes the radii of the planetary orbits proportional to the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 27. Consequently we have the different periods required for the revolution of the different planets thus spaced out, and ultimately the *annus magnus* which is completed when all the revolutions return to the same point in the heavens at the same time. I venture to think that it is to these numerical ratios which fix the planetary intervals that Claudian refers in this passage. Cf. Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* II. 2. 1, *hinc Plato, postquam et Pythagoricae successionem doctrinae et ingenii proprii divina profunditate cognovit nullam esse posse sine his numeris iugabilem competentiam, in Timaeo suo mundi animam per istorum numerorum contextionem . . . instituit*. It is the more probable that Claudian should have this in mind as the whole question of planetary intervals and sphere harmonies was much discussed by late authors, e.g. by Pliny *N.H.* II. 84, Censorinus, *De die natali* 13, and even by Sidonius, *Carm.* XV. 51-70.

If the whole passage be taken as referring to the planets alone, the phrase *cursus stabilesque moras* fits in perfectly. By *cursus* Claudian means the revolution of the planets in their respective orbits within the limits of the Zodiac. Nor is *stabiles moras* inconsistent with this, for it describes the phenomenon of retrogression in which, to an observer from the earth, a planet appears to slow down in its course, stop, curve backwards, then recover and advance. The illusion is, of course, caused by the comparative speed of the earth's motion on its small orbit as contrasted with the small distance which, in the same time, an outer planet (for example) will appear to travel on its great circuit. Cic. *N.D.* II. 103, *eae stellae, quas vagas dicimus, circum terram feruntur . . . quarum motus tum incitantur, tum retardantur, saepe etiam insistent*. Firm. Matern. I. 4. 5, *solis ac lunae et ceterarum stellarum (quae a nobis errantes, a Graecis vero planetae dicuntur) cursus, regressus, stationes; § 11, nunc directo cursu, nunc retrogrado, nunc stativa tarditate subsistunt*.

QUIBUS OMNIA VIVUNT AC PEREUNT FIXIS CUM LEGIBUS: I take *astris* to be the

antecedent of *quibus*: the intention of the passage is astrological, and it is the changing relations of the planets with each other and with the zodiacal signs that create the ineluctable decrees of fate which govern life and death throughout the Universe. Firm. Matern. I. XI. 2, hanc mortium nobis varietatem fata describunt: haec sunt illa stellarum decreta . . . : hinc constat ortum finemque vitae, actus etiam nostros universos . . . fatalis necessitatis inevitabili sententia contineri. I do not agree with Birt in punctuating with a comma after *pereunt* so as to take *fixis cum legibus* with *dividit*. For, though this gives a good sense, I feel that the tenor of the passage is against such an arrangement. Claudian is here stressing not the regularity of movement in the universe, but the inescapable certitude of the decrees of the stars.

INCERTUM QUID MARTIS ITER CERTUMQUE TONANTIS PROSPICIAT MUNDO: The ancients with their idea of a geocentric Universe found it difficult to account for the manifest irregularity of Mars' path in the sky, which varied much more than that of Jupiter or Saturn, the other outer planets. This was not satisfactorily explained by such ingenious mathematical theories as Eudoxus' homocentric spheres or the epicycles evolved by Hipparchus and Ptolemy. Not till 1604 was the problem finally solved when Kepler, working on the theory of a heliocentric Universe, discovered that the form of the orbit of Mars is *not circular*, but *eccentric*, in fact a perfect ellipse. By Claudian these eccentric irregularities in the motion of Mars are described in the phrase *incertum iter*.

Birt and Koch print *prospiciat*—quite in accord with Claudian's usage, for he employs the word with the dative in the sense of 'arrange for', 'provide for'. Cf. *Carm.* XVII. 265, Stilicho dum prospicit orbi; XVIII. 485, vestrae tu prospice causae; XXI. 71-72, imperioque ducem nataeque maritum prospiceret; XXIV. 130, consil tantae qui prospicis urbi. This verb of neutral sense is much to be preferred in this context to *proficiat*, which appears in all the older editions and in the recent text of Crépin.

VELOX SEMITA LUNAE PIGRAQUE SATURNI: The poet contrasts the innermost and outermost of the planets, the moon on her orbit near the earth taking just under 28 days to circle the Zodiac, while Saturn on his remote orbit takes 30 years to make the same circuit. Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* I. 21. 6-7, ideo stellae quae per spatia grandiora discurrunt ambitum suum tempore prolixiore conficiunt: quae per augusta, breviora; . . . quod eadem signa (i.e. the Zodiac) Saturnus annis triginta, luna diebus viginti octo ambit et permeat, sola causa in quantitate est circulatorum, quorum alter est maximus alter est minimus.

QUANTUM CYTHEREA SERENO CURRICULO PHOEBIQUE COMES CYLLENUS ERRET: Again, on the generally accepted theory of a geocentric system, the ancients were much puzzled to explain the apparent capriciousness of the planets Venus and Mercury. It was seen that they had an intimate connection with the sun—hence they are often called *Phoebe comites*: they appeared to make the circuit of the Zodiac in about a solar year, travelling with the sun and at the same speed. But there was a strange want of uniformity in their motions. Why, at times overtaking the sun, were they at other times overtaken by him? Why at one time of the year did Venus as Evening Star set after the sun, then later in the year rapidly pass him and rise before him as the Morning Star? And why do Venus and Mercury not move in orbits as independent of the sun as those of the other planets? Plato clearly thought Venus and Mercury to differ in some important way from the other planets when in the *Timaeus* (36D) he says that they have 'the contrary tendency to the sun'—τὴν δ' ἐναντίαν εἰληχότας αὐτῷ δύναμιν—which cannot mean that they move through the ecliptic in a direction contrary to the sun, but probably refers to the very rapid movement of Venus, for example, from her greatest *Eastern* elongation as Evening Star to her greatest *Western* elongation as Morning Star. [See Dreyer, *Planetary Systems*, p. 68, and Mayor's excellent quotation from Herschel in his note on Cic.

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N.D. II. 51.] It is surely to these apparently erratic movements (unintelligible except in a heliocentric Universe) that Claudian is referring in the words *quantum . . . errat*. Cf. Firm. Matern. I. 4. 8, Veneris etiam et Mercurii cotidiana nobis obsequia monstrata sunt; hae enim stellae brevi interiecto spatio circa solis orbem currunt pariter aut sequuntur aut una subsequens stella alteri praeuendi concedit obsequia. Scimus quando vespertino, quando matutino ortu nobis appareant, quando solis orbe absconsae lateant, quando ex radii eius fulgore liberatae lucido sui nitore praeefuleant.

To sum up then, Claudian describes the *verendus senex* outside the abode of Time as assigning to the planets the numbers which fix the ratio of their distance from the central earth, and as meting out to them their courses and their occasional *stationes* and *regressus*: for it is the influence of the planets (modified by their position in the Zodiac, their advance, or their retrogression) that creates the immutable law of destiny for all mortal beings. As an example of how the *senex* proceeds to learn the decrees of the stars before entering their *mansura iura* in the book of Fate, the poet represents him as reviewing (*recenset*) the orbit of Mars, well known to be irregular, and the orbit of Jupiter, which by comparison is regular, as calculating the effect of the slowly moving outermost planet Saturn, and of the rapidly moving innermost planet the Moon, and as estimating the elongation of the two inner planets closely associated with the Sun.

In explaining the astronomy of this passage, no editor of Claudian gives any useful help except Gesner, who, thanks to his contemporary Johann Tobias Meyer, the distinguished German astronomer, has given the correct explanation of *incertum . . . Martis iter*.

Carm. XVII. 103-105 (*Paneg. Manl. Theod. Cons.*):

sidera cur septem retro nitantur in ortus
obluctata polo, variisne meatibus idem
arbiter an geminae convertant aethera mentes.

No astronomical point is perhaps more often mentioned in Roman poetry than the contrary motion of the planets, which seem ceaselessly to revolve on their orbits in a direction opposed to that of the celestial sphere. The fixed stars, attached to the inner surface of the celestial sphere, are carried round in even progression once daily by the revolution of that sphere from East to West. The planets too have a *diurnal* motion which must be accounted for by assuming that the daily rotation of the sphere of the fixed stars drags the planets along with it from East to West. But the planets have also a *separate and independent motion* which they pursue, each on its own orbit and at its own velocity, from West to East. It is this motion which, for example, brings about the lunar month and the solar year: for it is in the period of a month and a year respectively that the moon and sun, travelling from West to East backwards through the constellations, appear to make a complete circuit of the Zodiac. Claudian here distinguishes between the diurnal motion of the celestial sphere (*polus*) and the orbital motion of the planets. *Cic. N.D.* II. 49, duo . . . genera siderum, quorum alterum spatiis immutabilibus ab ortu ad occasum commeans nullum unquam cursus sui vestigium inflectat, alterum autem continuas conversiones duas isdem spatiis cursibusque conficiat. *Vitruvius*, IX. 1-5, ea autem signa (the Zodiac) cum sint numero XII partesque duodecimas singula possideant mundi, versenturque ab oriente ad occidentem continenter, tunc per ea signa contrario cursu luna, stella Mercurii, Veneris, ipse sol, itemque Martis et Iovis et Saturni, ut per graduum ascensionem percurrentes, alius alia circumitionis magnitudine ab occidente ad orientem in mundo pervagantur. Cf. also *Manil.* I. 805-808, and *Macrob. Somn. Scip.* I. 18. 2 and II. 4. 8.

From a recognition of these opposing movements there arises easily the next

question which Claudian imagines Manlius as investigating. If the sphere of the fixed stars rotates from East to West and if the orbital motion of the planets is from West to East, does this indicate dual control of the Universe? Who controls these double motions—one supreme governor or two intelligences? What accounts for *rerum concordia discors*?

Carm. XVII. 126-131 (*Paneg. Manl. Theod. Cons.*):

invenit aethrios signantem pulvere cursus,
quos pia sollicito deprehendit pollice Memphis:
quae moveant momenta polum, quam certus in astris
error, quis tenebras solis causisque meantem
defectum indicat numerus, quae linea Phoebe
damnet et excluso pallentem fratre relinquat.

ATHERIOS SIGNANTEM PULVERE CURSUS: The maiden Iustitia, on descending from the Zodiac to persuade the philosopher Manlius Theodorus to re-enter public life, finds him engaged in plotting on an abacus the motions of the heavenly bodies. The idea of an abacus is suggested by the phrase *signantem pulvere* and again in l. 134 by *scriptaeque notas confundit harenae*. Cf. Cic. *N.D.* II. 48, *nunquam eruditum illum pulverem attigistis* (on which see Mayor's excellent and exhaustive note). See also Conington's note on Persius, I. 131, *abaco numeros et secto in pulvere metas*. I have sometimes wondered whether Claudian's *Senex Veronensis* may not have used a home-made abacus and stilus for his calculations—*qui baculo nitens in qua reptavit arena | unius numerat saecula longa casae*.

QUOS PIA SOLLICITO DEPRENDIT POLLICE MEMPHIS: He appears to use Memphis in the more general sense of Egypt: and the epithet *pia* suggests the priestly character of the early Egyptian observers who first established the scientific study of astronomy. In the phrase *sollicito pollice* the poet again, I think, refers to marks on an abacus made by a stilus or graphium held against the thumb. Cf. *c.m.* 40, 1-3, *quid rear, adfatus quod non mihi dirigit ullos | nec redit alterno pollice ducta salus?*, *scribendine labor? sed quae tam prona facultas?* Here the sense is clearly 'a greeting, in answer to mine, written by your hand'. A similar usage is found in Ovid, *Heroid.* XVII. 266, *littera iam lasso pollice sistat opus*, where (as Palmer explains) the sense is 'your thumb tired with holding the heavy stilus'. The adjective *sollicito* denotes the scientific care with which the Egyptian priests plotted and recorded in their diagrams the motions of the heavens. Cf. *c.m.* 29, 1-3, *quisquis sollicita mundum ratione secutus | semina rimatur rerum, quo luna laborat | defectu, quae causa iubet pallescere solem*. . . . I venture to think that this rendering of *sollicito pollice* is more in keeping with the context than the sense 'curious opera' given by both Heinsius and the Delphin and recently adopted by Crépin 'par de savantes études', or than the translation given by Nisard 'par de savants calculs' and followed by the Loeb editor 'by anxious reckoning'.

CERTUS IN ASTRIS ERROR: 'The controlled vagaries of the planets' or, as Macrobius puts the same idea (*Somn. Scip.* I. 14. 25), *vagantium stellarum error legitimus*. Cf. Cic. *N.D.* II. 51, *maxime vero sunt admirabiles motus earum quinque stellarum quae falso vocantur errantes*. Nihil enim errat, quod in omni aeternitate conservat progressus et regressus reliquosque motus constantes et ratos.

CAUSISQUE MEANTEM DEFECTUM INDICAT NUMERUS: That is, 'mathematical calculation proclaims a solar eclipse', which is a phenomenon '*causis meantem*', 'resulting from physical causes'—in other words, scientifically predictable, not an ominous or miraculous occurrence. Cf. Cic. *Div.* II. 18, *solis defectiones, itemque lunae, praedicuntur in multis annos ab eis qui siderum cursus et motus numeris persequuntur*. ea enim praedicunt quae naturae necessitas perfectura est.

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I see no reason why Birt should boggle at *causis meantem* which only means 'rational, not haphazard'. In his *apparatus criticus* he gives a great variety of proposed emendations: 'quantusque Gronovius, lucisque Jeeplus, pausisque Buechelerus; spatiis vel circlisque temptavi, cf. Plin. II. 56, *defectum redire in suos orbes* et II. 86 *circulum per quem meat*; quis tenebras casus solisque meantem Camers'. None of these suggestions makes good sense and, one and all, they are unnecessary. The best commentary on *causis meantem* is to be found in Livy's account of C. Sulpicius Gallus' speech to his troops before the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C. Livy 44. 37. 5 seqq., castris permunitis, C. Sulpicius Gallus, tribunus militum secundae legionis . . . consulis permissu ad contionem militibus vocatis pronuntiavit, nocte proxima, ne quis id pro portento acciperet, ab hora secunda usque ad quartam horam noctis lunam defecturam esse: id, quia naturali ordine statis temporibus fiat, et sciri ante et praedici posse.

QUAE LINEA PHOEBEN DAMNET: 'the line that crossed is the doom of Phoebe'. Claudian means the line of the ecliptic: when moon, earth and sun (in that order) are in the one line and in the same plane, then the moon should be at the full because directly opposite the sun, but must be eclipsed because the earth intervenes. Why then is the moon not eclipsed every month? Because the moon's orbit is inclined at an angle of 5° to the plane of the ecliptic, so that she passes sometimes above, and sometimes below, the line joining earth and sun: consequently she can be eclipsed only when, at the full, she happens to be at one of the two nodal points where her orbit intersects the plane of the ecliptic. To determine when this will occur is a matter for astronomical or mathematical calculation: and it is upon this problem that Claudian represents Manlius as engaged when the goddess finds him.

The ancients allowed for the inclination of the moon's orbit by making the Zodiac a belt of sky enclosing a narrow strip on either side of the line of the ecliptic—in fact, just sufficient to include the breadth of the zodiacal signs. Cf. Macrob. *Somn. Scip.* I. 15. 9 seqq., *natura caelestium circulorum incorporalis est linea quae ita mente concipitur ut sola longitudine censeatur, latum habere non possit: sed in zodiaco latitudinem signorum capacitas exigebat. quantum igitur spatii lata dimensio porrectis sideribus occupabat, duabus lineis limitatum est: et tertia ducta per medium ecliptica vocatur quia cum cursum suum in eadem linea pariter sol et luna conficiunt, alterius eorum necesse est evenire defectum: solis si ei tunc luna succedat, lunae si tunc adversa sit soli.*

W. H. SEMPLÉ.

READING UNIVERSITY.

(To be concluded.)

CRITICAL NOTES ON JOSEPHUS' *ANTIQUITIES*.

THE text of *Antiquities* I-X is preserved by a number of Greek MSS, none older than the eleventh century. That Niese in his great critical edition, relying as was then the custom of editors on a particular MS, attached too much importance to R (Paris fourteenth century) generally followed by O (Bodleian fifteenth century), is shown by Naber (Teubner 1888-92). But neither can any editor to-day follow without reserve the other family MSP. The latter usually give a longer text than the former, e.g. VI. 2, 61, 82 etc. But the combination ROM generally produces a satisfactory reading.

Neither editor however has, in reconstituting the text, fully used the Latin version made under the direction of Cassiodorus¹ after A.D. 540, from a Greek MS at least six or seven centuries older than any we now possess. That this itself was not faultless is clear (cp. III. 8): but except for certain striking cases to be found in Niese, the Latin version is still largely an unexplored field. It generally confirms the better Greek MSS, cp. VI. 178 *πρεσβύτερος* ROM, *senior* Lat.; it is helpful with proper names, in which even its corruptions point the way to emendation; it is useful in indicating and filling lacunae; and it often turns the scale in favour of the longer text of MSP.

The following are corrections of the Teubner text:

I. 44. The construction of τὴν αἰσχύνην . . . ὑπῆρχε as it stands is difficult ('served to quicken their intelligence' Thackeray). Lat. has *causa erat*. J. probably wrote ὀξύτης <αὐτοῖς αἰτίον> καὶ διανοίας.

314. ὑπεδέξατο καὶ παράσχοι. ὑποδέξατο should be read, because the variation of mood is not Josephan.

II. 58. Περὶφρῆς δέ . . . The meaning is 'to disbelieve what *she* said and *he* saw'. Lat. has *ipse*; so J. wrote καὶ <αὐτὸς> εἶδεν.

112. προστιθέναι seems incomplete. Lat. has *his malis*; J. probably wrote <τούτοις τοῖς κακοῖς> προστιθέναι.

III. 15. γίνονται with subj. 'the Israelites' is wrong. γίνονται with subj. ἡ μνήμη should be read: ἐκεῖνα = τὰ προῖκηγμένα.

31. The sentence ἀμύνει . . . ἀπορίαν is as it stands unsatisfactory. Lat. is unhelpful. The best solution is τοῖς ταύτῃ νεμομένοις [ἐκ] τῶν ἄλλων ἀπορίαν.

40. Lat. *quorum quinque reges* suggests πέντε ὄντες for πέμποντες.

121. Τοῦτο μέντοι . . . συνέχεν, ἀλλά. After μέντοι insert <οὐ μόνον>, cp. XX. 256 for a similar omission.

190. Τὸν δικαίωτερον . . . εἰδώς, ὥς. μάλλον is superfluous and may be excluded, and ὄντα may be added. Lat. supports εἰδώς ὥς.

226. προήκοντας. Lat. *maiores*. The meaning is 'older' and <ἡλικίᾳ> προήκοντας should be read as in XVIII. 12.

231. ἐς τοῦτο is impossible. 'Into sin' (Thackeray). εἰς ἁμαρτάδα προπεσών seems required.

290. To the clause τοῦ μὲν ἄρρενος (unless μὲν is omitted) a corresponding δέ clause with a number may well have fallen out. <τῆς δὲ θηλείας> . . .

305. Niese's insertion of πείθειν after εἶχεν is essential, though neither Naber nor Thackeray accepts it.

¹ *De Inst. Div. Lit.* c. 17 'Hunc (Josephum) ab amicis nostris, quoniam est subtilis nimis et multiplex, magno labore in libris uiginti duobus (Ant. I-XX, s. Ap. II) conuerti fecimus in Latinum'.

IV. 59. εἰς χρόνον 'the trouble seemed likely to be chronic' (Thackeray). Either εἰς χρόνον <πολύν> or εἰς αἰῶνα.

180. There is MS corruption. παρέχειν is better than παρέχοντες: a stop after παραινῶ, and γάρ after οὐ.

189. ὥστε τοῦ. ὥστε is probably only a gloss on τοῦ.

316. πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν . . . <καὶ> φροντίδα makes one of the synonymous doublets beloved by J. So omit κατά.

V. 132. A comparison with 179 τοῦ κόσμον τῆς πολιτείας, 186. τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῆς κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν, and III. 84 enables us to restore: ὑπὸ τρυφῆς καὶ ἡδονῆς, τοῦ κόσμου ὀλιγώρου τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ τῶν νόμων οὐκέτ' ἦσαν ἀκριβεῖς ἀκραταί.

233. After παρ' αὐτῶν a lacuna should be marked with the sense 'hires certain rascals'.

VI. 21. θεραπεύοντες αὐτήν. Lat. *las purgantes* suggests αὐτάς, i.e. τὰς ψυχάς.

31. Marcus' ἐκάστοις for αὐτοῖς is probable, and may be read if <τριχῶ> (cp. 79) is inserted before διακοσμήσας. But δις τοῦ ἔτους departs from Scripture, and δι' ἔτους meaning 'every year' should be retained.

68. From Ant. IV. 95 we see that in invading Gilead the first thing is to cross the Jabbok. So διαβάς <τὸν Ἰάβακχον>. It is quite unlikely that διαβάς is corrupt.

155. πυνθανομένον. 'And when the prisoner asked what manner of death his would be' (Marcus) has no real support from LXX. J. frequently uses πῶς=ὡς. Agag was not inquiring but lamenting about death. πενθοῦντος would hardly do: so perhaps ὀδυρομένον.

240. ὁ δ' ἐν ἐρημίᾳ MSP Lat. is preferable. But τῷ Δαυίδῃ and αὐτῷ need explanation. Keep both and read <ἀπαντήσας> before παρῆλθεν.

VII. 17. μετὰ MSP is better than μέγας because according to Scripture the Benjamites are with Abner. As it stands the text makes Joab ascend the hill. If we supply <εἰστίκει> καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἰώαβος αὐτοῦς τε . . . , τοῦτον in the next sentence refers to Abner, as it ought to do according to 2 Sam. ii. 25-6.

44. No great certainty can be attained here, but the best course is to read τοῦτοισιν οὐκ μάλιστα (i.e. 'to those who reflected in this way') <ἐδόκει> Δαυίδος. πρόνοιαν is David's care for the dead Abner <τοῦ ἀποθανόντος>.

197. τοῦτο γενέσθαι στρατηγίᾱς is omitted by Lat. As a mention of Absalom and Ahitophel is required, a lacuna should be marked.

235. πεισθεῖς E., Naber and Niese. Lat. *libenter accipiens*. There is no reason to depart from ἡσθεῖς with such MS support.

239. κοῦφος ὢν. Lat. *et ipse in toto levis existens*. But here Lat. is wrong: for κοῦφος seems the right reading 'stunned'. τοῖς πολεμίοις. Lat. *ille vero ramis comarum alligatiōne retinebatur adstrictus*. So read τοῖς πλοκάμοις.

VIII. 52. ἐπ' ἐμοῦ . . . ἔσεσθαι Naber. Niese reads ὑπ' ἐμοῦ. Lat. *esse aedificandum* suggests ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οἰκοδομηθήσεσθαι.

194. ἀσθενούντος . . . ἐπιχωρίων. Lat. *studia patria retinere* gives the sense. J. probably wrote ἀντέχεσθαι τῶν ἐπιχωρίων; πρὸς τὴν μνήμην is a marginal gloss, incorporated later in the text.

214. τοῦ μή. Niese proposes τῷ μή improbably. An alternative for τοῦ is καὶ τό, but it is better to change τοῦ into αὐτόν, 'decided not to give an immediate refusal'.

218. παρεῖς τὴν τῶν φίλων. Lat. *seniorum* enables us to add <πρεσβυτέρων> φίλων.

244. προφήτον. Lat. *nil prophetas habuit*, which is just possible Latin, but Greek requires <ἄξιον>.

281. τὸ προαγαγόν. Read <τὸ θεῖον> το προαγαγόν. τὸ θεῖον for ὁ θεός is very frequent in J.

319. Elijah's name is required, and as Lat. has *nomine Elias* we may insert after θεοῦ, <ὀνόματι Ἰλίας>.

IX. 151. περιρρηξάμενη. περιρρήγνυμαι τὴν ἐσθῆτα is so frequent in J. that <τὴν ἐσθῆτα> should be added.

176. Instead of τοὺς δυναμένους, read τοὺς δεομένους referring back to δέησιν in the previous sentence.

232. πάντων ὁμότατος. Lat. *regum omnium saevissimus*. So <βασιλέων> πάντων.

251. καὶ τέτταρες refers back to 250 Βαραχίας καὶ ἄλλοι τρεῖς. Lat. *illi quattuor preserves <οἱ> τέτταρες*.

X. 2. φθάνει πρεσβευσάμενος. Lat. *preuenit eum missis legatis Ezechias*, cp. Ant. VIII. 319. Lat. confirms <Ἐζεκίας>.

23. παῖς νεώτερος is required before Ἀσσαραχόδδας because τοῦ Σαναχηρίβου 'A. is not an idiom of J., particularly in that order.

26. πρότερον ἢ c. subj. is unparalleled. Lat. *non prius antequam*. So μὴ πρότερον πρὶν ἢ, cp. 171 μὴ πρότερον ἀναιρεθῆναι πρὶν ἢ παραδῶσιν.

169. Lat. *et velut insensatum* confirms <ὥσπερ> before βαπτισμένον. Without it the metaphorical use of βαπτίζω is hardly possible.

211. <οἱ Βαβυλώνιοι> is required as subj. to προσκυνοῦσι.

269. Both Naber and Niese read γράφας. But Chrysostom read γραφάς, which is obviously right.

277. ἐκ τούτων. Lat. *et per haec quae sunt ita verissima* is not likely to be anything but literal. So after τούτων insert <οὕτως ἀληθεστάτων>.

The MSS of the second half of Josephus' *Antiquities* also fall into two families. The oldest P(Palatinus) in the Vatican Library, of the ninth or tenth century, unfortunately lacks the last two books. Generally supported by F(Laurentian fourteenth century) and V(Vatican fourteenth century) for books 11-15 only, it is greatly preferred by Niese. Naber had no difficulty in pointing out a great many passages in which it is corrupt, and his list might be enlarged. The other family is headed by A(Ambrosian eleventh century) which contains the ten books, and their appendix, the *Life*. It is generally supported by M(Medicean fifteenth century) for XII. 199 to end, and V(Vatican) written in 1354 A.D., which is complete. The combination of L(Leyden) eleventh or twelfth century in books 16-20 with AMW, especially when confirmed by the *Epitome* and the Latin version, is often superior to PFV's readings. The complicated and intricate style adopted by the writer in books 16-19 added to the difficulties of the copyist, and has therefore made the task of the modern editor exceedingly hard. The following suggestions are therefore offered with due humility. The usefulness of the Latin version is quite as marked in the second as in the first half of the *Antiquities*. It is extremely important to mention the significant fact that a highly discreditable incident in Herod's life (XVI. 187 ff.) lacks the author's moral, and the severe judgement on Herod's character (XVI. 395-end) is also wanting in Latin, and therefore was not contained in the Gk. MS from which the version was made. They are therefore almost certainly additions made to the 2nd edition of the work, prepared and perhaps not completed by the author, which has left plain traces in a second epilogue (XX. 259-66), intended as an introduction to the *Life*, while the epilogue to the first edition remains (XX. 267-8).

XI. 133. γνωρισθῆναι gives a poor sense. It is obviously a corruption of ἀριθμῶ γ' ὁρισθῆναι. 'An indefinite number' is the sense required.

XII. 256. κακοί cannot be right. It was added by some copyist familiar with the idiom, cp. II. 300, where it is suitable.

XIII. 273. The sense requires ἐπὶ τούτων τῶν ἀδελφῶν (ἐπὶ with dat. = 'in time of' only Arcadian, L. and S. ed. 9).

345. ἀπάρχεσθαι (MSS) is right, in sacrificial sense.

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385. τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ σφᾶς παραδοῦναι. J. is nearly always incorrect in his use of σφᾶς etc. But Lat. has 'eum'. So J. probably wrote ἡνάγκασαν αὐτὸν τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ παραδοῦναι.

415. αὐτοῖς should be read and the lacuna may be filled by <τὴν πίστιν τηροῦντας>, which is however not in Lat.

XIV. 35-36. The quotation from Strabo goes down to δυνάστην 36 end. The Latin *donum Aristobuli filii Alexandri* enables us to emend Strabo's text <'Ἀρωτοβούλου τοῦ> 'Ἀλεξάνδρου.

49. συμφεύγω can be used of a number as in 100, but not of Aristobulus alone: <σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῦ>.

51. ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καταλύειν αὐτόν, 'that he might not depress himself too low (Whiston). Rather αὐτόν 'that Pompey might not depose him'. Probably <ἐαυτὸν ἀφελόμενος> has fallen out after ἀρχήν.

61. The lacuna after Πομπήιος can be filled from the Latin in sense, but not verbally.

115. μερίδες should be inserted after Κυρηναίων.

184. Lat. *genti monstrasset, reuersus est* suggests <καὶ> ὑπολαβὼν . . . [μόνον] <ὑπέστρεψεν>.

249. Lat. *liceat eis . . . deportare quae uolunt*. So αὐτοῖς, and after ἐξάγειν, <ὅσα βούλονται>.

271. παραληψόμενος. Bassus was already besieging Murcus. Lat. suggests Συρίαν, παραλαβὼν δέ.

294-5. Ἐλιξ. Lat. *Felix*. So Φηλιξ.

305. διάταγμα. There are three decrees (306-13, 314-18, 319-22). The Lat. confirms διατάγματα περιέχοντα.

349. Lat. *cum querelis* implies πρόσεισιν <ἀγανακτῶν> Πακόρω.

380. Niese's lacuna can be filled by Lat. *deflebat*. εἶτα <τὸ> ἐπικινδυνεύειν . . . <κατεδάκρυνε>.

384. Lat. *Messala et Atratinus* suggests μετ' αὐτοῦ.

393. Lat. *pecuniarium acceptio* shows that Naber should not have read τόλμημα but λῆμμα with P.

447. παραδίδωσι is not in Lat., which suggest a fresh punctuation: Σοσιφὴ μὲν 'Α. Συρίαν παραδίδωσι παρακελευσάμενος Ἡρώδη σ., αὐτὸς <δὲ> ἐπ' 'Α.

450. ἐχθρῶν (*inimicos* Lat.) is better than νεκρῶν.

460. The context requires ἐντὸς τῶν τοίχων, cp. 459.

XV. 10. Strabo probably wrote τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ βασιλέως and μειώσκειν <μὲν τι> τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν μνήμης.

90. As Lat. has *satisfacere*, the lacuna may be tentatively filled with <ἀρκέσειν>.

109. εὐρημένων MSS. *collectis* Lat. = συνειλεγμένων.

140. Lat. suggests the correct text to be: πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἀνδραγαθία ἡμῶν ἐνίκησεν, δεύτερον δὲ παρανομία τούτων καὶ ἐνέδρα.

149. προνοοῦντων requires an object. Lat. has *idem*. So read ταυτό for αὐτῶν.

150. The sense of the lacuna is given by Lat.: τοῦτ' εὐθὺς [εἰς] ἐλπίδας <τε> τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις οὐ μικρὰς ἐνήγειρε <καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐνήψεν, ὃ δὲ> τὴν δύναμιν.

154. οἱ δ' Ἰουδαῖοι would introduce the contrast required, and has the support of Lat.

181. Gk. has no main verb. ἔτυχεν is required. Lat. *impetrauit*.

185. ἐπ' αὐτῷ. The context suggests ἐπ' αὐταῖς. Lat. *super eandem mittens*.

188. ἀννοτιμῆτως occurs here and in XVI. 277, where it means 'with impunity', and 402, where Thackeray rightly inserts <οὐκ> 'impunity which did not go unpunished', cp. XV. 265. Here L. and S. ed. 9 translate 'without fear of punishment', which is a very improbable use. Lat. has *sine dubitatione*. This suggests ἀννοστόλως 'fearlessly'. The word occurs in XVI. 69.

196. Lat. suggests *δωρησάμενος* <δὲ> . . . ἤτεῖτο [δὲ].
206. μάλιστα μὲν needs εἰ δὲ μὴ, in place of ἐν φ, a change supported by Lat.
233. Lat. *causam* suggests ὦν <ἐνεκα>.
255. ἐξέβαινεν alone is unusual. Lat. *felicitem excedebat* gives <καὶ> ὑπὲρ τὴν εὐτυχίαν [καὶ].
278. Lat. suggests Ἡρώδης τεταραγμένος <καὶ> ὄρων.
291. ῥάδιον should be ῥάονα. Omit μὴ after εἰ (Lat.).
296. πολλοὺς μὲν πλείους δέ has support of Lat. and is more Josephan than πολλοὺς μὲν . . . πολλοὺς δέ.
340. ἔχονται for ἔχουσαι has the support of Lat.
359. Augustus would hardly have acquitted Herod if he had been guilty of ἀμαρτία as well as προπέτεια. So with Lat. read καὶ <οὐχ> ἀμαρτίας.
360. τὴν τούτου μοῖραν. Lat. suggests τὴν <τῶν> τούτου.
361. μετ' αὐτόν. Lat. *Caesar uel Agrippa*. So μετ' αὐτοῦ.
366. A better arrangement from Lat. is ὁδοιπορίας· ἦσαν <γὰρ> οἱ.
367. ἦν referring to πείραν is most unlikely to be right. Lat. *sentirent* suggests ἦν ἔχουσι <διάνοιαν>.
374. ἀπάρξεις W, ἀπάξεις cett., in the prophecy of Menahem to Herod, 'you will have a happy reign'. To read ἀρξεις or διάξεις is unsatisfactory. J. probably wrote ἐπάρξεις, a compound which he frequently uses of governors, in IX. 2 of Jehoshaphat and in XIX. 14 of Caligula himself.
412. With help of Lat. emend to ἀπ' ἄκρας τοῦ τρίτου τέγους.
- XVI. 4. αὐτοῦ . . . νενομικότος MSS. Herod did not 'purpose to regard lightly the punishment': his subjects thought he did. Read αὐτὸν . . . νενομικότων.
16. προρηγμένον. Lat. suggests προρηγσόμενον.
24. ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων ἦν † ἠπιζews, a deep-seated corruption, altered by a guess in W to ἡ δεξιῶσεως. Lat. suggests ἦν ἐπικουφίζειν. The word is used by J. for 'lightening' the burden of taxation XVIII. 204; XIX. 25. Cp. IGR. 4. 1523.
62. Lat. *discesserunt* suggests ἀνεχώρησαν. From Lesbos Herod and Agrippa went to Samos: there they parted.
84. Lat. *tamquam iniustum* = <ὥς> οὐ δίκαιον <ὄν>.
95. πρὸς τὸν ποτε MSS, πρὸς αὐτόν Niese. πρὸς τὸν πατέρα seems probable.
97. ὑστερήσῃ MSS, ὑστέρησεν Niese. It is more likely that after ὑστερήσῃ <πρίπει> has fallen out, as in 118 Niese saw that μνήμην was missing.
113. μὴ should be transposed before λελάλητο 'against those who falsely ascribed sayings to us'.
116. <σέ> probably should be inserted after φονεύσας.
119. ἀπολαμβάνεις. Read ἀπολαμβάνοις.
126. Can παρ' ἑκαστον be right? J. is not very sure in his use of prepositions. But this is a strange usage even for him and has no parallel.
132. τοὺς ἄλλους cannot be right. PW. have τοὺς ὄλους. Agrippa also (*Life* 366) uses the vulgarity ὄλοι for πάντες.
135. A lacuna must be indicated before ἐφίμενα.
148. After στοαῖς <κοσμήσας> should be inserted.
150. ἡρνήθη should be ἡδυνήθη. 'Even his enemies could not have failed to agree that he was most generous'.
154. κακῶν is possible, 'a provider of evils to those whom he taxed', but καινῶν 'fresh sources of revenue' suits ποριστήν better, and is probably right. There is nothing to be said for Naber's κακόν.
- 163 ff. A number of words have dropped out in the decrees and accompanying narrative, 163 ἱερὰ <χρήματα>.
170. κωλύοντο <μὴ τὰ ἱερὰ ῥέειν>, and read ἀφήρηνται, τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς.
174. συνεργούμεθα should be συνηργούμεθα. Lat. *defendebamur*.

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178. The sense is clear but the wording needs some mending. 'A good foreigner is not an alien', a highly commendable sentiment for an ancient writer. *κείσθαι* has probably dropped out after τὸ ἀλλότριον and we should read ἀνεπιτηδείως.

179. τὰς ἔξω. <χρείας> Bekker. But AM. have τοὺς; so we should also read τοὺς ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ.

181. χρυσοῦ καὶ κειμηλίων both are governed by κόσμον.

221. οὗτος ὑπὸ χρείας AM. Lat. τινοσούν accounts for the οὗν of other MSS. After διελέγετο we should probably insert <περὶ γάμων>. Lat. *de nuptiis*.

232. χαριζόμενοι, of the victims, is better.

235. χαλεπῶς <φέρων>: *moleste tulit* Lat.

237. μένεις is suspicious. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν οἰκίῳι seems required.

242 and 243. παρητήσατο. Lat. *expulit* (fort. *corruptum* Niese) is not impossible in the sense of 'dismiss' from his court. After χείρον <διαθείς> should be added. For the last words Lat. had a different text, but it is impossible to restore exactly.

257. τοὺς θάπτον. E. has τοῦ final, which is right.

261. From Lat. we can insert after ἦκεν <εἰς τὴν Ἰουδαίαν>.

264. λαβών MSS, λαθών Naber. If J. uses an uncommon word, it is sure to occur again before long. λωφίσειν is found in 268, and that suggests λωφῶν ἐκ here. He ceased to think his treatment of his sons just, and reverted to a father's feelings.

274. Lat. seems to have had ἀπαντας: perhaps both that and ἀπόντος were written.

276. χαλεπῶς δ' ἔχειν αὐτοῖς (not αὐτὸς) τῶν ἀδικημάτων.

281. The sentence is incomplete. Lat. suggests τοὺς ἀλλήλων ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ τῇ βασιλείᾳ <φυγάδας ἀποδοῦναι>.

292. οἷς has a government, if συνεληλάτουν is read. ἐκείνων is then the Idumaeen garrison.

293. Naber should have adopted Herwerden's ἀνελθόντας 'gone to Rome', as in 282, 336. The compound is used, because it involved a journey by sea.

337. ὑπονοήσαντες wants <τι κακόν>.

347. αὐτὸς ἐλάμβανεν. Lat. *cum eis partiebatur*. Therefore read αὐτὸς μετελάμβανεν.

XVII. 3. τοιαῖδε αὐτὸν περίσπευδον (or περιέσπευδον) ἀραί MSS. *talibus eum maliloquiis induxerat* Lat. at any rate gives a meaning suitable to the context. Perhaps τοιαῖσδε αὐτὸν κατέσπευσε διαβολαῖς. κατασπεύδω occurs in 123, apparently in the same sense 'urge on'.

20. ἰδίῳ MSS, *familiarē* Lat., Ἰουδαίῳ Niese. Perhaps Ἰουδαίῳ ἰδιώτῃ, cp. XVI. 274.

91. οἱ ἐληλύθει needs completion. <κακῶν> should be added from Lat. *in quas mala*.

132. The genitive absolute κομισθέντος is unsatisfactory. Lat. suggests καὶ κομισθεὶς τῶν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ τις. Confusion has arisen in the MSS with κομισθέντος and κελεύσαντος.

134. εἰ γνωσθεῖν demands a future tense, retained in Lat. *periclitabor*, and to be read in the Greek. So κινδυνεύσω.

150. The context, dealing with Herod's actions, supports the suggestion from Lat., αὐτοῦ for αὐτῶν.

167. A number, κ', has fallen out after καί.

195. ἀνέλεγεν. The sense requires 'read', ἀνέλεγτο.

205. P. ἐπειράτο ὁμίλους (sic). M. ἐπεὶ ἤρατο ὁμίλους. Lat. *placabat*. It seems as if J. had used the rare word ἐπίηρα, which easily became corrupted. σπουδαῖος ὢν can hardly stand for 'desiring' and certainly does not mean 'being a good man.' Either σπουδαίως ἔχων or σπουδάζων, ἐπίηρα τοῖς ὁμίλοις ποιεῖν πάντα. Archelaus courted mob favour.

206. παραχρήμα. Probably παρανόμος. Read also ἦσαν δ' οἱ <σύγγονοι> τῶν. . . .
212. A μέν clause is needed for τῶν δ' οὐχ. Lat. supplies the lacuna <τῶν μὲν ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέως λεγόντων>, τῶν δ'.
214. αὐτοῖς. Probably for ἄρτους, as *cicum* Lat. shows.
242. Hudson read μίσει from Lat. for φύσει MSS. Probably it is best to read both: <καὶ> μίσει <μᾶλλον> ἢ φύσει τοῦ. So Lat.
256. ἐγκαταλειφθέν should be read.
- XVIII. 1. μέγας σὺν ὀλίγοις can hardly be taken together as Naber's punctuation suggests: σ. ὁ. goes with παρῆν.
40. Read <δέ> after προιόντος, not after καταπλαγείς.
- 63-64. The famous *Testimonium* is genuine. If Eisner's addition to γίνεται of <ἀρχὴ καινῶν θορύβων> is accepted, its place in the context is vindicated, the list of disorders (θόρυβοι) affecting Jews at Rome and abroad. Thackeray's ἀληθῆ for ἀληθῆ is also probable. The passage has various Josephan idioms; Thackeray has pointed out ἡδονῇ δέχεσθαι (e.g. 6, 70: XIX. 185, 333), but not τρίτην ἔχων ἡμέραν, with which cp. VII. 1, X. 1, 57, 84. There are two necessary additions. On the analogy of XX. 200 τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰησοῦ τοῦ λεγομένου Χριστοῦ, we should read ὁ Χριστὸς <λεγόμενος> οὗτος ἦν and after ἐφάνη γὰρ αὐτοῖς <ὡς ἔλεγον> or possibly <ὡς λέγουσιν>. If J. wrote thus, we can see why Jerome (*De Viris Illust.* 13) renders *et credebatur esse Christus*.
118. τῇ ἀκροάσει as it stands is unsatisfactory. Lat. suggests συνήχθησαν πλείστοι <ἐπὶ> τῇ ἀ.
162. Tiberius rejoiced at the safe arrival. Then the MSS. say ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφικνείται. Lat. solves the difficulty. εἰς τὰς Καπρέας <δ'> ἐπεὶ ἀ.
203. συνδέτον MSS. The centurion was not chained to Agrippa but a private soldier. Read συνδαίτον, a word used by Lucian.
223. Tiberius prophesied that Gemellus' life would be a safeguard to Gaius, his death a prelude to Gaius' ruin. After μαντείας ταῖς ἐκείνου, <μὴ πειθόμενος> has dropped out. Gaius killed him not according to but against T.'s prophecy.
224. T. δὲ τότε suggests a μέν clause which is supplied by Lat. <καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον>, T. δέ.
274. γράφειν c. acc. is unusual in J. Lat. shows a participle was once read. XVIII. 281 has διασαφῶν. So here τὸ ἀνήκεστον αὐτῶν <διασαφούντα>.
300. Niese rightly has ἀρχὴν and ἀρετὴν transposed. For πεποιημένος read ἐποιεῖτο.
354. Lat. suggests τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ. Niese suggests τῶν ὀπλιτῶν.
357. Lat. *ad locum proprium* for εἰς τὴν ὕλην *in locis suis* for ἔλεσι 363. Probably therefore εἰς τὸ ἔλος and in 366.
- XIX. 119. ὁμώνυμοι has no real point, and ὁμώνυμον is better.
120. σπάνιον is corrupt. Lat. preserves the reading, with *Hispanis*. So ὥσπερ Ἰσπανοῖς καὶ τισιν ἑτέροις.
120. οὓς ἂν νομίσωσι: Lat. *congressi*. Thus οἷς ἂν ὁμός' ὡσι is preferable.
187. οἱτοι γάρ. It is improbable that J. described the functions of consuls inaccurately. Lat. suggests the more accurate τῶν <πολιτικῶν καὶ> στρατιωτικῶν.
230. The appeal is, in effect, not to be like Gaius. μισήσαντα gives the wrong sense. μιμησάμενον is wanted.
250. Lat. supports MWE, and suggests a slight change: ὥστε τῷ δήμῳ ἐναντία τὰ τῶν σ. ἦν, πολὺ πλέον διαμαρτίᾳ.
337. ἐπεμψε alone is insufficient. E. ἐπ-, Niese εἰσ-. Lat. *emissit* suggests ἐξέπεμψε.
- XX. 51. ἐνδείας ἀναλωμάτων is without sense. Read ἐνδείας ἀναγκαίων.

77. Naber after E. inserts the rare word *τομῶς* after *σπεύδειν*. Niese rightly omits. It would be superfluous.

256. καὶ τοῦτο μέτριον οὐκ ἦν. As *μέτριος* is unlikely to mean *ἀνεκτός* here, there is probably corruption. Naber tentatively suggests omitting the negative. It is probable that <οὐ μόνον> has fallen out, as in III. 121.

G. C. RICHARDS,
R. J. H. SHUTT.

A NEW FRAGMENT OF A GREEK TRAGEDY.¹

FRAGMENTS of mummy-cartonnage, formerly in the collection of University College, London, now on permanent loan to the Ashmolean. Parts of two columns of a papyrus-text of a Greek Tragedy: head and foot of both columns partly preserved. The lines of col. ii are not quite straight opposite those of col. i. There were eighteen or nineteen lines in col. i, nineteen in col. ii, the last line of col. ii being slightly below the level of the last line of col. i. The text was written in the third century B.C., perhaps before 250 B.C. The hand is similar to that of P. Petrie I Plate V. No *Lesezeichen* of any kind are visible. [Fragment (a) = 6.9 x 7.1 cm.: (b) = 6.7 x 10.9 cm.: (c) = 4.2 x 14.2 cm. Height of column of writing = 14.7 cm. Existing margins = 2.5 and 2.3 cm. Probable height of roll = 20/21 cm. (P. Petrie I, of same age and similar hand, is 21 cm. high). Fr. (a) = col. i, 1-6 + col. ii, beginnings of 2-4: fr. (b) = col. i, 9-18 + col. ii, beginnings of 9-14, 16-19: fr. (c) = col. ii, middle of 1-15.]

HEAD OF COLUMN.

	COL. I.	COL. II.
	Fr. (a).	Fr. (c).
	ΤΟΔΑΙΤΙΩΜΕΝΟC]ΟCΕΙΤΑΙ.Υ.[
]ΝΚΕΙΝ[.]ΔΕΕΙΔΕΝΑΙΘΕΛΩ	ΤΙ[.]Κ[. . .]ΑΙC.[
] . ΑΓΡΙΟΥΔΕΡΟC	ΕΥ[.]ΕΙΗΜΑΛΛΟΝ.[
] . ΔΕCΠ[.]ΤΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ	ΤΟ[.]ΤΕΡΟΝΤΩΝΔΕ.[. . .]Π[
5] . ΦΗΞΩΔΟΜΟΙC]ΟCΚΕΝΤΡΑΑΝΤΙ[. . .]
]ΕΠΕΙΝΕΧΕΙC] . ΠΗΤΟΙCΤΕΙ[
	Two lines missing.]ΩΚΕΙΝΤΟΥC. . . [
	Fr. (b).]ΝΙΟΥC[ΝΙΟΥC]ΟΝΤΑ.[
] . ΝΕΤΑΙ	ΠΕC[.]ΝΧΡΗΜΟΥΝ. . . [
10]CAY	ΤΑCΤ[. . .]ΜΑΤΑΙΟΥCΑΦΡΟC.[
] .	ΠΕΦΥ[.]ΝΤΙΤΟΥC[
]ΑΑΒΕΙΝ	ΧΡΗΧΡ[.]ΝΟΙCΙΚΑΙ[
]ΕΔΕΓΜΕΝΗ	ΟΡΑΝΤ[. . .]ΠΑΝΤΑΟΙ.[
]ΑΤΑΛΑΝΤΗΓΕΡΟΝ	. . ΔΑ[.]ΝΑΜ[
15]ΝΟΟΥΠΩΠΑΛΛΙ]ΤΩΝ[
]ΟΥΤΙΝΟC	ΟΤΕΧΘΡ[
] . ΑΘΑΙ	ΑΛΛΕΡΤ[
]ΗC	ΕΓΩΔΕΑΠ[
		ΜΟΛΩΝΕΠ[

FOOT OF COLUMN.

Col. i. 3. Perhaps]Ν. 4. Perhaps]Α: later ΔΕCΤ[less likely, then [. . .]Τ possible—if so, two letters likelier than one missing before it.
5. Ζ probably = Ζ.

¹ I am deeply indebted to Mr. E. Lobel for placing the most difficult fragments in their proper relative positions, and for suggesting an interpretation of the obscure letters in col. ii

v. 8: and to Mr. C. H. Roberts, who entrusted me with the publication of this papyrus and assisted me greatly with its reading and interpretation.

Col.

The measured think, mo

Euri as loving fundamen woman h for the h murdered disapprov great prob

The I punishme Artemis Chorus, p assembled Perhaps t Ovid, Ap indignant was a sc participati Althaea: p the questi she would lineage wa reply was a quarrel the play.

More chase, the hide to its second; th Thestios, b

¹ Nauck fr
² Probably Stesichoros' other works: 426 n. 3.

³ Bacchylid
⁴ Homer I
⁵ From Ap VIII 272 sq 34. fragment of Accius d 506 sqq., and v. van der

10.]Ç very doubtful, Α probable, Υ almost certain. 12.]Α almost certain, as are also 14]Α, 16]Ο. 17.]Ι]Γ or]Τ likeliest.
- Col. ii. 1. Perhaps ÇΥΝ[. 4. ΔΕÇ[most likely, Ο for C possible.]Γ and]Τ almost certain:]Ι[may as well be]Γ[: two letters likelier than one missing before it. 6. Perhaps]ΧΡΗ : Ι[may equally well be Υ, Ρ or Κ. 7. ΤΟΥÇΕΡ likely, next letter perhaps Α or possibly Ω. 8. Apparently ΝΙΟΥÇ written twice, second time crossed out. 9. ΟΥΝÇΕΡ[perhaps : Ο may be Ε.

The gaps between beginnings and middles of lines in this column cannot be measured exactly: the dots representing letters may in each case be one—not, I think, more—too many or too few.

Euripides wrote a *Meleagros*,¹ in which for the first time² the hero was represented as loving Atalante. This simple innovation changed the character of the legend fundamentally. Meleagros now kills the sons of Thestios because they humiliate the woman he loves; no longer unintentionally,³ no longer in battle against the Kouretes for the honour of his country.⁴ And Althaia destroys him not only because he has murdered her brothers, but also because he intends to marry Atalante, of whom she disapproves. The plot of Euripides' play, so far as it can be reconstructed⁵ with great probability, was as follows:—

The Prologue,⁶ spoken probably by Artemis, described the sin of Oineus and its punishment: he sacrificed the first-fruits of the harvest to the gods, and forgot Artemis alone; she in anger sent a boar to ravage the land. Then entered a Chorus, probably of women.⁷ Early in the play it was explained that Oineus had assembled the best men in Hellas to hunt the boar which ravaged Kaludon.⁸ Perhaps the Chorus gave this information: from their song the lists of heroes in Ovid, Apollodoros and Hyginus may have been derived. These heroes were indignant that a woman—Atalante—should take part in their adventure:⁹ and there was a scene of quarrel and debate, in which Meleagros insisted on Atalante's participation.¹⁰ One extant fragment¹¹ was certainly spoken by the hero to Althaia: perhaps then she was his opponent in this scene. Their discussion touched the question also whether Atalante was a fit wife for Meleagros, who argued that she would certainly be the mother of heroes.¹² Althaia replied that Atalante's lineage was unsatisfactory,¹³ and her conduct of life unwomanly.¹⁴ Whether this reply was made to Meleagros or to Atalante herself is unknown: certainly there was a quarrel between Atalante and Althaia,¹⁵ and probably it came in the first half of the play.

More than half-way through the play a Messenger¹⁶ narrated the story of the chase, the slaying of the boar and its fateful sequel.—Oineus had promised the boar's hide to its slayer. Atalante was the first to wound the boar; then Amphiaraios second; then Meleagros killed it. He gave the hide to Atalante. But the sons of Thestios, brothers of Althaia and so uncles of Meleagros, took it from her, alleging

¹ Nauck frs. 515 sqq.

² Probably: nothing relevant is known of Stesichoros' *Suotherai*, Aeschylus' *Atalante*, and other works; v. Séchan, *Et. sur la Trag. Grecque*, 426 n. 3.

³ Bacchylides V.

⁴ Homer I.

⁵ From Apollodoros I viii 2-3, Ovid, *Metam.* VIII 272 sqq., Hyginus fab. 174, Diodoros IV 34, fragments of the play in Nauck, fragments of Accius discussed by Ribbeck, *Kôm. Trag.* 506 sqq., and representations in art, for which v. van der Kolf in P.W.K. s.v. Meleager,

Séchan, op. cit. 423 sqq.: detailed discussion of the plot in these two.

⁶ Frs. 515, 516; Accius fr. 1; Ovid 272 sqq.; Apollod., Hyginus.

⁷ Welcker's shrewd inference from fr. 523.

⁸ Accius fr. 2; Apollod., Hyginus, Ovid 299-300.

⁹ Apollod. ¹⁰ Apollod. ¹¹ Fr. 518.

¹² Apollod.; frs. 518, 520.

¹³ Frs. 526, 527. ¹⁴ Frs. 521, 522.

¹⁵ Who speaks fr. 528 to Atalante.

¹⁶ Macrob. V 18. 17 ('nuntius inducitur'); frs. 530, 531, Accius frs. 4, 5.

that it belonged to them as next of kin, if Meleagros renounced his claim. Meleagros enraged slew the sons of Thestios, and restored the prize to Atalante.

This was the Messenger's story.¹ When she heard it, Althaia quenched² the firebrand of which the Fates had decreed that Meleagros should die when it was burnt out. Towards the end of the play it may be that Meleagros was brought dying on to the stage.³ It is likely, but by no means certain, that Althaia killed herself.⁴ Finally there is extant a fragment of a divine epiphany.⁵

The new fragments permit certain inferences.⁶ The words 'Αταλάντη and δέρος suggest the story of Atalante and the boar's hide.⁷ The phrase κείνο δ' εἶδέναι θέλω suggests (a) that this line is near the end of a speech, where such implied questions normally are, (b) that the question was to be 'Who won the boar's hide?' Below, the words αὐθις αὖ, λαβεῖν and δεδεγμένη are significant: the sense of those lines may have been 'He gave the prize *again* to Atalante *to take*, even as she *had received* it previously': this would be in accordance with the plot of the play outlined above. Further, the vocative γέρον strongly suggests that this line was (or was near) the beginning or end of a speech, where such vocatives normally are: this conclusion—that we have here a dialogue between at least two persons—had already suggested itself in the second line above. Finally, this brief answer to the question 'Who won the prize?' presupposes a longer and fuller account of the chase and the death of the Thestiada: the last three lines of col. ii, in which one interlocutor appears to leave the scene, suggest that this longer account *preceded* our fragment. Perhaps the Messenger concluded his principal narration with the death of the Thestiada: his interlocutor—probably Oineus—is appalled by Meleagros' crime, but goes on to ask what happened to the prize after the Thestiada were dead: the Messenger replies that it was restored to Atalante.⁸

The general sense of these lines may have been as follows:

COL. I.

—θαύμαστ' ἔλεξας, εἰ] τόδ' αἰτιώμενος
τολμᾷ σφ' ἀναιρεῖ]ν· κείνο δ' εἶδέναι θέλω,
θηρὸς τίς ἐνθίνδ' ἔλαβεν] ἀγρίου δέρος;

5. —σοί τ' οὐκ ἄρεστὰ ταῦτ]α, δέσποτ', εἶδέναι,
κἀγὼ λέγειν τὰ μὴ φίλ' οὐ] χρῆζ' ὁμοίως

—μή νύν με κρύψῃς, εἰ τι τῶνδ'] εἰπεῖν ἔχεις.

Two lines missing.

10. —]· νεται
αὐθις] αὖ
τιμῆς ἑκατὶ παρθένῃ Σχοινηίδει]
ἔδωκε τὰριστέιον ἐς χέρας] λαβεῖν·
μάλ' ἀξία γὰρ ἢ τὸ πρὶν δεδεγμένη.
—καὶ νῦν φράσον μοι ποῦ' στί]ν 'Αταλάντη, γέρον;

¹ Ovid 329 sqq.; Apollod., Hyginus; sarcophagus ap. van der Kolf pp. 463-4; numerous vases *ibid.* 460 sqq.

² Ovid 451 sqq.; Apollod., Hyginus; sarcophagus ap. van der Kolf p. 455, cf. Accius frs. 8, 9, 10.

³ Amphora ap. Séchan 431 sqq., sarcophagus ap. van der Kolf p. 464, cf. Accius frs. 11, 12, 13.

⁴ Ovid 531 sqq., Apollod., Diod., sarcophagi ap. van der Kolf.

⁵ Fr. 537.

⁶ Most, if not all, of these, as well as the restoration of the general sense below, are purely speculative. It is not even *certain* that our text is part of Euripides' (or any other poet's) *Meleagros*.

⁷ τὸ δέρος in Apollodoros *loc. cit.*

⁸ Accius fr. 6 cuius exuvias et coronam huic munerauit virgini.

15.

—τέρψει σε, δέσποτ', οὐδ' ἐκεῖ]ν'· οὐπω πάλαί

]ου τινος

].αθαί

]ης

vv. 1-2. 'I am appalled that Meleagros should have dared to slay the Thestiadai on so slight a charge.'

v. 10. παρθ. Σχοιν. sc. Atalante.

vv. 15 sqq. '? I have just heard that Atalante and Meleagros are journeying together, intending to marry.'

The second column yields few important or even promising indications. γέρον in v. 4 could be a vocative addressed to the Messenger by the recipient of his news. κέντρα proves nothing. διώκειν might be part of an order given by Oineus that Meleagros and Atalante should be *pursued* and brought to justice. The eighth line affords no help. ματαίους ἀφροσύνας most probably refers to the recent behaviour of Meleagros or of the Thestiadai. At the beginning of this line, τὰς τ[οι is far the most natural supplement: if it is correct, this line should begin a reflective sentiment, suitable in the end of a speech: it is possible, indeed easy, to transform this line and the next into a considerable variety of valid and interesting apophthegmata. The sense of the last three lines may have been 'I leave the task of requiting Meleagros to those whom it directly concerns, viz. the blood-relations of the Thestiadai: I myself will go and find Althaia, and stop her from any rash or desperate act.' The speaker would be Oineus; and the lines would closely precede his departure from the scene, and perhaps the end of an episode: e.g.

ἀλλ' ἔργ[ον ἤδη τοῖς ὁμαίμοσιν μέλει·
ἐγὼ δ' ἀπ[ειμ]ί' ἐς οἶκον, Ἀλθαίαν ὅπως
μολὼν ἐπ[ίσχω] μὴ παρὰ γνώμην τι δρᾶν.

DENYS PAGE.

CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

COLLOQUIAL EXPRESSIONS IN EURIPIDES.

THE language of Greek Tragedy can be considered as a whole by virtue of the characteristics which distinguish it from that of other branches of Greek literature, and the resemblance between the three tragedians in this respect is more noticeable than the differences. Still, if we compare Aeschylus and Euripides it is impossible not to feel a marked change of tone, in λέξας as in δίανοι and ἡθῆ. As in E. the familiar legends are frequently set in a more everyday atmosphere and the characters cast in a less heroic mould, it is natural that the tone of the language should be lowered, partly by the frequent use of distinctively prosaic expressions and partly by the introduction of what appear to be colloquialisms. This change of tone in language was at once noted by Aristophanes and is referred to by Aristotle as an innovation of E.¹ On the other hand E.'s style presents a certain anomaly, since while deliberately securing a closer approximation to the language of prose and ordinary conversation he also shows a poetic and archaizing tendency in the use of Aeschylean and Homeric words and forms not found in Sophocles.² This may be due to a reluctance to depart too far from the poetic tradition of Greek tragedy, and possibly to a scholar's interest in the language of Aeschylus and Homer, in a minor degree a foreshadowing of the learned archaism of the Alexandrian poets.

A considerable number of examples of colloquial usage in E. have been collected in an article by C. Amati, *Contributo alle Ricerche sull' uso della Lingua familiare in Euripide* (Studi Italiani di Filolog. Class. Vol. IX, pp. 125-48). The purpose of this paper is to suggest some additions to his list; but something must first be said to define what is meant by 'colloquial' words and expressions, and to indicate by what criterion they are distinguished.

The category of the colloquial is intended to cover such words and phrases as might naturally be used in everyday conversation, but are avoided in distinctively poetic writing and in formal and dignified prose. It does not here include what may be called vulgarisms, i.e. words of a definitely non-literary character, with exclusively low and vulgar associations, or irregularities in forms of words or in syntax.³ As might be expected, the colloquialisms found in Tragedy are not of a kind to contrast violently with the general tone of the language, and are sometimes used, presumably without any incongruity, in combination with words peculiar to tragic diction.⁴

The best evidence for colloquial Greek in the fifth century is provided by Aristophanes and other writers of the Old Comedy (apart from lyric and paratragedic passages). In Satyric plays also there is, to judge by the material available, a rather closer approximation to conversational language than in Tragedy, but on the whole they stand much nearer in style to Tragedy than to Comedy.⁵

¹ *Ran.* 939-42; *Rhet.* III ii 5.

² Numerous examples are collected in H. Burkhardt, *Die Archaismen des Euripides* (Diss. Erlang. 1906); see also O. Krausse, *De Eur. Aeschyli instauratore* (Diss. Jena 1905) and Kapff, *Die poetische Sprache der griech. Tragiker* (Cannstadt 1895).

The epic-ionic form *πρωλάκαμεν* put in the mouth of E. in *Thesm.* 878 is perhaps an allusion to this tendency; cf. E. *Hel.* 532.

Compare the contrast between the colloquial expressions often used by E. in stichomythia,

and the artificial, non-realistic balance and regularity of this conventional form of dialogue, used by E. to a greater extent than by Aeschylus or Sophocles.

³ Such as the use of diminutives and of various obscene or abusive expressions confined to Comedy, and the irregularities of form which appear in vase inscriptions.

⁴ See below (17) and (19).

⁵ See O. Lottich, *De Sermone Vulgari Atticorum maxime ex Aristophanis Fabulis cognoscendo* (Halle, 1881); F. Selters *De Mediae Comoediae Sermone*

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The Middle and New Comedy and the dialogues of Plato are also near enough in time to provide good evidence, particularly in confirmation, though there is a possibility that a word might undergo some change of status between the fifth and fourth centuries.¹ I have also thought it worth while to refer occasionally to Herodas, certain Idylls of Theocritus and the Ptolemaic Papyri, since in spite of their later date and differences in dialect they have some value as confirmatory evidence.

It is possible to obtain some idea of colloquial usage by comparing the language of these writers with that of Aeschylus and Sophocles, Thucydides and the Attic Orators. In Sophocles, however, the dialogue (esp. in stichomythia) is sometimes not far removed in general tone from ordinary conversation, and though as a general rule a certain level of poetic dignity is maintained,² colloquialisms are sometimes admitted, particularly in the speech of servants or messengers;³ so also in Aeschylus, but more rarely. Among the Orators some colloquial expressions are found in the lively and forcible style of Demosthenes, and more rarely in Aeschines, Lysias and Andocides. In Herodotus also, as might be expected from his general style and subject matter, there are instances of colloquialism, particularly in dialogue passages.⁴

It must be admitted that in an attempt to realize the atmosphere, colloquial or otherwise, of a word in a foreign, and particularly a dead language, some degree of uncertainty is almost inevitable. Even in our own language the exact status of a word may not always be easy to define; something depends on context. Moreover the evidence for the usage of Greek authors is sometimes inadequate; in Aeschylus and Sophocles the absence of certain words in the extant plays may possibly be accidental. But in spite of some uncertainty in results, investigation on these points is justified by their important bearing on any estimate of a writer's style.

The following examples from Tragedy and Comedy are all, unless otherwise specified, from speech and dialogue passages. Satyric plays are referred to only to confirm the colloquial character of a word, and the *Rhesus* has not been included among the plays of Euripides. References are to the Oxford Text, except Soph. Plays (Jebb), Frag. (Pearson), Eur. Frag. (Nauck), Com. Frag. (Kock), Menand. (Jensen). Where A. and S., Thuc. and the Orators are not mentioned it is implied that the usage discussed is not found in them; where examples from these authors are given they are intended to be complete.⁵

COLLOQUIAL USES OF INTERROGATIVES.

(1) *πόθεν*. 'Of course not': 'Nonsense'. Used without a verb, and either confirming the same speaker's negative statement or in answer to the words of the previous speaker.⁶

(1909); A. Mancini, *Il Dramma satirico greco* (Annali della R. Scuola Normale di Pisa, Filos. e Filolog., XI pp. 72-9); G. Guarini, *La Lingua degli Ichnutae di Sofocle* (Aegyptus VI pp. 313-29).

¹ It may be so with e.g. *ἦ γάρ* and *οἷμαι*; see Denniston, *The Greek Particles* lxxvii n. 1. For some examples of similar changes in English see L. Pearsall Smith, *Words and Idioms*, pp. 150-2.

² It is sometimes possible to observe the process of transmuting a common phrase into more poetic language; e.g. compare *τί νεώτερον*; with S. OC 1507 *τί δ' ἔστιν*, *ἦ καὶ Ἀσίου, νεοπρον. αδ*; and the colloquial use of *φθείρεσθαι* els with E. Hip. 506 *ἐς τοῦθ' ὁ φεύγει νῦν ἀναλωθήσεται*.

³ This has some bearing on the style to be adopted in translating tragic dialogue. There are times when Jebb's diction appears to be

rather too poetic in tone: see on *μάλιστά γε* below (14).

⁴ Wilamowitz (on E. *Her.* 575) holds that the literary standard was different in Ionic, and refers to Hdt. IV 127 *κλαλεῖν λόγῳ* as an example of a phrase colloquial in Attic but not in Ionic. This actually occurs in conversation, where it may well be intended as a colloquialism; but there are certainly words used by Hdt. in serious narrative, but in Attic confined to colloquial contexts; e.g. *παχύς* 'man of substance' Hdt. v. 30, 77 *etc.*, but in Attic only Ar. *Eq.* 1139, *Pax* 839, *Vesp.* 287.

⁵ Except for Eur., however, I have relied mainly on indexes.

⁶ The use with verbs is an intermediate stage; e.g. Pl. *Crat.* 398a *πότεν, ὡγαθέ, ἔχω*; 'Of course I can't'.

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A considerable number of examples of colloquial usage in E. have been collected in an article by C. Amati, *Contributo alle Ricerche sull' uso della Lingua familiare in Euripide* (Studi Italiani di Filolog. Class. Vol. IX, pp. 125-48). The purpose of this paper is to suggest some additions to his list; but something must first be said to define what is meant by 'colloquial' words and expressions, and to indicate by what criterion they are distinguished.

The category of the colloquial is intended to cover such words and phrases as might naturally be used in everyday conversation, but are avoided in distinctively poetic writing and in formal and dignified prose. It does not here include what may be called vulgarisms, *i.e.* words of a definitely non-literary character, with exclusively low and vulgar associations, or irregularities in forms of words or in syntax.³ As might be expected, the colloquialisms found in Tragedy are not of a kind to contrast violently with the general tone of the language, and are sometimes used, presumably without any incongruity, in combination with words peculiar to tragic diction.⁴

The best evidence for colloquial Greek in the fifth century is provided by Aristophanes and other writers of the Old Comedy (apart from lyric and paratragedic passages). In Satyric plays also there is, to judge by the material available, a rather closer approximation to conversational language than in Tragedy, but on the whole they stand much nearer in style to Tragedy than to Comedy.⁵

¹ *Ran.* 939-42; *Rhet.* III ii 5.

² Numerous examples are collected in H. Burkhardt, *Die Archaismen des Euripides* (Diss. Erlang. 1906); see also O. Krause, *De Eur. Aeschyli instauratore* (Diss. Jena 1905) and Kapff, *Die poetische Sprache der griech. Tragiker* (Cannstadt 1895).

The epic-ionic form *πρωτακαμν* put in the mouth of E. in *Thesm.* 878 is perhaps an allusion to this tendency; cf. *E. Hel.* 532.

Compare the contrast between the colloquial expressions often used by E. in stichomythia,

and the artificial, non-realistic balance and regularity of this conventional form of dialogue, used by E. to a greater extent than by Aeschylus or Sophocles.

³ Such as the use of diminutives and of various obscene or abusive expressions confined to Comedy, and the irregularities of form which appear in vase inscriptions.

⁴ See below (17) and (19).

⁵ See O. Lottich, *De Sermones Vulgari Atticorum maxime ex Aristophanis Fabulis cognoscendo* (Halle, 1881); F. Selters *De Mediae Comoediae Sermones*

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The Middle and New Comedy and the dialogues of Plato are also near enough in time to provide good evidence, particularly in confirmation, though there is a possibility that a word might undergo some change of status between the fifth and fourth centuries.¹ I have also thought it worth while to refer occasionally to Herodas, certain Idylls of Theocritus and the Ptolemaic Papyri, since in spite of their later date and differences in dialect they have some value as confirmatory evidence.

It is possible to obtain some idea of colloquial usage by comparing the language of these writers with that of Aeschylus and Sophocles, Thucydides and the Attic Orators. In Sophocles, however, the dialogue (esp. in stichomythia) is sometimes not far removed in general tone from ordinary conversation, and though as a general rule a certain level of poetic dignity is maintained,² colloquialisms are sometimes admitted, particularly in the speech of servants or messengers;³ so also in Aeschylus, but more rarely. Among the Orators some colloquial expressions are found in the lively and forcible style of Demosthenes, and more rarely in Aeschines, Lysias and Andocides. In Herodotus also, as might be expected from his general style and subject matter, there are instances of colloquialism, particularly in dialogue passages.⁴

It must be admitted that in an attempt to realize the atmosphere, colloquial or otherwise, of a word in a foreign, and particularly a dead language, some degree of uncertainty is almost inevitable. Even in our own language the exact status of a word may not always be easy to define; something depends on context. Moreover the evidence for the usage of Greek authors is sometimes inadequate; in Aeschylus and Sophocles the absence of certain words in the extant plays may possibly be accidental. But in spite of some uncertainty in results, investigation on these points is justified by their important bearing on any estimate of a writer's style.

The following examples from Tragedy and Comedy are all, unless otherwise specified, from speech and dialogue passages. Satyric plays are referred to only to confirm the colloquial character of a word, and the *Rhesus* has not been included among the plays of Euripides. References are to the Oxford Text, except Soph. Plays (Jebb), Frag. (Pearson), Eur. Frag. (Nauck), Com. Frag. (Kock), Menand. (Jensen). Where A. and S., Thuc. and the Orators are not mentioned it is implied that the usage discussed is not found in them; where examples from these authors are given they are intended to be complete.⁵

COLLOQUIAL USES OF INTERROGATIVES.

(1) *πῶθεν*. 'Of course not': 'Nonsense'. Used without a verb, and either confirming the same speaker's negative statement or in answer to the words of the previous speaker.⁶

(1909); A. Mancini, *Il Dramma satirico greco* (Annali della R. Scuola Normale di Pisa, Filos. e Filolog., XI pp. 72-9); G. Guarini, *La Lingua degli Ichnusae di Sofocle* (Aegyptus VI pp. 313-29).

¹ It may be so with e.g. *ἦ γάρ* and *οὐρα*: see Denniston, *The Greek Particles* lxxvii n. 1. For some examples of similar changes in English see L. Pearsall Smith, *Words and Idioms*, pp. 150-2.

² It is sometimes possible to observe the process of transmuting a common phrase into more poetic language; e.g. compare *τί νεώτερον*; with S. OC 1507 *τί δ' ἔστιν, ὃ καὶ λαλῶν, νεότερον, αὖ*; and the colloquial use of *φθελπεσθαι* eis with E. Hip. 506 *ἐς τοῦθ' ὃ φεύγω νῦν ἀναλωθήσομαι*.

³ This has some bearing on the style to be adopted in translating tragic dialogue. There are times when Jebb's diction appears to be

rather too poetic in tone: see on *μάλιστά γε* below (14).

⁴ Wilamowitz (on E. Her. 575) holds that the literary standard was different in Ionic, and refers to Hdt. IV 127 *κλαίει λέγω* as an example of a phrase colloquial in Attic but not in Ionic. This actually occurs in conversation, where it may well be intended as a colloquialism; but there are certainly words used by Hdt. in serious narrative, but in Attic confined to colloquial contexts; e.g. *παχύς* 'man of substance' Hdt. v. 30, 77 etc., but in Attic only Ar. Eq. 1139, Pax 839, Vesp. 287.

⁵ Except for Eur., however, I have relied mainly on indexes.

⁶ The use with verbs is an intermediate stage; e.g. Pl. Crat. 398a *πῶθεν, ὡγαθὲ, ἔχω*; 'Of course I can't'.

E. *El.* 656 ΗΛ. ἤξει κλύουσα λόχιά μου νοσήματα. Πρ. πόθεν; τί δ' αὐτῇ σοῦ μέλειν δοκεῖς, τέκνον; so *Andr.* 82, and (confirming a neg. statement) *Alc.* 780 οἶμαι μὲν οὐ· πόθεν γάρ; *Hec.* 613, *Ph.* 1620.

Ar. Ran. 1455 τίσι χρῆται; πότερα τοῖς χρηστοῖς; Δι. πόθεν; μουεῖ κάκιωτα. *Vesp.* 1144, *Ecc.* 389, 976, *fr.* 655. *Dem.* xviii 47 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα· πόθεν; πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ. *Ibid.* 140, xix 30, xxiv 157, 195. *Aeschines* i 109. *Pl. Symp.* 172c, *Lys.* 211c, *Gorg.* 471D, *Hipp. ma.* 285E.

(2) τί followed by repetition of the words of the previous speaker or of the speaker's own words, expressing surprise or impatience.

E. *Alc.* 807 Hp. ζῶσι . . . Θε. τί ζῶσιν; οὐ κάτοισθα τὰν δόμοις κακά; *fr.* 300 οἶμοι, τί δ' οἶμοι; θνητὰ τοι πεπόνθαμεν. *IA* 460 and perhaps *Ion* 286, accepting Hermann's correction τιμῇ, τί τιμῇ; μήποτ' ὠφελὸν σφ' ἰδεῖν.¹ *Bac.* 1177 (lyr.) Κιθαρίων . . . Χο. τί Κ.; is different, 'What (about) C.?' and the text is not certain. *Ar. Ran.* 649. *Diph.* *fr.* 96. *Men. Sam.* 106, 159, *Her.* 44, *Gorg.* 28.

Cf. Ter. Heaut. Tim. 317 *Sy. At enim.* *Clit. Quid 'enim'?* 'Oh, but . . . 'What do you mean "but"?' *Plaut. Rud.* 736, *Trin.* 1080, *Amph.* 1021.

(3) τί δέ used elliptically (a) with εἰ c. opt. to suggest a course of action (formally a question about its result), (b) with ἦν c. subj. to question the result of (generally) another's action,² and (c) εἰ c. indic. in the same sense.

E. (a) *Hel.* 1043 φέρε, τί δ' εἰ κρυφθεὶς δόμοις κτάνοιμ' ἀνακτα; *IT* 1024, *Ph.* 732, *Andr.* 845 (ἀλλ' εἰ); (b) *Herac.* 1020 τί δ' ἦν θάνητε καὶ πόλει πιθώμεθα; *cf. Hel.* 833 φέρ' ἦν δέ . . . μὴ ἀποδέξηται . . .; (c) *Ion* 357 τί δ' εἰ . . . νιν Φοῖβος ἐκτρέφει;

Similarly *S. Ph.*³ 1405 τί γάρ, εἰ πορθῶσι . . .;

Ar. (a) *Nub.* 769, 154, 1083, *Lys.* 307, 339, *Thesm.* 773. (b) *Nub.* 1445, *Pax* 140, *Av.* 1655, *Lys.* 157, 366, *Ecc.* 1023; in *Nub.* 351 τί γάρ is used with the full apodosis afterwards expressed, τί γάρ ἦν κατίδωσι Σίμωνα, τί δρῶσιν⁴; *cf. also Ecc.* 779-803, 862-4 ἦν δέ μὴ κομίσωσι τί εἰ σίμ. 'And suppose they don't . . . , what then?' (c) *Eupol.* *fr.* 46 τί δῆτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸ σκάφιον αὐτῇ παρῇ;

Also in prose: *Dem.* xxxix 18 (τί δ' εἰ). *Pl. Theaet.* 196D (τί εἰ), *X. Symp.* ii 3 (τί οὖν εἰ).

(4) τί δέ used elliptically (a) in the sense 'Well': 'And what of that?' See Denniston, *op. cit.*, p. 175 iv (b), where he cites E. *Hec.* 1256 ἀλγεῖς· τί δ'; ἦ μὲ παιδὸς οὐκ ἀλγεῖν δοκεῖς; and *Or.* 672, 1326; add *Bac.* 654 τί δ'; οὐχ ὑπερβαίνονσι καὶ τεύχη θεοί; (b) as a formula of transition. 'Mainly a prose use' Denniston, *loc. cit.*, iv (b) citing E. *IT* 563 τί δέ; σφαιγείσης θυγατρὸς ἔστι τις λόγος; *Ph.* 1078, *Or.* 672, 1326: *Ar. Pl.* 173: 10 exx. from *Pl.*, 2 from *Dem.* and 1 from *Andoc.* In *S. Ph.* 421 the text is uncertain.

The distribution of instances and the frequency of similar elliptical expressions in colloquial language suggest that both uses may have a colloquial flavour.

(5) τί οὐ c. aor. indic. in impatient questions, equivalent to an imperative or an exhortation.

¹ Codd. τιμῇ τιμῇ· ὡς μήποτ'. . . In C.R. Sept. 1936 p. 116 J. D. Denniston gives fresh reason for supposing that ὡς is corrupt, and was inserted at some stage to mend the metre. His suggestion τιμῇ γ' & τιμῇ is perhaps less likely than H.'s; the explanation of the corruption is a little less simple and the outspoken nature of the following wish suits something stronger than the equivocal expression. After a sudden outburst, roused by the irony of τιμῇ, Creusa recovers her calm in v. 288.

² But the distinction is not in practice invariable; nor is it elsewhere, to

distinguish the uses of the moods on general principles.

³ In this play S. approaches nearest to E. in more realistic treatment of his subject and more conversational language. See Jebb, *Intr.* xli, and for colloquialisms see his notes on 327 (εὖ γε, the only instance in Tragedy), 577, 1049, and add 234 (τὸ καὶ λαβεῖν), 291, 295, 442 (iter. *Ar. c.* past ind.), 762 (βοῦλει λάβωμαι), 1006 (μηδὲν ὑγίει), 1233 (οὐ τί σου), 1229 (τὸν ποῖον).

⁴ It is less likely that the first τί merely anticipates the second.

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E. *Heracl.* 805 τί τήνδε γαίαν οὐκ εἰάσαμεν; (But if Heath, followed by Murray and Pearson, is right in marking a lacuna of several lines after v. 805, the exact sense and construction cannot be regarded as certain.)

A. *Pr.*¹ 747 τί δῆτ' ἐμοὶ ζῆν κέρδος ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐν τάχει ἔρριψ' ἐμαντήν . . . ; S. *OT.* 1002 (messenger) τί δῆτ' ἐγὼ οὐκ . . . ἐξελυσάμην;

Ar. *Vesp.* 213, *Lys.* 181, 906, *fr.* 466. *Pherecr.* 59.

Pl. *Ph.* 86D, *Symp.* 173B, *Prot.* 317D, 310A, *Soph.* 251E, *Gorg.* 503B, 509E, *X. Cyr.* II i 4, IV i 12, *Mem.* III xi 15, *Hier.* i 3.

Herodas vii 78.

(6) τί γὰρ πάθω; expressing assent under some form of compulsion. 'What is to become of me (if I don't)?' and so 'How can I help it?'

E. *Suppl.* 257 στέργειν ἀνάγκη· τί γὰρ πάθω; *Hec.* 614, *Ph.* 895. Cf. Pearson on *Ph.* 894; but *Andr.* 513 (lyr.) ὦμοι, μοι, τί πάθω; and *Tro.* 792 (lyr.) are rather different: merely 'What is to become of me?'

Ar. *Av.* 1432, *Lys.* 884, *Ecc.* 860. *Men. Sam.* 259, *Ph.* 1b, 8 'οὐτω ποίει', [φησίν, ποῦ δὲ τ]οῦτο· τί γὰρ ἂν τις πάθοι;

Pl. *Euthyd.* 302E ὁμολόγηκα· τί γὰρ πάθω; *Hdt.* iv 118, II τί γὰρ πάθωμεν;

(7) τί πάσχεις; 'What are you about?'² The verb πάσχειν, though strictly passive in sense, seems in this phrase to have by implication the force of τί παθὼν τοῦτο ποιεῖς;

E. *Hec.* 1127 οἶτος, τί πάσχεις; *Ion* 437 νουθετητός δέ μοι Φοῖβος, τί πάσχει· παρθένους βία γαμῶν προδίδωσι; (representing the direct ὦ Φ., τί πάσχεις;) *Hip.* 340 τέκνον, τί πάσχεις; cf. also *Ion* 1385 καίτοι τί πάσχω; *Med.* 1049.

Ar. *Vesp.* I οἶτος, τί πάσχεις; ΞΑΝ. φυλακὴν καταλύειν διδάσκομαι. *Av.* 1044, *Lys.* 880. *Carm. Por.* 43 (Diehl) ὦ τί πάσχεις; μὴ προδῶς ἄμμ', ἱκετεύω.

(8) Repetition of interrogative word before the reply. Of this idiom, characteristic of Comedy, there are no certain examples in E., but the following passages may be so taken.

In *Alc.* 1119 the vulgate (after Monk) has *Hr.* ἔχεις; *Ad.* ἔχω. *Hr.* ναί, σῶξέ νυν, καὶ τὸν Δίδω . . ., but elsewhere ναί seems to be used either in answer to a question ('yes') or opposing a negative statement or attitude (almost = 'nay'), and Murray's punctuation is an improvement: *Hr.* ἔχεις; *Ad.* ἔχω; ναί. *Hr.* σῶξέ νυν καὶ . . .³ In *Ion* 958 the vulgate has Πα. καὶ πῶς ἐν ἀντρῷ παῖδα σὸν λιπεῖν ἔτλης; *Kr.* πῶς δ'⁴; οἰκτρὰ πολλὰ στόματος ἐκβαλοῦσ' ἔπη. Murray, however, prints with no stop after πῶς δ' or ἔπη, and assumes that interruption by the next speaker (in stichomythia) prevents the completion of the sentence. In similar repetitions in Ar. the indirect interrogative is generally used, but the direct interrogative is also repeated, as in *Ran.* 1424, *Av.* 1234, *Ecc.* 761.

In A. *Ch.* 766 Χο. πῶς οὖν κελύει νιν μολεῖν ἐσταλμένον; *Tr.* ἡ πῶς; λέγ' αὖθις, ὡς μάθω σαφέστερον, the addition of ἡ makes some difference, but here too a slight touch of colloquialism or garrulity may be intended, in keeping with the general style of speech given to the nurse.

(9) ποῖος with the article.

E. *Ph.* 707 τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; *ibid.* 1704 ὁ ποῖος;

A. *Pr.* 249; S. *Ph.* 1229, *El.* 671, *OT* 120, 291, *OC* 893, *Tr.* 78.

¹ For the linguistic peculiarities which distinguish this play from the other extant plays of A., and are often reminiscent of Sophoclean and later usage, see W. Schmid, *Untersuchungen zum Gefesselten Prometheus*, pp. 68-77. These peculiarities, however, might well prove to be less numerous if more evidence for Aeschylean usage were available, and in the circumstances hardly justify the ascription of the *Pr.* to some other

writer.

² Said 'ad eum quem stulte aut temere aut perperam agentem aliquid viderent', Cobet, *Misc. Crit.* p. 150.

³ Or possibly, keeping the traditional divisions, emend to καὶ σῶξέ νυν . . . (καὶ and ναί are not infrequently confused).

⁴ We should not expect δέ with a repeated question word, and there is some doubt about the MS reading; see Murray's crit. note.

Ar. *Ach.* 418, 963, *Nub.* 1270, *Ecc.* 646. Timocl. 12. 4. Alex. 9. 3.
Pl. e.g. *Phaedr.* 277A, 279A, *Rep.* 550C; more than fifteen other examples are cited in Ast. X., e.g. *Oec.* 10. 1. Also, in indirect question, Dem. xviii. 64.
Cf. τὸ τί; in Comedy, e.g. Ar. *Nub.* 775, *Pax* 696, *Av.* 1039, *Pl.* 902, and τὰ τί; Ar. *Pax* 693.

COLLOQUIALISMS IN SYNTAX.

(10) ἄν with imperf. (more rarely aor.) indic. in iterative sense.

E. *Ph.* 401 ποτὲ μὲν ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ εἶχον, εἰτ' οὐκ εἶχον ἄν. (Valckenaer corrects to αὐ, which may possibly be right owing to the frequent confusion of ἄν and αὐ. K.-G. cite E. *Ino* fr. 13 εἴπερ ἄν τροφή δόμοις παρήν, but this seems to be a not very probable correction of γυναικάς, εἴπερ τροφή δόμοις παρήν (Nauck 406, 3).

S. *Ph.* 291-5(3), 442, 701 (lyr.).

Ar. very common, about 50 exx.

Also in prose. Hdt. 14 exx., incl. 5 with imperf. in -σκον; Hippocr. II 182, 1 (Kuhlewein); Thuc. vii 71 (vi 2 4 is past potential); Dem. xviii 219, ix 48 (ἀναχωρεῖν ἄν repr. direct ἀνεχώρουν ἄν); Lys. vii 12. Isocr. vi 52 (cited by Jebb on S. *Ph.* 291) ὑπὸ πάντων ἄν ὁμολογεῖτο is probably potential: 'everyone would have admitted'. Pl. *Ap.* 22 13; Xen. *ca.* 12 exx. There are no certain examples of this construction in subordinate clauses in the classical period; in the Koine it almost ceases to be used in principal sentences, but is common in subordinate clauses (Blass-Debrunner, *Neutest. Gramm.* § 367).

This usage is perhaps Ionic in origin, and in Attic at any rate seems to have a colloquial flavour.¹ For lists of examples and some discussion of origin see Seaton in C.R. III pp. 343-5, and for more detailed treatment, especially of the relation between classical and post-classical usage, see A. Debrunner, *Das hellenistische Nebensatziterativpräteritum mit ἄν*, Glotta XI pp. 1-28.

(11) ἄν c. opt. (potential) referring to present time.

This use seems to be distinct from the Homeric optative referring to present or past in unfulfilled conditions, and to be derived from the ordinary potential opt. referring to the future. To say that something would, on investigation, turn out to be true, is equivalent to saying that it is true now or was true in the past. The use of a tentative form of expression to denote what is not regarded as open to doubt is characteristic of Attic meiosis,² and can be paralleled in colloquial English.³ It is doubtful how far this idiom can be regarded as colloquial in the fifth century; it occurs twice in S. where a colloquial expression would not be expected. In the fourth century, however, it certainly seems to be conversational in tone, and is found again in Papyri.

E. *Hel.* 91 τλήμων ἄν εἴης 'You must be unhappy'; *ibid.* 834, 1287, *Herac.* 212, *Hip.* 349; also in questions, *Ion* 543 πῶς ἄν οὖν εἶην σός; 'How then can I be your (son)?' *Hel.* 467, *Andr.* 1165, *IA* 843. So in *Herac.* 282 with a protasis expressed μάτην γὰρ ἤβην ὦδέ γ' ἐκεκτήμεθα . . . μή σε τιμωρούμενοι.⁴

S. *Aj.* 186 ἦκοι γὰρ ἄν θεία νόσος 'some heaven-sent madness must have come'; *OT* 1182 τὰ πάντ' ἄν ἐξήκοι σαφῆ. Jebb takes ἦκοι ἄν as referring to the future: 'Yea, when the gods send madness it must come'; but it seems more likely that both passages alike refer to the present. Also in questions, *El.* 1450 ποῦ δῆτ' ἄν εἴεν οἱ ξένοι; *ibid.* 1372.

¹ So Stahl, *Syntax der griech. Verb.* I p. 305, 'Es scheint also diese Gebrauch zuerst in der Umgangssprache aufgekommen zu sein'.

² Several passages in Hdt., e.g. i 2 εἴσαν δ' ἄν οἱτοί Κρήτες, are probably to be explained on similar lines, but generally seem to suggest rather

than assert; cf. K.-G. I pp. 232-3.

³ E.g. on hearing a description, 'That will (would) be so-and-so'.

⁴ Suppl. 764 φαίης ἄν, εἰ παρήσθ' ὅτ' ἡγάπα νεκροῖς is different and may be an echo of the Homeric φαίης ἄν.

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Ar. (in questions) *Th.* 847, *Vesp.* 348, *fr.* 149, 8;¹ *Men. Epir.* 172 οὐκ ἂν διαγνοίην 'I can't tell which'; *K.* 53 καὶ τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη; Pl. v. common, e.g. *Euthyphro* 13D, 14C, *Euthyd.* 302D, *Symp.* 175E, *Rep.* 444D; X., e.g. *Mem.* III v 7. So in Papyri, e.g. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης 'You wouldn't know'; οἱ θεοὶ μάλιστ' ἂν εἰδέσαν (Mayser, *op. cit.*, p. 291).

(12) The genitive in exclamations.

The causal gen. with adjectives (τλήμων σὺ τόλμης) and with exclamations (φεῦ τῆς ἀνοίας) is an Attic usage, appearing first in A. and found not infrequently in A., S., and E. as well as in Ar. (K.-G. I p. 389); but the gen. alone in exclamations, or preceded by an invocation, is confined to E. and such works as comedy, prose dialogue and the conversational *Id* XV Theocr.

E. *Bac.* 263 τῆς δυσσεβείας. *Med.* I. . . ἰλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, τὸ καὶ προέσθαι. . . . *IA* 327 ὦ θεοί, σῆς ἀναισχύντου φρενός.

Ar. *Nub.* 818 τῆς μωρίας, τὸ Δία νομίζειν ὄντα τηλικουτονί. *Ecc.* 787 τῆς μωρίας, τὸ μηδε. . . . *Ach.* 87 τῶν ἀλαζονευμάτων. *Eq.* 144 ὦ Πόσειδον τῆς τέχνης. *Av.* 61, *Nub.* 153 etc.; Alex. 144 τοῦ ταιλαιπύρου πάθους. *Men. Epir.* 154, 504, 667, *P.* 685 ὦ θεοί, δεινοῦ πάθους. Theocr. XV 75 χρηστῷ κῶκτίρμονος ἀνδρός. X. *Cyr.* II ii 3 τῆς τύχης, τὸ ἐμὲ κληθέντα δειροῦ τυχεῖν. Pl. *Rep.* 509C Ἀπολλον, εἴφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.

(13) The infinitive in exclamations.

This use of the infin. without the article appears first in A. *Eum.* 837 (lyr.), *Ag.* 1662. It is generally used to express indignation, and is perhaps emotional and dramatic rather than purely colloquial. Other exx. are S. *Aj.* 410, *Ichn.* 74; Ar. *Vesp.* 835; Dem. xxi 209.

The articular infin., however, does not occur in Tragedy in this sense except in E. and S. *Ph.* 214; this may be accidental, but its frequency in Ar. suggests that it may have been regarded as colloquial in tone. E. *Alc.* 832 ἀλλὰ σοῦ τὸ μὴ φράσαι. *Med.* 1052, *fr.* 442. Ar. *Nub.* 268, 819, *Av.* 5, *Ran.* 741, and perhaps 530, *Ecc.* 787, *Pl.* 593. Pl. *Symp.* 177C;² X. *Cyr.* II ii 3.

(14) *περί* c. acc. E.'s more frequent use of prepositions, as compared with A. and S., and his more frequent use of the acc. with prepositions³ are relevant rather to the consideration of the prosaic than the colloquial element in his language. But the use of *περί* c. acc. in the sense 'belonging to' or 'attached to', almost equivalent to a genitive, may have been a popular one. There are a few examples of similar uses of *κατά* c. acc. in Hdt. and Thuc., but these prepositional periphrases, esp. with *περί* c. acc., become much more common in the fourth century, particularly in Pl. and Arist., and are common in Papyri (Mayser, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-13).⁴

So E. *Tro.* 426 οἱ *περί* τυράννοισι καὶ πόλεσι ὑπηρέται 'the servants of tyrants and cities'. Cf. *Eupol.* 159 ἐπειδὴν κατίδω τιν' ἄνδρα ἡλίθιον, πλουτοῦντα δ', εὐθὺς *περί* τούτων εἰμί. In Ar. *Thesm.* 1188 εἶν, καλὴ τὸ σκῆμα *περί* τὸ πόστιον the prepositional phrase is perhaps equivalent to τοῦ ποστίου.

ADVERBS AND ADVERBIAL PHRASES.

(15) *μάλιστα* standing alone, in assent to a request or in answer to a question. 'Certainly': 'Of course'.

E. *Tr.* 62 συνθελήσεις ἂν ἐγὼ πᾶσαι θέλω; Πο. *μάλιστ'* ἀτὰρ δὴ καὶ τὸ σὺν θέλω μαθεῖν. *Med.* 677, 944, *Hec.* 989, 1004, *Heracle.* 641, 793, *Hel.* 851 *μάλιστά* γε (answer-

¹ *Eq.* 414 is doubtful, and H. Richards' ἐκτραφὲς ἦν (C.R. xvii p. 143) may well be right.

² In *Ph.* 998, cited by Stahl (*op. cit.* II 673), τὸ μὴ διελέσθαι should probably be taken as an instance of anacoluthon.

³ See T. Mommsen, *Beiträge zu der Lehre von*

den griech. Präpp., II pp. 76 ff.

⁴ On the periphrastic uses of *περί* and *κατά* see G. Rudberg, *Ad usum circumscribentem praep. Graecarum adnotationes*, *Erano* xix pp. 173 ff. (mainly on post-classical usage), and C.Q. xxx (1936) pp. 212-15.

ing himself), 1415, *Or.* 235, *Bac.* 812. Similarly ἡκιστα *Hec.* 997, *Hel.* 1428, *Or.* 846, 1108; cf. *Cy.* 124, 220.

S. *OT* 1044 (messenger), 1173 (servant), *El.* 386; μάλιστα γε *OT* 994, *Tr.* 609; μάλιστα πάντων *El.* 665. In *Tr.* 609 Jebb's 'Yea, even so' is probably too poetic in tone; it certainly would be for μάλιστα γε in *Ar.* Similarly ἡκιστα *Ph.* 522, *OT* 623, *Tr.* 319, *El.* 82, 800, ἡκιστα γε *OT* 1386 (answering himself).

Ar. *Nub.* 672, *Pax* 834, *Pl.* 827, *Ecc.* 1128; μάλιστα γε *Nub.* 253, *Ran.* 125 *fr.* 149, 7; μάλιστα πάντων *Av.* 1531, *Ecc.* 768. *Men. Epitr.* 337.

Pl., e.g. *Prot.* 311E, *Gorg.* 477C, and (μάλιστα πάντων) *Phaedr.* 262C, *Phil.* 11C, *Rep.* 468E.

Cf. the frequent use of *maxime* in the same sense in Plaut. and Ter.; and for μάλιστα 'yes' in modern Greek see Thumb, *Handbk. of the Modern Greek Vernacular* § 283.

(16) καλῶς (sc. ἔχει or λέγεις) expressing approval. 'Good!'

E. Hec. 598 *Hr.* ὥστ' ἐκ προνοίας κρύφιος εἰσῆλθον χθόνα. *Am.* καλῶς. *Ion* 417, *On.* 1216; cf. *Cy.* 583 κάλλιστα.

(In *S. El.* 1340 ἔχει is supplied from πῶς οὖν ἔχει in the previous line.)

Ar. *Vesp.* 785, *Nub.* 848 καλῶς γε, *Eq.* 23 πάνν καλῶς. *Alex. fr.* 230. *Men. Epitr.* 76, 137, *Peric.* 240 πάνν καλῶς.

Pl. *Soph.* 227C. πάντων κάλλιστα. *Dem.* xx 160, xxxix 14.

(17) καλῶς ἔλεξας as a formula of polite refusal.

E. Alc. (stichomythia) καλῶς ἔλεξας· ἡ γυνὴ δ' ἀπελθέτω. Perhaps *Herac.* 726; the servant strongly urges Iolaus to put on his armour, and then offers, if I. hesitates to carry so heavy a weight, to carry it for him till they are on the battlefield; in the reply καλῶς ἔλεξας· ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ πρόχειρ' ἔχων τεύχη κόμψε . . . the first words are a formula of thanks, and perhaps of refusal, referring to the servant's first suggestion.

Cf. *Ar. Ran.* 888 καλῶς 'No, thanks'. (The addition of the verb of saying in *E.* makes the phrase a little more formal.) Similarly *Ran.* 508 κάλλιστ' ἐπαινῶ,¹ 512 πάνν καλῶς.

(18) εὖ (καλῶς) ποιεῖν with participle.

E. Med. 472 εὖ δ' ἐποίησας μολών· ἐγώ τε γὰρ . . . κουφισθήσομαι . . . 'But I am glad you came'. *IA* 642 χαῖρ'· εὖ δέ μ' ἀγαγὼν πρὸς σ' ἐποίησας, πάτερ. 'Thank you for bringing me. . .'

This phrase does not seem to be as purely colloquial as εὖ γε (καλῶς) σὺ ποιῶν,² and may be sufficiently neutral in tone to suit either trivial conversation or more serious speech. It is, however, at least reminiscent of conversational usage and does not appear elsewhere in Tragedy.

Cf. e.g. *Hdt.* v 24 εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπικόμενος. *Pl. Phaed.* 60C εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. *X. Cyr.* I iv 13 καλῶς ἐποίησας προειπών 'Thank you for the warning'.³ In the Papyri the future of ποιεῖν is often so used as a formula of politeness, e.g. καλῶς ποιήσεις ἀντιλαμβανόμενος (*PSI* iv 361, 21) and, in parataxis, εὖ ποιήσης γράψον (*BGU* 601, 9).⁴

(19) καλῶς used ironically.

E. Med. 504 καλῶς γ' ἂν οὖν δέξαιντό μ' οἴκοις ὃν πατέρα κατέκτανον. *Ibid.* 588 καλῶς γ' ἂν, οἶμαι, τῷδ' ὑπηρέτει λόγῳ.

¹ On ἐπαινῶν so used in *E.* see Amati p. 142, and Wilam. on *Hec.* 1235.

² Esp. with μολεῖν, which is poetic except for 16 exx. in *Ar.*, all in lyrics, parody, or dialect speech; for evidence of its Doric origin see Gantier, *La Langue de Xénophon*, p. 30.

³ Cf. the almost purely adverbial use in *Dem.* xxiii 143 τοῦτο δέ . . . εὖ ποιοῦν, οὐ συνέβη 'fortunately'.

⁴ See Mayser, *Grammatik d. griech. Pap. aus der Ptolemäerzeit*, II p. 174.

S. C.
Ant. 18
Jebb
πεινήσω
διάπυρος
σοι . . .
καταφανή
ὅτι τοῖς
(20)
without
E. H.
S. C.
Pl.
Stalbaum
καλόν γε
E. H.
δοῦναι δίκ
S. E.
Ar.
ἐξακούω;
οὐκ ἐν κα

(21)
E. H.
Not 'say
explanati
S. O.
Very
κινδυνεύει
(22)
E. (C)
A. P.
Ar.
Thesm. 12
(23)
E. H.
Ar. I
Eq. 26, F
Comedy.
to form ἡ
(24)
(a) '
E. P.
A. C.

¹ It may
ἐν καλῶν an
incongruity
used in co
common in
in itself st
other hand

S. OT 1008 (messenger) ὦ παῖ, καλῶς εἰ δῆλος οὐκ εἰδὼς τί δρᾷς. Perhaps also Ant. 18 ἦδη καλῶς.

Jebb (on OT 1008) compares Lat. *pulchre, belle*, and quotes Alciphron Ep. i 36 πεινῆσω τὸ καλόν, and Ael. Ep. 2 ἐπέκοψε τὸ σκέλος πάνυ χρηστῶς. Cf. also E. Cy. 631 διάπυρος δ' ἐστὶν καλῶς: Ar. Eq. 344 ἰδοὺ λέγειν. καλῶς γ' ἂν οὖν σὺ πρᾶγμα προσπετόν σοι . . . μεταχειρίσαιο: Pl. Rep. 506B ὁδὸς, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀνὴρ, καλῶς ἴσθα καὶ πάσαι καταφανῆς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι. Dem. ix 65 καλὴν γ' οἱ πολλοὶ νῦν ἀπειλήφασιν χάριν, ὅτι τοῖς Φιλίππου φίλοις ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτούς. Ibid. 66 καλῶς Ὀλυνθίων ἐφείσατο. . .

(20) εἰς καλόν, ἐν καλῷ (perh. sc. χρόνον, but the phrase may well be used without any clear consciousness of ellipsis).

E. Her. 728 ἐς καλὸν στείχει¹ ('familiäre redeweise' Wilam. ad loc.).

S. OT 78 ἀλλ' ἐς καλὸν σύ τ' εἶπας.

Pl. Symp. 174E εἰς καλὸν ἤκεις. So Meno 89E εἰς καλόν 'οἰσθησέμεθα, ut sescenties' Stalbaum ad loc. X., e.g. Symp. i 4 εἰς καλόν γ' ὑμῖν συντετύχηκα. Men. Sam. 68 εἰς καλόν γε τουντοῖ παρόνθ' ὕρῳ.

E. IA 1106 ἐν καλῷ σ' ἔξω δόμων ἤρηκα. Heracl. 971 οὐκ οὖν ἐτ' ἐστὶν ἐν καλῷ δοῦναι δίκην; Or. 579 πρὸς θεῶν, ἐν οὐ καλῷ μὲν ἐμνήσθην θεῶν.

S. El. 384 νῦν γὰρ ἐν καλῷ φρονεῖν.

Ar. (of place, not time) Thesm. 292 ποῦ ποῦ καθίζομαι ἐν καλῷ, τῶν ῥητόρων ἴν' ἐξακούω; So Theocr. XV 73 θάρσει, γύναι· ἐν καλῷ εἰμές. X. Hell. IV iii 5 νομίσαντες οὐκ ἐν καλῷ εἶναι . . . ἱππομαχεῖν.

MISCELLANEOUS.

(21) λέγειν τι 'talk sense', λέγειν οὐδέν 'talk nonsense'.

E. Her. 279 ἦν τί σοι δοκῶ λέγειν. Bac. 479 τοῦτ' αὖ παρωχέτευσας εἰς κοῦδέν λέγων. Not 'saying nothing'; D. has replied to the question, but provided no rational explanation.

S. OT 1475 λέγω τι; 'Am I right?' (Jebb).

Very common in Ar. and Pl., e.g. Ar. Vespr. 75, 649, Eq. 334; Pl. Crat. 404A κινδυνεύεις τι λέγειν etc. Antiph. 194, 6 οὐκ αἶδ' ὅτι λέγεις· οὐδέν λέγεις γάρ.

(22) σὸν ἔργον (a) with infin., (b) standing alone.

E. (a) IT 1079, Ph. 444; (b) El. 668, Hel. 830, 1288, Bac. 849.

A. Pr. 635 σὸν ἔργον . . . ὑποურγῆσαι. S. Ph. 15 ἔρ. σ. ὑπηρετεῖν.

Ar. (a) Nuβ. 1345, 1397, 1494, Ran. 589, Ecc. 514; (b) Av. 862, Lys. 381, Thesm. 1208. Crat. 108.

(23) ἦν as interjection.

E. Her. 867 ἦν ἰδοῦ, καὶ δὴ τινάσσει. . .

Ar. Pax 327 ἦν ἰδοῦ, καὶ δὴ πέπαιμαι. . . So also (ἦν ἰδοῦ) Ran. 1390, and (ἦν) Eq. 26, Pl. 25; Men. Epit. 174, S. 90, 98. Herodas i 4 ἦν ἰδοῦ. Cf. en in Latin Comedy. In Theocr., Callim. and the Anthol. ἦν coalesces with the verb of seeing to form ἦνιδε

(24) εἰὲν² as interjection.

(a) 'Well': 'All right'. In answer to a command or request.

E. Ph. 849 πέλας . . . ἐξωρμίσαι σὸν πόδα. Te. εἰὲν, παρίσμεν.

A. Ch. 657 Or. τίς ἐνδοι, ὦ παῖ, παῖ, μάλ' ἀδθις, ἐν δόμοις; Oik. εἰὲν, ἀκούω.

¹ It may be assumed that the combination of *ἐς καλόν* and *στείχειν* produced no impression of incongruity. *καλός*, though here and elsewhere used in colloquial phrases, is also, of course, common in quite different contexts, and does not in itself strike a note of triviality; and on the other hand *στείχειν* (like *μολεῖν*), though not used

in prose, was so common in tragic dialogue that in that context it would seem to be the normal word and not especially poetic in tone.

² For the form see L. and S. s.v.; and on form and meaning, esp. as discussed in ancient grammarians, see Uhlig in Rhein. Mus. xix pp. 33 ff.

Ar. *Pax* 661 εἰν, ἀκούω 'All right, I hear you.'

This use is certainly colloquial in tone.

(b) To mark a transition. 'Well, so much for that': 'Well, now'.¹ This use is very common in E., Ar. and Pl. and is probably in the main colloquial, though it also occurs in A. *Ch.* 719 (lyr.), *Eum.* 244.

E. (at the beginning of a speech) *El.* 595, 907, *Her.* 451, 1214, *IT* 467; (in the middle of a speech) *Tro.* 945, 998, *Her.* 1358, *Hec.* 313, *Ph.* 1615, *IA* 454, 1185, *Med.* 386; (in conversation) *El.* 959, *IT* 342, *Hel.* 761; (in stichomythia) *El.* 618, *Or.* 774, *Ion* 275.

S. *El.* 524, *Aj.* 101, *OC* 477, 1310, *Ph.* 1308. *Neophr. Med. fr.* 2, 1.

Ar. *Eg.* 1078, 1237, *Nub.* 176, 1075, *Pax* 877, 1284, *Thesm.* 407, 1188, *Ran.* 607. *Eupol.* 351, 5. *Men. Peric.* 144, *Ph.* 48.

Pl. very common; see *Ast s.v.* for over forty instances, some with different shades of meaning, e.g. with the force of 'Really?' e.g. *Rep.* 350E ἐγὼ δέ σοι, ὥστερ ταῖς γραυσι ταῖς τοῖς μύθοις λεγούσαις, εἰν ἐρῶ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανεύσομαι. Cf. Ar. *Pax* 1284.

In the Orators apparently confined to Antiphon iv β 3, v 58 and about five passages in Dem.

(25) ἀγχόνῃ strangling, as refuge of despair.

E. *Heracle.* 244 οὐκ ἐλευθέραν οἰκεῖν δοκήσω γαίαν, Ἀργείων δ' ὄκνη ἱκέτας προδοῦναι· καὶ τὰδ' ἀγχόνῃς πέλας is perhaps a modification of a colloquial use of ἀγχόνῃ.² S. *OT* 1374 ἔργα κρείσσον' ἀγχόνῃς is similar. (Jebb's version is 'such sins as strangling could not punish'; but the sense is rather that hanging himself would provide no escape from remorse. In answer to the view of the Chorus that he were better dead he has just replied 'No, for had I sight I know not with what eyes I could have looked on my father when I came to the place of the dead'.) Pearson (on *Heracle.* 244) compares Ar. *Ach.* 125 ταῦτα δῆρ' οὐκ ἀγχόνῃ; and Aesch. ii 38 when Philip refused to speak to Dem. τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἄρα ἀγχόνῃ καὶ λύπη τούτω. Cf. also Luc. *Tim.* c. 45 ἀγχόνῃ γὰρ ἂν τὸ πρᾶγμα γένοιτο αὐτοῖς. In these passages, by colloquial exaggeration, ἀγχόνῃ, like *cruix* in Latin Comedy, denotes 'trouble' or 'torment'. Cf. the use (in a different sense) of 'a hanging matter'.

(26) χρῆμα in various uses.

(a) In periphrastic expressions, e.g. E. *Andr.* 181 ἐπιφθονόν τοι χρῆμα θηλείας φρενός. Amati (p. 132) refers to this use, and cites three other passages from E. *Andr.* 957, *Ph.* 198, *Suppl.* 953³ (wrongly including also *Andr.* 727, *Or.* 70, for which see below), S. *fr.* 401 and eleven passages in Ar. Cf. also Telecl. *fr.* 1, 15, οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι πίονες ἦσαν τότε καὶ μέγα χρῆμα γιγάντων, Pl. *Rep.* 567E μακάριον λέγεις τυράννον χρῆμα, *Theast.* 209E. Hdt. vii 188.

(b) Added where the neuter adj. might have been used alone. E. *Andr.* 727 ἀνεμμένον τι χρῆμα πρεσβυτῶν γένος, *Or.* 70, *fr.* 97, 319, 4, 340; perhaps also *Bac.* 1152 (χρῆμα P et Chr. Pat.).

Ar. *Lys.* 677 ἱππικώτατον γάρ ἐστι χρῆμα κάποχον γυνή, *Agath. fr.* 3, 2, Pl. *Com. fr.* 98; Hdt. iii 53 τυραννίς χρῆμα σφαλερόν, Pl., e.g. *Ion* 534B κούφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής; *Theocr.* XV 83, 145.

Cf. the use of τί χρῆμα, with verb expressed or supplied from the previous line, found in A. (4, e.g. *Ch.* 10 τί χρῆμα λείσω; and S. (5); fairly common in E., also without verb, esp. in the frequent εἰα, τί χρῆμα; e.g. *Or.* 277, 1573, *Hip.* 905. τί

¹ συγκатаθέσεις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα, Timaeus, *Lex. Plat.* p. 94.

² For a purely poetic variation cf. E. *Alc.* 229 (lyr.) καὶ πλῆον ἢ βρόχῳ δέρον οὐρανίῳ πελάσσαι. For other references to suicide by hanging see E.

Andr. 811, *Tro.* 1012.

³ To these *Hec.* 714 must be added, if Murray's reading is accepted: τί χρῆμα δόξης; τοῦ δ' ἔχειν τεκμήριον;

χρῆμα; 'Why?' (= τί) occurs in E. *Hec.* 1179 τί χρῆμά με . . . ἐκάλεσας; *Alc.* 512, *El.* 831, *Hec.* 977 and *Cy.* 669, but apparently not elsewhere.

(c) Used rather vaguely for 'the situation': 'the state of affairs'.

E. *El.* 606 εὖρημα γάρ τοι χρῆμα γίγνεται τόδε, κοινῇ μετασχεῖν. . . .

S. *Ph.* 1265 κακὸν τὸ χρῆμα, *Tr.* 1136 ἅπαν τὸ χρῆμα, ἤμαρτε χρηστὰ μωμένη 'The whole thing is, . . .' Cf. *Ichm.* 44, 136, 365.

Ar. *Vesp.* 799 ὄρα τὸ χρῆμα, *Lys.* 660 ἀπιδύσειν μοι δοκεῖ τὸ χρῆμα μάλλον, *Pax* 38, *Ran.* 795. Hdt. iv 150 ἐς ἀφανὲς χρῆμα ἀποστέλλειν ἀποικίαν.

πρᾶγμα is similarly used in S. (e.g. *Ph.* 789 ἔχετε τὸ χρῆμα), E. (*IA* τὸ πρᾶγμα δ' ἀπόρως εἶχε), Hdt. (e.g. i 206), Dem. (e.g. xxi 111).

P. T. STEVENS.

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN.

THE METAPHORICAL VOCABULARY OF DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS.¹

THE method of approach to detailed criticism of prose-writers and poets adopted by Dionysius is in a large measure comparative. The procedure of comparison is threefold: firstly, the bringing together of passages from authors to elicit points of resemblance or of difference between their styles;² secondly, the assumption of the existence of common critical standards for all works of art, whether literature, painting, or sculpture;³ thirdly, the use of metaphor and simile to illustrate matters of criticism which need the assistance of some visual or mental image to make clear the exact meaning of the point of criticism. The metaphorical vocabulary is the richer for the greater preoccupation of Dionysius with aesthetic appreciation than with philosophical analysis; and any seeming differences in technical vocabulary are compensated by the freedom with which his vocabulary in general draws on the Greek of his own and earlier times.⁴ The following list gives some of the more interesting metaphorical expressions used in the rhetorical works, with notes on their meaning and, in some cases, with illustrations of the use of the same or similar terms in other Greek critics and in the volumes of scholia.⁵ References to the text of Dionysius are not given except in usages not adequately treated by Liddell and Scott:

ἀβασάνωτος of untortured language. In *de Imit.* p. 207 U.R., in the comparison of Herodotus and Thucydides, the text is printed ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ πειθοῖ καὶ χάριτι καὶ

¹ References throughout are to the two volumes of the Teubner edition of the *Opuscula* by Usener and Radermacher.

² Cf. *de Dem.* 33 p. 202 'for I knew that it is impossible to obtain a clear conception of the true character of anything by a mere examination of the object itself'.

³ For the analogy of the arts in Dionysius, see *de Isocr.* 3 p. 59, *de Isaeo* 4 p. 96, *de Dem.* 41 p. 220, *de Din.* 7 p. 307, *C.V.* 21 p. 95, and especially *C.V.* 25 pp. 132 f. and *de Dem.* 51 pp. 240 ff. Music (*e.g.* *de Dem.* 22 pp. 176 f., 40 p. 216, *C.V.* 11 p. 40), and the 'useful' arts (*e.g.* *C.V.* 2 p. 8, 6 p. 28, 21 p. 96) also play their part among analogies, as also do gymnastic, the human body, and the world of nature.

⁴ Goetzeler, *Animadversiones in Dionysii Halicarnassensis Antiquitates Romanas*, listed 101 words found only in the historical writings of Dionysius; this number can now be reduced to 92; delete ἀνέρωσις, μονογνώμων, περιζυμάτιον, περικλυτος, πρόσπαισις, σιρόσπορος, συγκαταπίπτω, συνεισπορεύομαι, while ἀναγκοφορέω (X 16), which is usually emended to ἀναγκοφάρω, is perhaps a mistake for ἀναγκοτροφέω. He listed also 254 words used for the first time in Dionysius; this number can be reduced to about 180 by the weeding out of technical or political terms of no literary significance, of translations of Latin, of wrongfully included words (notably ἑκατέρω and κρεκόντος, which is surprisingly translated 'doctor'), and the deletion of ἀδιακρίτως, ἀκρίω-

σις, ἀνείσφορα, ἀνέμβωτος, δανιστικός, δεκαετία, διαπύρρασκω, δοξοκοπία, δυσπύρρατος, ἐκλαμπρόνω, ἐκπικραίνω, ἐνδιαίτημα, ἐνορμίζομαι, ἐντοχίσις, ἐπικύρωσις, ἐπιμερίζω, ἐπιπραπίζω, ἰδιογνωμονέω, ἰστοιμία, καθιέρωσις, καλύβιον, λυχνεῖω, ναυπήγησις, οὐδόντος, οὐδίαυτος, ὀπλοκοίς, παθαίνομαι, περιφύβωσις, προκαταναλίσκω, προσηγορικός, στασιαστής (earlier in a different sense), συνάσκησις, συνδιαπορέω, συνεγγράφω, ταρακτικός. In the critical works I have found about 50 words cited only from Dionysius and about 100 cited as appearing first in him, while my word-list shows a very considerable number of words which appear only in Dionysius in a given sense, or which are used for the first time by Dionysius in a given sense. Even when due allowance is made for the gaps in our knowledge of the Greek vocabulary, it can be safely said that these figures confirm the description of Dionysius as τὴν φράσιν καὶ τὴν λέξιν καινοπραγής by Phot. *bibl. cod.* 83 p. 65A and the statement of Radermacher (*Rhein. Mus.* 54 p. 373) that Dionysius 'schreibt kein attisches Griechisch'.

⁵ Latin equivalents are not discussed here; but I hope to treat of the relations of Greek and Latin critical terms in the lexicon of the vocabulary of ancient literary criticism which, on the advice of the late Professor Rhys Roberts, I am now engaged in preparing. It is a source of regret to me that the notes of Greilich and Geigenmüller on the vocabulary of Dionysius have been inaccessible.

τῷ [ἀφελ
compara
regard t
42 p. 398
μηδὲ κατ
and it is
epitoma
gloss the
cf. Long
sense 'w
ἀβία
μηδὲ ἀλλ
τις αὐταῖς
sociated
in *de Thu*
42 p. 39
ἴσται δὲ β
μὴ βεβια
p. 20 B
adjective
κατὰ τὴν
τὸ αὐτοφ
Ioann. S
ἀγεν
ἀγκώ
ἀγεν
ἀγρο
ἀδέκα
225 p. 24
κρίνειν, P
cod. 6 p. 3
ἀδιδό
ἀδικεῖ
ἀκατά
an enthyn
ἀλκή
ἀλληλ
ἀμορφ
is used of
ἀναστ
32 p. 200
critical vo
Lysias, lik
λόγῳ. Th
judgments
λόγους in
ἀναπλ
ἀνδρώ
de *Imit.* p.
ἀνεσις,
ing or tigh
quotations
Philod. Vo

τῷ [ἀφελεί] αὐτοφνεί [ἀβασανίστῳ] μακρῷ διενεγκόντα τὸν Ἡρόδοτον εὐρίσκομεν. But the comparatively rare word ἀβασάνιστος is an unlikely gloss. The verb βασανίζειν in regard to style is used by Dion. only in *de Thuc.* (viz. 41 p. 396 σχῆμα βεβασανισμένον, 42 p. 398 τὴν Πλαταιέων ἀπολογίαν θαύμακα παρ' οὐδὲν οὕτως ἕτερον ὥς τὸ μὴ βεβασανίσθαι μηδὲ κατεπιτετηδεύσθαι, 55 p. 417 κατασκευὰς . . . πολὺ τὸ βεβασανισμένον . . . ἐχούσας), and it is possible that in the passage of *de Imit.* dealing with Thucydides the epitomator has preserved a genuine word of Dion. in ἀβασανίστῳ, and the gloss, if gloss there is, must be one or both of the other adjectives. For the use of βασανίζειν cf. Long. *de Subl.* 10, 6. Dion. has the adverb ἀβασανίστως (*C.V.* 25 p. 133), but in the sense 'without a test'.

ἀβίαστος of unforced language: *de Dem.* 38 p. 211 ἵνα μὴ κακόφωνοι μηδὲ ἀηδεῖς μηδὲ ἄλλην τινὰ ὄχλησιν ἐπενεγκάμενοι ταῖς ἀκοαῖς λάθωσιν αἱ τοιαῦται συνήγαι, ἀλλ' ἐπανθῇ τις αὐταῖς χινυὺς ἀρχαιοπινῆς καὶ χάρις ἀβίαστος, cf. *Demetr. de Eloc.* 246, where ἡ βία is associated with τὸ δύσφθογγον, and also *ibid.* 248 for βιάζεσθαι. Cf. also βεβασμένα σχήματα in *de Thuc.* 33 p. 381, 35 p. 383, 49 p. 408, and σχηματισμῶν . . . βεβασμένων in *de Thuc.* 42 p. 397, βεβασμένη ἀπόδοσις in *Schol. Hom. Il. XVIII* 509 (Vol. IV p. 195 D.), ἵστι δὲ βεβασμένος ὁ λόγος in *Schol. Arist. Frogs* 15 R. and φυσικόν τινα (*sc. ποιητὴν*) καὶ μὴ βεβασμένον *ibid.* 96. Long. *de Subl.* 10 has συμβιάζεσθαι and Photius *bibl. cod.* 61 p. 20 B ἔκβεβασμένος (cf. 83 p. 65 A, 86 p. 66 A, 127 p. 95 B, 138 p. 97 B). The adjective ἀβίαστος appears also in *Procl. in Tim.* I p. 93 D. ὡς ἀνείμενον καὶ ἀβίαστον κατὰ τὴν ποιήσιν (cf. the adverb *ibid.* I p. 64 D., ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἐπαινέτον δαίται τὸ ὕψος τὸ αὐτοφνέει ἐπιδεικνυμένον καὶ τὴν μεγαλοφωνίαν ἀβιάστως καὶ καθαρῶς ἔχοντος), and in *Ioann. Sard.* p. 37 R. ἀπλούστερα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἀβίαστον ἔχει τὸν λόγον.

ἀγεννής mostly of ignoble rhythms.

ἀγκών of a bend in a winding period.

ἀγνέεσθαι of the pure Greek of Demosthenes.

ἄγροικος of unrefined verbal embellishment.

ἀδέκαστος of an unprejudiced judgment; cf. *Phot. bibl. cod.* 87 p. 66 B ἀδ. κριτής, 225 p. 243 A ἀδ. ἀκροατής. For the adverb, cf. *Schol. Lucian* p. 13 R. ἀδεκάστως κρίνειν, *Phot. Lex.* ἀδεκάστως · ἀμερίστως · δικαίως · ἀδιωροδοκῆτως · ὀρθῶς, and *Phot. bibl. cod.* 6 p. 3 B ἀδ. εἰπεῖν, 85 p. 65 B ἀδ. ἀποδέχεσθαι, 201 p. 163 B ἀδ. ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι.

ἀδιάστροφος of an undistorted, unprejudiced judgment.

ἀδικεῖν of injury to metre, *C.V.* 9 p. 35.

ἀκατάλληλος of the lack of correspondence in the use of figures or in the parts of an enthymeme.

ἀλκή of an author's strong point, *de Thuc.* 23 p. 360.

ἀλληλονυχία of the 'mutual support of words in composition' (cf. ὀχεῖσθαι).

ἄμορφία and εὐμορφία of style, cf. εὐμορφος, δυσειδής, εὐσχημος, εὐσχήμων. ἄμορφος is used of the thought of a passage.

ἀναισθησία of lack of literary appreciation or sensibility, *C.V.* 18 p. 79, cf. *de Dem.* 32 p. 200 εἰ μόνον ἔχοι μετρίαν αἰσθησιν περὶ λόγους. For the place of αἰσθησις in the critical vocabulary of Dion., cf. *de Lys.* 11 p. 19, where it is said that the grace of Lysias, like all other forms of perfect proportion, αἰσθήσει . . . καταλαμβάνεται καὶ οὐ λόγῳ. The aesthetic criterion is irrational, but plays a necessary part in all artistic judgments, *de Thuc.* 27 p. 371, cf. *de Thuc.* 4 p. 330, *C.V.* 7 p. 31, and ἀναισθητοὺς λόγους in *Orat. Vett.* 2 p. 5.

ἀναπλάσσειν of the moulding or composition of speeches.

ἀνδρόδης of vigorous rhythms and figures, cf. ἀνανδρος describing Euripides in *de Imit.* p. 206.

ἀνεσις, ἀνίεναί and ἐπίτασις, ἐπιτείνειν of variations in style considered as slackening or tightening, *de Dem.* 13 p. 158, 37 p. 209, 44 p. 228, *et al.* A comparison of the quotations of a passage from Hieronymus using these terms in *de Isocr.* 13 p. 73 and *Philod. Vol. Rhet.* I p. 198 S. raises a textual problem in the latter. Dionysius has

τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κινητικώτατον τῶν ὁχλῶν παρῆσθαι, τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον· δουλεῦν γὰρ αὐτὸν τῇ λειώτῃ. In Philodemus Sudhaus gives τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κεινητικώτατον παρῆσθαι τῶν ὁχλῶν· ἄψυχον γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἀνυ<π>ἀκ<ου>σ<τ>ον εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ οἰονεῖ πρ<δ>ς εἶνα> τόνον πεποιημένην. Herwerden *Lex. Suppl.* s.v. ἀνυπάκουστος points to εὐανάγνωστος on p. 199 in support of the unexampled ἀνυπάκουστον. But it may be objected that the sentence on p. 199 τοιγαροῦν κ.τ.λ. repeats with some amplification the detail of p. 198, that εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι represents ἀναγνῶναι μὲν αὐτοῦ τοὺς λόγους καλῶς δύνασθαι τινα, and that the positive aspect of the clause ἄψυχον κ.τ.λ. is presented in the words τὸν δὲ πολιτευομένων ἐπιστατήσοντα πολιτικὴν δεῖν καὶ δημηγορικὴν κατακεχῆσθαι λέξιν καὶ μὴ τὴν ἐπιδίφριον καὶ καταψιθυρίζουσαν τὸν λόγον. The latter clause is nearer in meaning to παθητικὸν of Dionysius than to ἀνυπάκουστον. Bearing in mind Demetr. *de Eloc.* 194 πάνν (πᾶν Orth) δὲ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ἀνυπόκριτον, we shall perhaps not err in reading in Philodemus ἀνυπόκριτον. See also E. Gros *ad loc.*; and W. G. Rutherford, *A Chapter in the History of Annotation* pp. 97 ff. for the relation of ὑπόκρισις to ἀνάγνωσις.

ἀνθηρός (*de Isocr.* 3 p. 59), ἄνθος of colourful style, ἀνθίζειν of giving colour to style; cf. the likening of the style of Plato to ἀνθηρῶ χωρίῳ καταγωγὰς ἡδείας ἔχοντι *de Dem.* 32 p. 201 and the reference to ἀνθεσι . . . τοῖς ἑαρινοῖς *C.V.* 22 p. 98. Cf. also the use of ἀνθεῖν, διανθίζειν, περιανθίζειν by Photius, e.g. *bibl. cod.* 5 p. 3 B λόγος . . . ἐπιχειρήμασι περιηγησμένος, 32 p. 6 B ἐπιστολαὶ . . . χαριέντως ἀνθοῦσαι, 191 p. 156 B ἡ μεταφορὰ αὐτῶ τῶν λέξεων οὐκ εἰς τὸ χαρίεν καὶ γεγοητευμένον περιήνθισται, and cf. ἀνθηρός (sup.) *ibid.* 78 p. 54 B.

ἀντιστηριγμός and στηριγμός of the firm planting of the voice to secure forcefulness. ἀξιοματικός of dignified style, figures, rhythms, arrangement, and metrical feet.

ἀπερίσπαστος of an uninterrupted history; cf. ἀπ. ἀνάγνωσις in Herm. in *Phaedr.* p. 9.

ἀπηγνής of unattractively rough or rugged composition; *C.V.* 22 p. 108 ἀπηγνής ἁρμονία opposed to λεία καὶ συνεξεσμένη ἁρμονία; cf. Long. *de Subl.* 32 ἀκράτους καὶ ἀπηγνέας μεταφορὰς. [So, too, but not in reference to style, Schol. *Soph. Aj.* 334 φθέγμα (comp.)] The antithetical term προσηγνής, conjectured by Usener in *C.V.* 23 p. 119 *crit.* π., where the resulting phrase πραεῖαί τε . . . καὶ προσηγνέας . . . ἁρμονίαι can be matched with Schol. *Hom. Il.* X 288 (Vol. I D.) προσηγνὴ καὶ πρᾶον λόγον, appears with some frequency in critical contexts; cf. especially Dio Chrys. *Orat.* XVIII 7 where Euripides is approved for his προσηγνεία καὶ πιθανότης, *ibid.* 13 where ἀκοῇ προσηγνής is used of the Socratics, *ibid.* 14 where τὸ εἶδος τῆς ἀπαγγελίας of Xenophon is described as προσηγνὲς καὶ κεχαρισμένον καὶ πειστικόν (with which cf. Schol. *Hom. Il.* I 247 (Vol. V M.) τὸ εἶδος τῶν λόγων τὸ προσηγνές). It is coupled also with ἡδονή in Anon. Seguer. I p. 370 Sp.-H., and πρ. λόγος is coupled with γλυκυθυμία in Herm. in *Phaedr.* p. 247 C. See also Plut. *Moral.* I p. 326 for πρ. added by Paton and Wegehaupt. The scholiast on Arist. *Clouds* 445 explains εὐγλωττος by λέγειν προσηγνής.

ἀπηρτισμένος (*II ad Amm.* 2 p. 422), ἀπαρτίζειν, συναπαρτίζειν, ἀπαρτισμός, all suggesting the idea of completeness. This group of terms goes back to the philosophic schools. ἀπαρτίζειν seems not to have been used with any frequency by any writer before Aristotle, and it was probably from him that it descended into Peripatetic stylistic doctrine. The Stoics adopted these terms; cf. the statement attributed to Zeno by Diog. Laert. VIII 1, 18 ἔφασκε τοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀσολοίκων λόγους καὶ ἀπηρτισμένους ὁμοίους εἶναι τῷ ἀργυρίῳ τῷ Ἀλεξανδρινῷ, εὐοφθάλμους μὲν καὶ περιγεγραμμένους καθὰ καὶ τὸ νόμισμα οὐδὲν δὲ διὰ τοῦτο βελτίους· τοὺς δὲ τοῦναντίον κ.τ.λ., cf. Chrysipp. *Stoic.* 2, 164 κατ' ἀπαρτισμόν and 107 ἀνηρτισμένους. By the rhetorical writers from Dionysius onwards the terms are used regularly in periodic theory, cf. Hermogenes' definition of a colon as ἀπηρτισμένη διάνοια (π. *id.* A p. 232 R.) and Phot. *bibl. cod.* 265 p. 429 A αἱ περίοδοι τῷ ἀπηρτισμένῳ συναγόμεναι, and, for a more extended usage, Herod. π. σχημ. III p. 86 Sp. τὴν προτέραν περιγραφὴν τοῦ λόγου καταλιπὼν ἀπηρτισ-

μένην, an
use of ἀ
p. XXX
ἀπνε
parations
ἀποκ
ἀκούοντας
καθ' ἑκάστ
ἀποκ
116) of j
cf. *de Des*
de Imit. p
Mus. 76
20 p. 181
Φαῖδρος.
also Olym
ἀπορ
ἀποτ
and of a
πάθους τὸ
ἀκεντρὸν
in his co
stantially
Schol. H
συντραχύ
striking
διαχεῖν,
πικραίνει
ἀποτ
p. 209, ἐ
Pomp. 5
ἀπτα
Sp.-H. ο
ἀρχα
ἀσυνγ
ἀσίσ
ἀσφά
Thucyd
p. 23, cf.
Dem. 24
βαίνειν
derivativ
Scott, cf.
Herm. in
frequentl
C.V. and
Septem 6
ἐπικίνδυν
αὐθέ
dispositio
γὰρ τὸ αὐ
τὸν ταχύν
also αὐθα

μένην, and cf. the use of εὐαπάρτιστος in Schol. Eurip. *Hippol.* 362 S. Cf. also the use of ἀπηρτισμένος and ἀπαρτισμός in metrical theory, e.g. Proleg. Schol. Aristoph. p. XXX B D.

ἀπνευστί of Thucydides' breathless, uninterrupted march through battles, preparations, etc.

ἀποκναίειν of boring an audience to death; *de Dem.* 20 p. 171 ἀποκναίει τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἀηδία καὶ κόρη, cf. *Dem.* XXI 153 ἀποκναίει γὰρ ἀηδία δῆπον καὶ ἀναίσθησία καθ' ἐκάστην τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.

ἀποκυματίζειν of ruffling the stream of sound, cf. διασαλεύειν (*C.V.* 22 p. 109, 23 p. 116) of jarring notes that ruffle the surface of the flow of sound. For stream similes, cf. *de Dem.* 4 p. 136, 5 p. 136, 28 p. 191, 40 p. 216, *de Thuc.* 34 p. 381, *C.V.* 23 p. 117, *de Imit.* p. 203, *ad Pomp.* 6 p. 247, Long. *de Subl.* 13, and a note by Marx in *Rhein. Mus.* 76 p. 448. With the phrase ὥσπερ ἑλαιον ἀψοφητὶ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς ῥέονσα in *de Dem.* 20 p. 181 cf. Herm. in *Phaedr.* p. 81 C. τῷ διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς εἰσρέοντι κάλλει ἐγάννυτο ὁ Φαίδρος. Choricus II *Laud. Marc.* 74 has πηγὴν ἀψοφητὶ ῥέονσαν in the literal sense; cf. also Olympiodorus in *Phaed.* p. 14 ἀψοφητὶ τῆς μεταβάσεως γενομένης δίκην ἑλαίου ῥέοντος.

ἀπορριπίζειν of the breath blowing back the tongue.

ἀποτραχύνειν, τραχύνειν, ὑποτραχύνειν of giving roughness to a clause or juncture, and of a harsh effect upon the ear; also τραχύς, τραχύτης. Cf. Long. *de Subl.* 21 τοῦ πάθους τὸ συνδεδιωγμένον καὶ ἀποτραχυνόμενον, ἐὰν τοῖς συνδέσμοις ἐξομαλίσῃς εἰς λειότητα, ἀκεντρὸν τε προσπίπτει καὶ εὐθὺς ἐσβέσται. The scholiast on Hom. *Il.* VI 4 (Vol. III D.) in his comment on the 'harshness' of the word Σκάμανδρος seems to follow substantially the theory of sound-quality put forward by Dionysius in *C.V.* 14 f. [In Schol. Hom. *Il.* XVII 58 (Vol. IV D.) the verb συμπαχύνω seems to be a mistake for συντραχύνω.] For the effect of language upon the ear Dionysius has a long list of striking verbs from which may be selected for notice ἀποστρέφειν, γλυκαίνειν, γοητεύειν, διαχεῖν, ἐκμαλάττειν, ἐνοχλεῖν, ἐπιστύφειν, ἡδύνειν, θέλγειν, κηλεῖν, λεαίνειν, λυπεῖν, πικραίνειν, πρᾶννειν, ταράττειν.

ἀποτυποῦσθαι *de Din.* 8 p. 308, ἐκτυποῦσθαι *de Imit.* p. 204, ἀπομάττεσθαι *de Imit.* p. 209, ἐκμάττεσθαι *de Dem.* 4 p. 135, 13 p. 157, *C.V.* 25 p. 122, *de Imit.* p. 200, *ad Pomp.* 5 p. 243, of reproducing by imitation the form or manner of a model.

ἀπταιστος and ἀπταιστως of 'unfaltering', easy skill; cf. Long. *τεχν. ῥητ.* I p. 189 Sp.-H. οὐδὲ (sc. τὸν λόγον) λείως τε καὶ ἀπταιστως εἰς τὴν ἀκοὴν παρίησιν.

ἀρχαιοπινής (cf. πίνος and χυνός) of an 'old-world mellowness' of style.

ἀσυνγκρότητος of undisciplined expression or thought; cf. also συγκροτεῖν.

ἀσύστροφος of the imitators of Isocrates whose style was too free and wordy.

ἀσφάλεια as a property of the style of Lysias in contrast to the boldness of Thucydides' language. The adjective ἀσφαλής is used of Lysias' style (*de Lys.* 13 p. 23, cf. *de Dem.* 2 p. 131), and appropriately of the βάσις or ὥδρα of a period (*de Dem.* 24 p. 182, 40 p. 217, *C.V.* 22 p. 102). The adverb ἀσφαλῶς is combined with βαίνειν to express the steady movement of a period. For these terms and their derivatives, which are not sufficiently noticed in their rhetorical usage by Liddell and Scott, cf. *Demetr. de Eloc.* 41, *Procl. in Tim.* I pp. 193, 351, II p. 31, III p. 225 D., Herm. in *Phaedr.* p. 83 C., Schol. *Soph. Antig.* 640. The opposite terms appear fairly frequently, e.g. παρακεκινδυνευμένος, on which see Roberts' Glossary in his edition of *C.V.* and cf. Long. *de Subl.* 8, 32, Schol. *Soph. El.* 823 (adv. in Schol. Aesch. *Septem* 64), κινδυνώδης in *Demetr. de Eloc.* 80, κινδυνεύεσθαι in Schol. Aesch. *Septem* 179, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἀκίνδυνος etc. (e.g. *de Dem.* 2 p. 131, and cf. [Aristid.] *Lib. Rhet.* R. passim).

αὐθέκαστος of the blunt style of the 'austere harmony' *C.V.* 22 p. 98; also of the disposition of Thucydides, *ad Pomp.* 3 p. 238; cf. Schol. Lucian pp. 1 f. R. σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐθέκαστος τὸν τε ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἄδολον καὶ ἀληθευτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἐτοιμον πρὸς ἅπαν καὶ τὸν ταχὺν καὶ σύντομον καὶ αὐτόματον, and in a further note ἀκριβῆ καὶ αὐστηρόν. Cf. also αὐθαδῆς . . . κάλλος *C.V.* 22 p. 108, and αὐθαδέστωμος in Arist. *Frogs* 837.

αὐτουργός of a roughly-fashioned colon or period.

αὐχμηρός of an arid narrative, speech, or historical treatise; *de Dem.* 45 p. 230 διήγησις, *de Din.* 8 p. 308 ῥήτορες (*cf. de Imit.* p. 211 τὸ αὐχμηρόν in oratory, *de Dem.* 44 p. 228 αὐχμός used of 'a spare, meagre, jejune style'), *de Thuc.* 51 p. 411 πραγματεία, *cf. Procl. in Tim.* I 83 D. πρὸ τῆς φυσιολογίας παρέλαβεν αὐτὸ ψυχαγωγῶν τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἐρμηνείας ἐκείνης αὐχμηρὸν προθεραπεύων διὰ τῆς τούτου παραθέσεως, and Schol. Lucian p. 174 R. Ioann. Sard. *Comm. in Aphth.* p. 225 R. contrasts αὐχμηρός with εὐανθής.

ἀφετήριον of a starting-point in style, *de Dem.* 3 p. 134 (with εἰς).

ἀφροδίτη of charm or grace of style, *de Lys.* 11 p. 19, 18 p. 30, *C.V.* 3 p. 9; *cf. ἐπαφροδίτως in de Lys.* 11 p. 20. *Cf. also Phot. bibl. cod.* 79 p. 55 A τὸ γλαφυρὸν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπαφροδίτον, 180 p. 126 B, 186 p. 142 A ταῖς τε συνθήκαις καὶ ταῖς λέξεσι χαρίεις τε καὶ ἐπ., 241 p. 331 A ἔχουσι γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν λόγων τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν καὶ ἐπ., and for the adverb 180 p. 125 A καὶ πολλαχού μὲν ψυχρῶς ἄγαν καὶ παραβόλως, ἔστι δ' ἐνθα οἰκείως καὶ ἐπ. *Cf., too,* the usage in passages such as Choricus VI 24 F.-R. μὴ τοίνυν ὁ καλλωπίσαι τὴν Ἀφροδίτην βουλόμενος ὀνομαζέτω χρυσὴν τὴν θεόν, ἀλλ' εἰ τὸν χρυσόν τις βούλεται κοσμεῖν, ἐπαφροδίτον καλείτω τὴν ὕλην, and *ibid.* XXIX 5 ἐπ. λόγος, *i.e.* chosen as befitting Aphrodite; Menand. π. ἐπίδ. III p. 399 Sp. διηγῆμασιν ἐπ. καὶ ἐρωτικοῖς.

ἀψυχος of lack of life and vividness in expression, *cf. ἐμψυχος* of a lively style.

βοστρυχίζειν of Plato's elegant crimping and dressing of his dialogues *C.V.* 25 p. 133, *cf. Procl. in Remph.* p. 199 K. τὸ γὰρ ἐλευθερώτατον εἶναι τῶν ποιητῶν τὴν ἐκ τούτοις ἀδειαν δηλοῖ, μήτε ὀνομάτων ὥρας φροντίζοντες, οἷαν οἱ πολλοὶ περὶ πλείονος ἄγοντες βοστρυχίζουσι τοὺς στίχους, μήτε κ.τ.λ. For similar Latin expressions see *Thesaurus s.vv.* calamistrum, cincinnus, cincinnatus, crispus, crispulus.

γενναῖος of nobility or robustness in language, rhythms, arrangement; *cf. γεννικός de Dem.* 39 p. 214 ἁρμονία, *de Isaeo* 16 p. 115 πάθη (comp.), εὐγενής, εὐγενῶς, εὐγένεια.

γλαφυρός of elegant, polished composition, figures, and rhythm.

γλυκαίνειν of a sweet, soothing effect upon the ear, *cf. γλυκὺς* and *γλυκύτης*.

γοητεία of the spell-binding method of Isaeus and of the enchanting manner of the historians before Thucydides; *cf. γοητεύειν* of the enchanting effect of rhythm and clever σύνθεσις upon the ear, and Schol. Eurip. *Med.* 349 καταβελομένου καὶ καταγοητευομένου τοῖς λόγοις.

δημιούργημα used with a touch of humour to describe *C.V.*

διαβεβηκέναι of the 'mighty stride' of words and metrical feet.

διακλῶσθαι of soft, unmanly rhythms.

διακνίζειν of 'pulling to pieces' in criticism.

διαρθεοῦν of differentiating the meanings of a word.

διασπᾶν of a rent in the smoothness of composition or in the sequence of facts in a historical work; *C.V.* 22 pp. 105, 110, *de Dem.* 39 p. 214, 43 pp. 225 f., *de Thuc.* 9 p. 337. *Cf. διασπῶν τὰς ὑποθέσεις in Proleg. Schol. Aristoph.* p. XIV A Dind.

διανυγής of transparently clear style; *de Dem.* 5 p. 136 καθαρὰ γὰρ ἀποχρώντως γίνεται (*sc. ἡ πλατωνικὴ διάλεκτος*) καὶ διανυγής, ὥσπερ τὰ διαφανέστατα τῶν ναμάτων. For a similar combination of terms *cf. Dio Chrys. XXX 44* (Vol. II p. 383 de B.) διανυγέστερον . . . καὶ καθαρώτερον (in description of nectar).

διαχάλασμα of slackness in juncture.

διαχαράττειν of a rift in the smoothness of composition, *cf. χαράττειν* of the harsh, grating effect of certain pairs of consonants upon the ear.

διαχεῖν of the melting or relaxing effect of smooth sounds upon the ear *C.V.* 15 p. 60 (also of breaking up metre); (opposed to this is the astringent effect of στύφειν, *cf. also ἐπιστύφειν in de Dem.* 38 p. 211). *Cf. Schol. Lucian* p. 172 R. διέχεεν ὑπερβαλλούσῃ τῇ ἡδονῇ τὴν ἀκοήν, Hermog. π. ἰδ. B p. 333 R. διαχεῖ γὰρ τοὺς ἀκούοντας, Trypho *de Trop.* III p. 205 Sp. χαριεντισμός ἐστι λόγος εὐτράπελος ἐν ᾧ διαχεῖται ὁ τε λέγων καὶ ὁ ἀκούων, Schol. Hom. *Il.* II 212 (Vol. III D.) γέλωτι διαχέονται, *cf. Schol.*

Theocr.

i.g. Schol.

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ἰδ. B p. 3

δόσις

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Anton.

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p. 176, 34

ἐγκαθ

ἐγκατ

p. 238, cf.

εἰσβά

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ἐκβεβ

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ἐκθλίβ

ἐκμαλ

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cf. Eustath

ἐμβριθ

21 p. 176.

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Theocr. XI 78 a p. 248 W. *κεχλίζοντι· σφόδρα γελῶσι καὶ διαχέονται*. Other usages, e.g. Schol. Hom. *Il.* VII 212 (Vol. III D.) *σμικρύνει γὰρ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ ἀποστεινὸί δειλία*, *χαρὰ δὲ πληθύνει τε καὶ διαχέει* and *ibid.* IX 225 *διαχέαι τὸ σκυθρωπὸν αὐτοῦ*, refer more specifically to physiognomical effects, but never, so far as I have found, of an effect such as is presented in Roberts' translation of the C.V. passage (p. 155 of his edition) 'they (*viz.* the sounds) make us pull a wry face (*στύφουσι*), or cause our mouths to water' (*διαχέουσι*).

διαγείρειν (*cf.* *ἐξεγείρειν*) of the rousing effect of the style of Isocrates or of πάθος or of a passage from a speech of Thucydides; *de Lys.* 28 p. 45, *de Thuc.* 23 p. 360 τὸν νοῦν, 47 p. 404 τὰς ψυχὰς . . . ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνημα τὸ πάτριον, *ad Pomp.* 4 p. 242 τὴν φράσιν. The compound *διαγείρειν* tended to displace other compounds of *ἐγείρειν* in later Greek. *Cf.* Herm. in *Phaedr.* p. 21 C. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, p. 80 *διεγυγερμένη ψυχὴ* (*cf.* Schol. Hom. *Il.* XX 183 Vol. IV D.), p. 213 τὴν διάνοιαν, p. 242 τὰ πάθη, Hermog. π. 15. B p. 382 R. τὸν ἀκροατὴν, p. 315 τὸν λόγον ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπτιότητος.

δοῦς in the phrase *δοῦσιν ποιῆσθαι* with genitive, 'to set store by'.

δραματίζειν Usener's conjecture in *de Thuc.* 37 p. 388; *cf.* *διαδραματίζειν* in Marc. Anton.

δραστήριος of an energetic, impassioned, combative style; τὸ δρ. in *de Dem.* 21 p. 176, 34 p. 205.

ἐγκαθισμός and *ἐγκάθισμα* of resting on a syllable, thereby prolonging it.

ἐγκαταχωρίζειν of the posting of rhythms in the style of civil oratory, *de Dem.* 50 p. 238, *cf.* *συνκαταχωρίζειν* in Philod. *de Poem.* V p. 67 J.

εἰσβάλλειν of plunging into a speech; the verb is much rarer in criticism than the noun *εἰσβολή*.

ἐκβιβάζειν of diverting diction (from the path of plainness into the way of greater impressiveness).

ἐκθλίβειν of the grammatical figure synaloephe.

ἐκμαλάττειν of the softening effect of melodious, rhythmical, euphonious words upon the ear, C.V. 12 p. 46.

ἐλξ of involved, complex figures in the style of Thucydides, *de Thuc.* 48 p. 406, *cf.* Eustath. *proem. ad Pind.* (Schol. Pind. Vol. III p. 289 Dr.).

ἐμβριθής of weighty, grave style *II ad Amm.* 2 p. 425 and τόνοι (*comp.*) *de Dem.* 21 p. 176. For this term *cf.* Philod. *de Poem.* V p. 17 J. καὶ ποία τις (*sc.* ὑπόθεσις) *ἐμβριθὴς καὶ οὐκ ἐλαφρὸς*; τὸ δ' εὐτελὲς καὶ ἐλαφρὸν παντελῶς ἀπείναι δεῖν ('wuchtig und nicht unbedeutend . . . dürftig und unbedeutend' Jensen), and *ibid.* p. 15 προστιθέναι δὲ τοῖς προῖποκεμένους λέγοντος εἰς τὰ στερεώτατα καὶ μείζω τῶν ποιημάτων ἐναρμόττοντα τὸ πολυτελὲς καὶ ἐμβριθῶς καὶ μὴ εὐτελῶς μὴδ' ἐλαφρῶς κ.τ.λ. *Cf.* also Long. *de Subl.* 9, 3 *ἐμβριθεῖς ἐννοιαί*, and Marcell. *vit. Thuc.* 56 p. 10 H. *ἐμβριθὴς τὴν φράσιν*. In these passages the connotation is that of the weight of dignity or impressiveness or significance. [See also Ernesti, *Lex. Tech. Graec. Rhet.* s.v. *ἐμβριθής* and Eustathius on Hom. *Od.* β p. 1432.] The antithetical term *ἐλαφρός* seems to mean 'without dignity or impressiveness or significance', though in critical writings it is not restricted to such meanings. In *Phil. Woch.* XLI (1921) pp. 47 f. Orth (followed by Kunze *ibid.* XLI (1922) p. 189 and by Liddell and Scott) suggests that in *Plut. Moral.* I p. 133 E (p. 275 P.-W.) πολλὰ μὲν ἔστι τῶν φυσικῶν προβλημάτων ἐλαφρὰ καὶ πιθανὰ, πολλὰ δ' ἡθικὰ κ.τ.λ. and in *Dio Chrys. Orat.* XVIII 11 ἀλλὰ καὶ Λυκούργῳ συμβουλευσάμην ἂν ἐντυγχάνειν σοι, ἐλαφροτέρῳ τοῦτων ὄντι καὶ ἐμφαίνοντί τινα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπλότῃ καὶ γενναυότητῃ τοῦ τρόπου, the term *ἐλαφρός* means not 'leichtwiegend, ziemlich unbedeutend' but 'leicht verständlich'. But it is doubtful whether the idea of lightness in regard to scientific problems and literature should be thus limited to the field of intelligibility. In the *Plutarch* passage *ἐλαφρός* should be read in its context. A few lines lower down (p. 133 F), in speaking of aids to digestion, the author writes εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ διηγῆρεις ἄλνποι καὶ μυθολογίαι, καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐλοῦ τι καὶ

λύρας ἀκοῦσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ἐλαφρότερον ἢ λύρας αὐτῆς φθεγγομένης ἀκοῦεν καὶ αὐλοῦ, and the term ἐλαφρός is surely intended to recall earlier phrases relating to food, e.g. 131 E τῇ ποιότητι τῆς τροφῆς ἐλαφρότερον ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος (cf. 137 A αὐτοὶ δ' ἀγνοοῦσι τί τῷ σώματι μυχθὲν ἐλαφρὸν καὶ ἄλντον ἔσται καὶ χρήσιμον), 129 F τροφαῖς ἐμβριθέσι καὶ κρεώδεσιν, and more particularly 132 E ἐτέροις σιτίοις . . . καὶ ὄφιοις ἃ καὶ τῷ σώματι μᾶλλον ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥττον ἀμβλύνει τὸ λογικὸν ὥσπερ ἐκ λιτῆς καὶ ἐλαφρᾶς ὕλης ἀναπτόμενον. Heavy food is that which causes physical discomfort. Light literature and light problems are such as do not cause mental discomfort. But unintelligibility is only one source of discomfort. For a similar idea of 'uncomfortable' style cf. the use of λυπεῖν in *de Isocr.* 11 p. 70, of ἀλύπως in Schol. Eurip. *Or.* 640, and of ἀνεπαχθής in Lucian *de Conscr. Hist.* 44. In the passage from Dio, the orators with whom Lysurgus is compared are Hyperides and Aeschines, of whom it is said that ἀπλούστεραί τε αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ εὐληπτότεραι αἱ κατασκευαὶ καὶ τὸ κάλλος τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἐκείνων (viz. Demosthenes and Lysias) λειπόμενον (cf. Phot. *bibl. cod.* 264 p. 490 A for the clearness of Aeschines). It can hardly be seriously contended that the extant writings of these orators support the view of the greater measure of intelligibility in Lysurgus. Weil in conjecturing ἀφελεστέρω for ἐλαφροτέρω was introducing the natural point of comparison. Dion. *de Imit.* p. 212 ὁ δὲ Λυκούργειός (sc. λόγος) ἔστι . . . οὐ . . . ἀστέιος οὐδὲ ἡδὺς, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖος and Hermog. π. 18 B 11 p. 402 R. τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀφέλειαν ἥθους note the feature of the work of Lysurgus which compared favourably with the μέγεθος . . . ὑπέρογκον of Hyperides and with Aeschines, who is characterized as τῷ μεγέθει μετὰ τοῦ κατὰ σχῆμα κάλλους πλεονάζων (Hermog. *ibid.* pp. 396, 399). Lysurgus is 'lighter' in so far as his style is deficient in those qualities which make for μέγεθος. For ἐλαφρός, cf. also Alciphro IV 18 (II 3).

ἐξευτελισμός of disparagement.

ἐπανθεῖν mostly of the bloom of grace on the style of Lysias.

ἐπιλαμπρύνειν of giving clearness and definiteness to an uttered sound.

ἐπιταχύνειν (cf. ταχύς, τάχος) of accelerating the pace of a sentence, *C.V.* 20 p. 92 (bis); cf. Schol. Hom. *Il.* I 530 (Vol. III D.) τάχος συλλαβῶν, XVII 605 (Vol. IV D.) τὸ τῆς ἀπαγγελίας τάχος (cf. *de Thuc.* 24 p. 363), XXIII 392 (Vol. IV D.) ταχύνειν τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν, and cf. XX. 456 (Vol. IV D.).

ἐπιτροχάδην of a somewhat cursory, summary account (cf. ἐπιτροχάζειν), *de Thuc.* 10 p. 340, 14 p. 345, *II ad Amm.* 2 p. 422, cf. Phot. *bibl. cod.* 34 p. 7 A, 81 p. 64 A.

ἐπιτροχάλος of a light, 'tripping' movement in composition, *C.V.* 18 p. 76, *de Dem.* 40 p. 216, cf. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. IV 907a W. τῆς τροχαλῆς ψδῆς τὸ μέλος ἐκίνησεν and *ibid.* 907b εὐτρόχαλος δὲ ἡ εὐκόλως καὶ ὁμαλῶς καὶ ἐμμελῶς ῥέονσα.

ἐρείδεσθαι of the firm planting of words in a sentence.

εὐκόρυνφος of rounded periods which rise well, *de Dem.* 40 p. 217, 43 p. 227 (ἀκόρυνφος in *C.V.* 22 p. 110). Roberts understands κορυφή in these adjectives of the beginning of a period, but there is no warrant for such a meaning. The use of ἀκέφαλος in metric, and by Ioann. Sard. *op. cit.* p. 98 R. of a λόγος that lacks a προοίμιον (cf. Lucian *de Conscr. Hist.* 23) is hardly evidence for ἀκόρυνφος as 'without a beginning' (ἀκέφαλος sometimes seems also to mean 'without an end', see Suidas' ἀκέφαλος μῦθος ἐπὶ τῶν ἀτελῇ λεγόντων εἶρηται ἡ παροιμία); nor is 'caput' as used by Cicero in *Orat.* 59, 199 'qua re cum aures extremum semper expectent in eoque acquiescant, id vacare numero non oportet, sed ad hunc exitum iam a principio ferri debet verborum illa comprehensio et tota a capite ita fluere, ut ad extremum veniens ipsa consistat'. In the Dionysius passages it is the rounded form of the period that is in question and this is regarded as a rise and fall. In *de Dem.* 43 τῶν δὲ περιόδων αἱ μὲν εἰσιν εὐκόρυνφοι καὶ στρογγύλαι ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τόρνον, αἱ δὲ ὑπτιαί τε καὶ κεχυμέναί καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν τὰς βάσεις περιττάς Ernesti *op. cit.* s.v. εὐκόρυνφος is right in taking εὐκ. and στρ. as parallel expressions of a single idea; in *C.V.* 22 ἡ τε περίοδος . . . οὐκ ἔχει τὴν βάσιν εὐγγραμμον καὶ

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περιφερῇ, ἀλλ' ἀκόρυφός τις φαίνεται καὶ ἀκατάστροφος, Upton rightly translated 'tam fastigio destituta quam fine expers'.

εὐκρατός of a style nicely blended from the extremes.

εὐσταθής of the steady manner of the 'austere' style (*cf.* σταθερές).

εὐτροχος of easily-running rhythmical movement.

ζόφος (*de Dem.* 5 p. 137) of obscurity (*cf.* σκοτεινός, σκοτεινῶς, σκοτίζειν, μελαίνειν, and see below *s.v.* λευκῶς).

ἡδύνειν sometimes of sweetening (*i.e.* delighting) the ear or mind, but also of giving charm to an undistinguished thought, *cf.* ἡδυσμα in a simile, *de Thuc.* 23 p. 359.

ἡμιτελής of one whose knowledge is imperfect in regard to real nobility of language.

θάλλειν of the flowers of Plato's style and of the abundant use of certain figures.

θεατρικός of showy, stagy figures, rhythm, and composition.

ἰδρύνειν of settling a noun or verb in a sentence.

ἱλαρός (opp. to αὐστηρός and φοβερός) of cheerful style, *de Dem.* 8 p. 143, *ad Pomp.* 3 p. 240; *cf.* *Demetr. de Eloc.* 128, where *P* reads ὁ γλαφυρός λόγος χαριεντισμός ἐστι λόγος ἱλαρός (καὶ ἱλαρὸς λόγος *P* mg.); Eustath. *proem. ad Pind.* (Schol. *Pind.* III p. 289 D.) ἱλαρύνει μὲν ἀκοήν (*cf.* also φαιδρός in Ioann. Sard. *op. cit.* p. 28 R.). [In non-literary contexts there are some usages which have escaped the lexicographers, *e.g.* the application of ἱλαρός to things, *cf.* *Demetr. de Eloc.* 132 τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα, καὶν ὑπὸ Ἰππώνακτος λέγεται, χαριέντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ αὐτὸ ἱλαρὸν τὸ πρῶγμα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, 134 πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἀτερεῖ ἔστι φύσει καὶ στυγνά, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ λήγοντος γίνεται ἱλαρά, Schol. Hom. *Il.* XXIII 598 (Vol. IV D.) καὶ οἱ γεωργοὶ πολλάκις ἱλαρὰ εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ φυτόντα and *cf.* Schol. Hom. *Od.* I 44 D.]

καθαρός of pure language, *cf.* καθαρῶς, καθαρεύειν, ἀγνεύσθαι. Roberts, *Three Literary Letters* p. 193, seems to be wrong in giving the meaning 'clear, lucid' to καθαρός in *ad Pomp.* 4 p. 242, though it has this sense in *de Thuc.* 30 p. 376.

καθεστηκώς of the calm, composed style of Lysias' introductions, *de Lys.* 9 p. 17.

καθιδρύνειν of settling a history in (*i.e.* restricting it to) a single region, *de Thuc.* 6 p. 332, *cf.* *Antiq. Rom.* I 1.

καλλωπίζειν, of embellishing language, *de Dem.* 26 p. 185 τὴν φράσιν, 55 p. 248 τὴν διάλεκτον, *de Thuc.* 30 p. 375 τὴν λέξιν and in passive *de Dem.* 21 p. 176 ἡ διάλεκτος, *cf.* Hermog. π. 18. A p. 232 R. λόγον κεκαλλωπισμένον μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπλοῦ τε καὶ καθαροῦ, *et al.*, Procl. in *Tim.* I p. 59 D. τὸν Πλάτωνα . . . διὰ . . . τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων χάριτος καλλωπίσαντα τὸν λόγον, Schol. Lucian p. 225 R. τῷ κεκαλλωπισμένῃ ἔχειν τὴν φράσιν, Phot. *bibl. cod.* 181 p. 126 B, 214 p. 172 AB, 215 p. 173 B. *Cf.* also Procl. in *Tim.* I p. 86 D. πιθανότητος : . . . αὐτοφθοῦς καὶ ἀκαλλωπίστου (perhaps borrowed from Origen), Marcell. *vit. Thuc.* 44 p. 7 H. ἀκαλλώπιστος, Procl. in *Remp.* II p. 269 K. συνεφορμώσης δὲ αὐτῷ τῆς ἐρμηνείας ταῖς νοήσεσιν ἀκαλλωπίστως.

καλλωπισμός (*cf.* καλλώπισμα) of the embellishment of language, *de Dem.* 25 p. 184 τὸν περιττὸν καλλωπισμὸν τῆς ἀπαγγελίας, *de Thuc.* 29 p. 375 τὰ ἐπίθετα καλλωπισμοῦ χάριν κείται, *cf.* Procl. in *Tim.* I p. 86 D. (pl.), Schol. Hermog. π. εὔρ. D (Walz *Rh. Graec.* VII p. 846) εἰς καλλωπισμὸν τοῦ λόγου.

κατακλᾶσθαι of broken rhythms, *C.V.* 25 p. 131; and of unmanly writing, *C.V.* 18 p. 79.

κατημαξενίμενος of hackneyed topics, *cf.* the fairly frequent use of τετρημμένος and ὁδός.

κατακλείειν of closing down a discussion.

καταπυκνοῦν (*cf.* συμπυκνοῦν) of packing syllables with vowels or mutes.

κατασκελής of 'leggy' style, *de Isocr.* 2 pp. 56 f. The style of Isocrates ὑπτία . . . ἐστὶ μᾶλλον καὶ κεχμμένη πλονσίως, οὐδὲ δὴ σύντομος οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκελής καὶ βραδυτέρα τοῦ μετρίου. Ernesti *op. cit.* *s.v.* κατασκελής translates 'claudicans, tardo pede incedens', Liddell and Scott 'meagre', but Egger, *Denys d'Halicarnasse* p. 57

n. 2, is more probably correct in rendering 'allongé' (lit. 'tout en jambes'), i.e. 'leggy'. The sense given by L.S. is surely disproved by the description of the style of Isocrates in *de Dem.* 4 p. 136.

κατασπᾶν of pulling down or lowering style, *C.V.* 17 p. 92.

καταστρατηγεῖν of out-generalling a jury.

κεχυμένος of a tedious style.

κήρες of pestilential faults of style (*cf.* σίνος), *de Thuc.* 24 p. 363, *cf.* Long. *de Subl.*

29, 1 ἐπικήρον μέντοι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ περίφρασις κ.τ.λ.

κόλλα of words which cement or joint others together, *de Dem.* 44 p. 215, *cf.* προσκολλᾶν *de Dem.* 43 p. 224, and see Ernesti *op. cit.* s.v. κόλλησις.

κεκολωμένος of a loosely-hanging sentence, *cf.* κολυῶδης.

κόπτειν of a sound jarring on the ear.

κτίζειν of founding a philosophical school.

κυκλεῖν of changes in the meaning of terms.

κύκλος of a well-rounded period (*cf.* κύκλιος, κυκλοῦν, κυκλογραφεῖν). *E.g.* *de Isocr.* 2 p. 57 περιόδῳ τε καὶ κύκλῳ περιλαμβάνειν τὰ νοήματα (*cf.* *C.V.* 22 p. 97), *ibid.* 3 p. 59 τῷ κύκλῳ τῆς περιόδου (*cf.* *C.V.* 19 p. 87 εἰς περίδον κύκλος τις, which Roberts somewhat hazardingly translates 'one continually recurring period', as also in *C.V.* 23 p. 120 τῶν . . . περιόδων ὁ κύκλος 'the cycle of the periods'); *de Isocr.* 12 pp. 71 f. τῆς . . . ἀγωγῆς τῶν περιόδων τὸ κύκλιον, *de Dem.* 20 pp. 171 f. ταῦτ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἕως τελευτῆς κεκύκλωκε, *ibid.* 19 p. 167 τὴν πρώτην διάνοιαν ὀλίγοις ὀνόμασιν ἐξενεχθῆναι δυναμένην μακρὰν ποιεῖ κυκλογραφῶν. Roberts' translation of *ad Pomph.* 6 p. 247 τῆς κυκλικῆς εὐρυθμίας τῶν περιόδων 'the measured cadence of periods' obscures the idea of the roundedness and essential unity of a period which is conveyed by κύκλος and cognate words.

κωτίλος of a chattering style which is inappropriate to forensic oratory, *cf.* κωτίλλειν.

λαβύρινθος in *de Thuc.* 40 p. 392 πρὸς ταῦτα ποιεῖ τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἀποκρινόμενον λαβυρίνθων σκολιώτερα, *cf.* Eustath. *proem. ad Pind.* (Schol. Pind. III p. 289 D.) τὸ λαβυρινθῶδες τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ φράσεως.

λαΐνειν of the effect of smooth sound upon the ear.

λευκῶς, if right, of clear arrangement (contrast ζόφος above); *de Lys.* 6 p. 14 ταύτην (viz. τὴν στρογγύλην λέξιν) ὀλίγοι μὲν ἐμιμήσαντο, Δημοσθένης δὲ καὶ ὑπερεβάλετο πλὴν οὐχ οὕτως γε λευκῶς (MSS. οὕτως τελευκῶς or οὕτως εὐτελῶς) οὐδὲ ἀφελῶς ὥσπερ Λυσίας χρησάμενος αὐτῇ ἀλλὰ περιέργως καὶ πικρῶς. Kiessling accepted εὐτελῶς, which however is too depreciatory, *cf.* *de Din.* 11 p. 317 (*sc.* λόγῳ) εὐτελής τε ὦν καὶ κενὸς καὶ οὐκ ἀπέχων ἰδιωτικῆς φλυνρίας, *I ad Attm.* 10 p. 268, *de Thuc.* 6 p. 332, *et al.* (For the combination of ἀφελής and εὐτελής, *cf.* Hermog. π. ιδ. B p. 324 R. ἀφελεῖς ἐννοιαὶ καὶ αἱ πλησιάζειν πως δοκοῦσαι τῷ εὐτελεῖ, and *ibid.* pp. 322 (bis), 323.) Serious doubts, too, must be felt of the correctness of λευκῶς. The adjective λευκός, from having been used of clear, transparent water by the poets (*cf.* the later use of λευκαίνειν of clarifying oil) and of αἶγλη in the *Odyssey*, was used of the voice by Aristotle and later (than Dionysius) in reference to language; see Ernesti *op. cit.* s.v. λευκός (to whose illustrations may be added Schol. Hom. *Il.* III 222, Vol. III D.) and Liddell and Scott. Justification of λευκῶς as a critical term in Dionysius might be sought in his use of μελαίνειν *de Dem.* 5 p. 137; μέλας had much the same history as λευκός, and for its literary sense *cf.* *Anth. Pal.* XI 343, Athen. X 451 C φράσιν μελαίνω, Tryph. *de Trop.* III p. 194 Sp. τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος . . . μελαίνεται καὶ ἀμαυροῦται, *cf.* also Lycophron *Alex.* 7 Σφιγγὸς κελαινῆς γῆρην, where the paraphrases and scholia explain κελαινῆς by σκοτεινῆς, σκολιᾶς, ἀσήμεον with reference to the riddle. But the notion of transparency is not the most appropriate to the context of *de Lys.* 6; nothing in the words περιέργως καὶ πικρῶς (used as being the terms common on the lips of critics of the Demosthenic style; *cf.* the defence of Demosthenes by Dionysius in *de Dem.* 35

pp. 206

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pp. 206 f., 55 f. pp. 247 ff.; in the former passage *περιεργίαν καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν δὴ τοῦτο καὶ πικρόν* refers to choice of words, not to composition) necessarily involves an antithesis to clearness. What is wanted is emphasis on the absence of natural simplicity in Demosthenes. *ἀπλοϊκῶς* might give the sense, but in *de Dem.* 45 p. 230 it is used in conjunction with *γενναίως καὶ μετὰ σεμνότητος αὐστηρᾶς* (cf. Schol. Hom. *Il.* XXIII 818 Vol. IV D. for *ἀπλοϊκῶς* and *γενναίως*), which hardly suggests the right idea; Roberts' conjecture *ἐπεικῶς* (*Three Literary Letters* p. 201) approaches nearly to this moral nuance of *ἀπλοϊκῶς*. The fondness of Dionysius for coupling a direct expression with a negative expression of the same meaning makes <ἀνεπι>τηδεύτως a probable correction; cf. *C.V.* 22 p. 97 τὸ ἀνεπιτήδευτον . . . καὶ ἀφελές (of the composition of a period), *de Thuc.* 23 p. 359 σύνθεσιν . . . ὀνομάτων . . . ἀφελῇ καὶ ἀνεπιτήδευτον. The adverb appears in *de Lys.* 8 p. 16 ἀνεπιτηδεύτως καὶ οὐ κατὰ τέχνην, αὐτομάτως δέ πως καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε σύγκειται. For the adjective, cf. Lucian *de Conscri. Hist.* 44, Ioann. Sard. *op. cit.* p. 24 R.; for the adverb, cf. Schol. Hom. *Il.* XVI 46 (Vol. II D.) For similar forms in Dionysius, cf. *ἀκόμψεντος* (-ως), *ἀπραγματεύτως*, *ἀταμεύτως*, *ἀτεχνέντεος*. In *de Dem.* 13 p. 156 Dionysius commenting on a passage from Dem. LIV, which he compares with a narrative of Lysias, asks οὐχὶ σύντομα καὶ στρογγύλα . . . καὶ τὴν ἀφελῇ καὶ ἀκατάσκεπον ἐπιφαίνοντα φύσιν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα; These are the qualities in *στρογγύλη λέξις*, viz. plainness and lack of artificiality, which are referred to in *de Lys.* 6.

λιγυρός of clear-sounding expression, *de Dem.* 5 p. 137.

μαλακός of weak, womanly style, e.g. *de Dem.* 20 p. 171 τὸ τῆς λέξεως . . . μαλακόν (cf. *μαλθακός* used of rhythms, etc.).

μελιχρός of honeyed, sweetness of expression.

μετέωρος of lofty style, *de Isocr.* 19 p. 121 τὴν μὲν ποιητικὴν κατασκευὴν καὶ τὸ μετέωρον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ πομπικὸν εἰρημένον, cf. Long. *de Subl.* 3, 2 for a distinction between *μετέωρος* and *ὑψηλός*: καὶ τίνα τῶν Καλλισθένους ὄντα οὐχ ὑψηλά, ἀλλὰ μετέωρα.

μικρόκομπος of the dapper style of Hegesias.

νεωτεροποιία of revolutionary innovation in language.

ὁδηγός of an 'art' as a guide to oratory.

ὄργανον of an instrument of style, *II ad Amm.* 2 p. 428.

παραπλήρωμα of a supplementary word or phrase inserted for stylistic rather than logical reasons.

παρθενωπός of soft, smooth words, *C.V.* 23 p. 112.

παχύς of a gross, coarse style, *de Isaeo* 19 p. 121 (comp.), *de Dem.* 5 p. 137 (comp.); adv. *παχύ* in *de Dem.* 27 p. 188. Cf. Phot. *bibl. cod.* 225 p. 242 Α παχυτέραις . . . λέξεσι, and Schol. Arist. *Frogs* 1445 D. ἀγροικότερον καὶ παχύτερον (as explanation of ἀμαθέστερον).

περιγραφή of rhetorical ornament, *de Thuc.* 26 p. 366.

περιπλανᾶσθαι of disorderly straggling metre and rhythm.

πλάσμα of the types of style, *de Dem.* 34 pp. 203 f., and of the historical manner, *ad Pomp.* 4 p. 242, cf. *C.V.* 4 p. 18. For the history of this term, see J. Stroux, *De Theophrasti Virtutibus Dicendi* p. 92.

πομπικός of the stately style of Isocrates and Theopompus, and of Aeschines' choice of words.

προσερانیζεσθαι of style that is overwhelmed with supplementary contributions.

προσυλακτεῖν of snarling criticism.

προϋφίστασθαι of superiority in value.

πτωχός and *πλούσιος* of poverty or wealth of thought.

πυκνότης (cf. *πυκνός* and *καταπυκνοῦν* above) of terse, condensed expression.

ῥινᾶν of Thucydides' prolonged filing and polishing of his work, *de Thuc.* 24 p. 361; cf. *συγχεῖν*, *περιτορνεῖν*, *τορνεῖν*. Cf. also Arist. *Frogs* 902 κατερρινημένος, Schol. Arist. *Frogs* 86 R. ἄζεστος ἐν τῇ ποιήσει, and see Ernesti *op. cit.* s.v. ἀποτορνεῖν.

ῥυπαρός of a sordid expression, *C.V.* 12 p. 46, cf. Long. *de Subl.* 43, 5 οὐ γὰρ δεῖ καταντᾶν ἐν τοῖς ὕψεσιν εἰς τὰ ῥιπαρά καὶ ἐξυβρισμένα.

σημειώδης of the strange, portentous language of Thucydides, *de Isocr.* 2 p. 56, cf. Demetr. *de Eloc.* 208 φευγέτω δὴ καὶ τὰ σημειώδη σχήματα.

σκενωρία of technical finesse, *de Thuc.* 5 p. 331, 29 p. 374, *C.V.* 25 p. 132; cf. Procl. *in Tim.* I p. 398 D. ὁ δὲ γε θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος πᾶσαν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐξηγήσιν ὡς ἂν λίαν περιττῶς διεσκευωρημένην ἐπιρραπίζει (cf. ἐσκευωρημένος *ibid.* II p. 278, III p. 56).

σκληραγωγεῖν of harshly disciplining style.

σκολιός of 'twisty' style, e.g. *de Thuc.* 27 p. 371, 32 p. 378 (comp.), and cf. its use (along with σκοτεινός and συμπεπλεγμένος) of dithyrambs by Herm. *in Phaedr.* pp. 55, 61, 62 C., and cf. σκολιῶς (along with πανούργως and ἐσχηματισμένως) *ibid.* p. 49.

σπαδονισμός of the convulsive effect of a concurrence of aspirates upon sound as uttered by the voice; perhaps best derived from the feminine noun σπαδών, 'convulsion, spasm'.

στερεός of the hard solidity of Thucydides' style (cf. στιβαρός, στριφνός, στριφνότης); *de Din.* 8 p. 308 τὸ . . . εὐτονον καὶ στερεὸν καὶ δεινόν, cf. Philod. *de Poem.* V p. 17 J. ἐπιζητῶ τίνα τὰ στερεὰ καὶ μείζω καλεῖ ποιήματα and *ibid.* p. 16 τὰ μὴ εὐτονα (Jensen renders both στερεὰ and εὐτονα by 'straffen'). In his essay *Neoptolemos und Horaz* p. 119, Jensen notes that these seem to be the only passages in critical writings where the term στερεός appears as a critical term; in a fairly extensive reading of the critics and of scholia I have noticed no other examples. [The combination of στερεός and εὐτονος appears in non-critical contexts, e.g. Schol. Hom. *Il.* XIII 564 (Vol. II D.) ἀκάνθης εἶδος ὁ σκῶλος, ἡ πυρωθεῖσα εὐτονος γίνεται. σκῶλον τὸν σκόλοπα· οἱ γὰρ ἄγροικοὶ ἀποξύνοντες τὰ ξύλα πυρακτοῦσι τὸ ἄκρον, ὅπως πιλωθὲν εἴη στερρότερον, and *ibid.* XV 625 (Vol. II D.) οἷς δὲ (viz. δένδροις) προσπίπτει τραχὺς ἄηρ καὶ ἀνεμώδης, ταῦτα ταῖς τῶν πνευμάτων τριβόμενα πληγαῖς εὐτονον . . . ἔχει τὴν στερρότητα, ὥς φησι Πλούταρχος ἐν μελέταις Ὀμηρικαῖς, and Porphyry's note on gold *ibid.* XX 271 (Vol. IV D.) Photius *bibl. cod.* 271 p. 504 A contrasts στερεός with τρυφερός.] Dionysius uses εὐτονος also to describe the style of Thucydides, *de Imit.* p. 209 τὸ . . . στρογγύλον καὶ πυκνὸν καὶ εὐτονον καὶ ἐναγώνιον. Cf. *ibid.* p. 212 ὁ δὲ Δημοσθενικὸς (sc. λόγος) εὐτονος τῇ φράσει (cf. Phot. *orb. cit.* 181 p. 126 B τὸ . . . εὐτονον καὶ πικρόν), and *ibid.* p. 204 Ἀντίμαχος δὲ εὐτονίας καὶ ἀγωνιστικῆς τραχύτητος κ.τ.λ., cf. Hermog. π. ἰδ. A p. 293 R. εὐτονίας καὶ δυνάμειος.

συγκορυφοῦν of bringing to a head or completing a narrative.

συγκυλίεσθαι (for this form cf. κυλίεσθαι *Antiq. Rom.* VIII 39, προκυλίεσθαι II 35, VI 26, VIII 39, 63) or συγκατακυλίνδεσθαι (cf. συγκαταφέρεισθαι) of style (in Hom. *Od.* XI 596-8) that rolls down in time with the boulder of Sisyphus (κατακυλίεσθαι being used of the stone).

συγχρώζειν (if right) of the close joining of words, *C.V.* 23 p. 119 ταῦτ' οὖν συνήλειπται τε καὶ συγκέχρωσται (Upton reported also a reading συγκέχρηται). The meaning of the term is uncertain, though it would presumably have to signify either the blending of colours or close physical contact. Elsewhere in Dionysius συναλείφεισθαι appears several times, e.g. *de Dem.* 40 p. 215 συνεξέεισθαι καὶ συνηλεῖσθαι (Roberts seems to be wrong in equating συγχεῖν with 'expolire', as I hope to show in a future article on Demetrius), *ibid.* 38 p. 211 μήτε συναλείφεισθαι μήτε συγχέεισθαι (the critics normally use συγχέειν to signify confusion; perhaps read συγχεῖσθαι), *C.V.* 23 p. 112 συνηλεῖσθαι τε . . . καὶ συνυφάνθαι. This last combination, coupled with the use of συγκλώθειν in reference to juncture by Herm. *in Phaedr.* p. 230 C. and Procl. *in Remf.* pp. 64, 162 K. (cf. *ibid.* p. 63 ἀσύγκλωστος) and in *Tim.* I p. 424 D., suggests that in *C.V.* 23 Dionysius may have written συγκέκλωσται. Cf. also συμπλέκειν, συμπλοκή in Dionysius.

συνδρομή of a concourse of particular characteristics, *de Dem.* 50 p. 236; perhaps a medical metaphor.

συνεδρεύειν of the intimate relations of adverbs and verbs, and of the presence of individual characteristics in men.

συνολισθαίνειν of the slipping of words into one another:

σφίγγειν of the tight binding or pinning together of words, *de Dem.* 19 p. 168 ταῦτα κεκολλημένα σφίγγει, *cf.* [Aristid.] *Lib. Rhet.* B p. 97 S. τὸν λόγον . . . στρογγύλον γίνεσθαι καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ κατεσφικμένον, *Phot. bibl. cod.* 61 p. 20 B συνεσφικμένος ὡς περ Λυσίας.

ταμειεύεσθαι (*cf.* τεταμειμένως, ἀταμειύτως) of careful or economical arrangement; *cf.* [Aristid.] *Lib. Rhet.* B p. 123 S., *Schol. Hom. Il. XXIV* 804 (Vol. IV D.) *et al.*, *Schol. Soph. O.T.* 8 P.

τηλαγυῖς of conspicuously clear meaning.

τρυφερός of soft, voluptuous rhythms, words, and figures.

ὑπαγωγικός of a slowly-moving period.

ὑπτιος of the style of Isocrates, and of his supine, tedious imitators.

φιλο- compounds, *e.g.* φιλαίτιος, φιλάνθρωπος, φιλαπεχθήμων, φιλάρχαιος, φιλόκαινος, φιλόκαλος, φιλόλογος, φιλοπονία, φιλοτεχνεῖν (*cf.* φιλοτέχνης).

χαμαιτυπῆς of grovelling style, *de Thuc.* 27 p. 371; *cf.* *Lucian de Conscr. Hist.* 16 ὑπόμνημα . . . χαμαιπετές, *Phot. bibl. cod.* 97 p. 84 A τὴν φράσιν . . . χαμαιπετής, 180 p. 125 B λέξει . . . χαμαιπετεῖ, *Rabe Prol. Syll.* p. 391 χαμαιπετῇ . . . λόγον, *cf. ibid.* p. 392 n. τὸ χαμαίζηλον.

χρῶμα of (rhetorical) colouring in verses or speeches, *de Thuc.* 24 p. 363, 42 p. 398, *C.V.* 4 p. 17, 20 p. 88 (χρήμασιν Usener). *Cf.* χρωματίζειν of the colouring effected by ὑπόκρισις, *de Dem.* 22 p. 177; *cf.* also *Ioann. Sicul.* in *Rabe Prol. Syll.* p. 419.

ῥαϊσμός of elegant ornament in language, *C.V.* 1 p. 4 (*cf.* *Plut. vit. Fab.* 1 ῥαϊσμός . . . χάρις). *Cf.* *de Din.* 7 p. 307 χάρις καὶ ῥα (this combination appears also in *C.V.* 11 pp. 37, 39, *Procl. in Tim.* I p. 14 D.), *Procl. op. cit.* p. 86 ὀνομάτων ῥας καὶ ποικιλίας (cited as the words of Longinus). For the adjective ῥαῖος see *Hermog.* π. 18. A p. 311 R. ὁ . . . λεγόμενος ῥαῖος λόγος καὶ ἡ ἀβρότης, *Phot. bibl. cod.* 158 p. 101 B καλοῦ καὶ ῥαίου λόγον. For ῥαίεσθαι, *cf.* *Procl. op. cit.* I p. 59 ῥαίεσθαι πῶς εἰκοι καὶ ψυχαγωγοῦντι τὸν ἀκροατήν. *Cf.* also *Phot. op. cit.* 214 p. 172 AB οὐ μὴν γε τοῖς κεκαλλωπισμένοις καὶ περιττοῖς ἐξωραϊζομένη (sc. ἡ φράσις) χρώμασί τε καὶ ποικίλμασι τῆς ῥητορίας, *Phot. Lex.* καθωραίζεται · σεμνύνεται.

J. F. LOCKWOOD.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

THE DATE OF THE HESIODIC *SHIELD*.

IN attempting to date the *Shield*¹ several complementary methods are possible. Roughly these may be classed as literary, historical and archaeological. The literary method indicates that the *Shield* comes late in the Hesiodic corpus: in particular the use of the *F* is careful. The historical method suggests a preciser upper limit. Wilamowitz² believed that the point of lines 393-401, which give the season in which the combat between Herakles and Kyknos took place, can only be that a commemorative festival³ was held—at the temple of Apollo at Pagasae, since the scene is laid in Apollo's sanctuary. Mazon⁴ continues that the reputation of the temple dates from the end of the Sacred War and the establishment at Pherae of a dynasty with close connections with Delphi (which Kyknos was in the habit of defrauding⁵): he therefore sets the *terminus post quem* at about 590. This argument is attractive and possible. Several scholars have attempted to secure a lower limit from the last sentence in *Hypothesis A*: καὶ Στρησίχορος δὲ φησιν Ἡσιόδου εἶναι τὸ ποίημα. But as Wilamowitz observes,⁶ we do not know whether the poem in which this mention came (plausibly a *Kyknos*) was a genuine work of Stesichoros. Certainly it need not make the *Shield* much earlier than the Stesichorean poem, since our 'Hesiod' wrote his epyllion for incorporation in the *Ehoiai* which was attributed to the genuine Hesiod, and an insertion into such a work could have been very quickly accepted. Mazon's lower limit of 560 is then on insecure grounds.⁷ Thirdly there is the possibility that analysis of the decoration of Herakles' shield might give useful comparisons to the conclusions of archaeologists on the chronology of Greek art. It is this method that I shall attempt.

Perhaps it would be as well to summarize the system of chronology used by archaeologists for the archaic period. From the great mass of objects of that period⁸ it has been possible to construct main series of development for certain important classes. These series can be safely anchored in the early fifth century. Before that time there are two shaky contacts with historical events at about 525 and 560.⁹ Earlier still comes the western colonization, for which the foundation dates given by Thucydides are accepted as a necessary assumption. However, in history and literature these foundation dates are equally assumed, so that archaeology swims or

¹ The literature of the *Shield* is considerable and much of it difficult to procure. I give a select bibliography.

Texts:

A. Rzach, *Hesiodi Carmina* (Teubner 1902 and 1908).

F. Mazon, *Hésiode* (Budé 1928).

H. G. Evelyn-White, *Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homeric* (Loeb 1914).

Commentaries:

F. Studniczka, *Ueber den Schild des Herakles, Serta Havelliana*, 50-83 (1896). Mainly archaeological.

U. v. Wilamowitz, *Hermes* xl (1905), 116-24. Mainly textual.

P. Mazon, *op. cit.*, 119-29.

For suggestions and criticism I should like to thank Professor D. S. Robertson, Professor T. B. L. Webster and Mr. J. M. Cook.

² *Op. cit.*, 119.

³ Wilamowitz on line 472 suggests a *Totenfest*.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 124.

⁵ Possibly then the behaviour and fate of

Kyknos is meant to recall that of the Crisaeans.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 122. Nor is the date of S. certain.

⁷ It is the reasoning, not the conclusions, of which I have doubts.

⁸ For example the quantity of painted Proto-corinthian and Corinthian pottery of the seventh and sixth centuries that is available to students is enormous, and must reach the tens of thousands.

⁹ About 525, the sculptures of the Siphnian treasury at Delphi, which is supposed to have been put up shortly before the Spartan expedition to Samos (Hdt. iii. 57-8; but Herodotus does not specify the interval). About 560, the Panathenaic amphorae in the British Museum (B130) and in Halle, the earliest of our long series: it is assumed that Pisistratus introduced athletic contests into the Panathenaic festival in 566, that Panathenaic amphorae immediately became prizes, and that the Halle amphora is from one of the very earliest meetings. See E. Langlotz, *Zur Zeitbestimmung der streng-v.f. Vasenmalerei*.

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sinks with them. Between these 'fixed' dates archaeologists space their series to give a plausible average of development in style: so that archaeological chronology for this period is by no means absolute, although it is unlikely that the margin of error at any point would be great.

To return to the inquiry into the decoration of the shield described by 'Hesiod'. It must first be considered what are the sources of this decoration, and how far contemporary art was such a source. The possible sources may be divided into three groups,—first, the writer's unfettered imagination or observation; secondly, earlier art, whether actually seen or known only from description; thirdly, the art of 'Hesiod's' own time. It is on a *priori* reasoning unlikely that a writer would be able to invent the decoration of an elaborate work of art without any reference to some phase of art with which he was familiar; and even if he had such ability, he would still have to make himself intelligible to his public. Thus, in any modern phantasy of machinery, switchboards, cogwheels and bulbs must play a large part; for they are the terms in which the present public conceives of machinery. Such reasoning is strengthened when one comes to the particular consideration of the *Shield*. It appears the work of a hack poet, who dispenses to a great extent with the process of original invention. If there should be other sources available, the theory of detached inspiration ought, I think, to be rejected for this 'Hesiod'.

The second group of possible sources is earlier art. During the archaic period, that is to say roughly between 700 and 480, Greek art developed continuously and steadily. The past might excite admiration, but not imitation: archaism was irregular and never strong. It is most unlikely that 'Hesiod' in describing this *tour de force* of decorative metal-work would have chosen unfashionable models. But though he might not have imitated earlier works of art which he had seen, there remained the literary masterpieces in the *Iliad*.¹ Homer's shield of Achilles may or may not be intelligible in the light of Mycenaean art: in the archaic age it must have been incomprehensible as a description of an actual artistic work. But Homer's greatness and distance gave a traditional sanctity to his poetry and its contents. The dull and imitative poetaster of the *Shield* based his epyllion on Homer and drew freely on Homer's shields, perhaps the more freely because their decoration suggested no real artistic school to him.

It is a reasonable presumption that where the decoration of the shield of Herakles is not borrowed from Homer we may expect traces of the art contemporary with the composition of this poem. In fact, a source for almost every part of the decoration can be found, without any difficulty, either in the *Iliad* or in common subjects or types of a certain period of archaic art, as known to us from pottery; and the decoration of pottery was, in the archaic period, an important and progressive art, and one which by the accident of material has been tolerably well preserved.

And so to the discussion of the details of Herakles' shield. 'In his hands he took his flashing shield' (which our poet always calls *σάκος*, though the Alexandrine title is the *Ἄσπις*), 'a shield none ever broke with bolt or crushed, a marvel to behold'. Incidentally *θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι* (140), immediately before the description, is picked up by *θαῦμα ἰδεῖν καὶ Ζηνὶ βαρυκτύπῳ* (318), the first words after the description,—the author lets the reader know what his emotions should be.²

Lines 144-67 have suffered much textual criticism. Rzsch rejects 151-3. Studniczka emends δὲ δράκοντος in 144 to δ' ἀδάμαντος and rejects 151-9 and 163.³

¹ If there were similar passages in lost works, we have no record of them; and I do not see any sign or need of such extra sources for the compilation of this piece. The imitation even of Homer is confined to two passages, the arms

of Agamemnon in A and the shield of Achilles in Σ.

² Compare the emphasis on the divine manufacture of the shield in 219, 244, 297, 313.

³ *Op. cit.*, 58-67.

Wilamowitz also emends to δ' ἀδάμαντος and rejects 156-9.¹ Mazon rejects 154-60 and 163. Evelyn-White emends to δ' ἀδάμαντος. Yet there seems no adequate reason against the testimony of the MSS, though the archetype be not old. Textual criticism of the *Shield* is difficult, where the MSS are united. The poem is in itself disjointed and unequal; so that irrelevance and clumsiness are not alone adequate reasons to emend or expurgate. In this passage the varying *Stilgefühl* of the critics is a fair warning.²

144-53. The MSS read

ἐν μέσῳ δὲ δράκοντος ἔην φόβος οὐ τι φατεῖος,
ἔμπαλιν ὁσοῖσιν πυρὶ λαμπομένοισι δεδορκώς·
τῶν καὶ ὀδόντων μὲν πλῆτο στόμα λευκὰ θεόντων,
δεινῶν, ἀπλήτων, ἐπὶ δὲ βλοσυροῖο μετώπου
δεινὴ ἔρις πεπότητο . . .

145

144 is disputed. The Munich scholiast offers the reading δ' ἀδάμαντος and has been followed by some scholars. Presumably, with Studniczka, they would like a Gorgoneion rather than a snake in the centre of the shield: there seems no other reason. That the writer had a fairly clear pictorial conception of his centrepiece seems to me beyond doubt; that it was a concept based on contemporary art seems likely. The arguments then for this emendation are that the Gorgoneion was a favourite archaic shield sign; that the archaic type of Gorgon explains the emphasis on the eyes and the mouthful of teeth; and that to follow so closely after a δράκων with a band of ὀφίων κεφαλαί is clumsy. On the other hand, snakes are common enough on archaic shields,³ and the facial details of 145-7 will pass. Ἐμπαλιν δεδορκώς does not make sense of a bodiless Gorgoneion,⁴ but does of a snake with head turned back. As for repetition, 'Hesiod' is a clumsy composer, and anyhow Gorgons get full treatment later.⁵ Further, φόβος does not mean a (male) bearded figure or head of Gorgon type: that theory received its *coup de grace* from Blinkenberg.⁶

On the snake's grim brow δεινὴ ἔρις πεπότητο. Most editors print 'Ἐρις.' To judge by their use of capitals elsewhere they assume with Studniczka that a small

¹ *Op. cit.*, 119-20. He agrees largely with Studniczka in his outlook towards the *Shield*. See below, pp. 213-14.

² The best criticism is by Wilamowitz (*op. cit.*, 116-24), but it is partly vitiated by his whole-hogging belief in the reality of the shield. The limit of reasonable criticism of the text of the *Shield*, where the MSS agree, is the cautious removal of doublets.

³ An elaborately convoluted snake as a shield sign on an Attic *Bauchamphora* of the second quarter of the sixth century, Halle 590. Much later Epaminondas was honoured with a δράκων (Paus. viii, 11, 8). Cf. Pind., *P.* viii, 45-7.

⁴ Studniczka (*op. cit.*, 61-2) argues that the spectator looks at the Gorgon's head and the Gorgon's head looks back, hence ἔμπαλιν, at him. This is thin.

⁵ Homer repeats similarly: he gives Agamemnon six δράκοντες on his breastplate and a single δράκων on his τελαμών (A 26-8, 38-40).

⁶ *R.A.* 1924, 1, 267-79: an admirable article, which firmly disposes of Weizsäcker's claims (Roscher *Lexikon* iii, 2934, 11).

R. Hampe, in an illuminating excursus (*Frühe griechische Sagenbilder*, 58-67), argues that there are three sources of the Gorgon legend and

type: (1) the apotropaic masks with monstrous human features (such as those from Tiryns, e.g. his pl. 42); (2) the episode of Perseus and Medusa (Medusa is vaguely a δεινὸν πέλωρον and not more exactly defined); (3) the two immortal Gorgons. To Homer the Gorgon is still a vague monster, notable only for its look: he makes four mentions, in E 741-2, A 36-7, Θ 349, λ 633-5. The mythological synthesizers of the Hesiodic period combined (2) and (3) (e.g. *Theog.*, 270-81). In the first half of the seventh century artists brought in (1) as the type of the Gorgons, though apotropaic antefixes continued independently. The pursuit of Perseus was a slightly later novelty, borrowed probably from the Harpies. Compare the gradual identification of the man-horse hybrid of art with the Centaurs of literature (see E. Buschor, *A.J.A.* 1934, 128-32; early seventh century); and of human-headed birds with the Sirens (no certain instance in art or literature till the early sixth century): whereas in Homer both Centaurs and Sirens were of human form. The author of the *Shield* describes both Gorgons and Centaurs in their developed archaic style.

⁷ So Rzach, Mazon, Evelyn-White.

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personified figure of Eris hovers on the head of the snake or monster. Studniczka cites as a parallel in art Athena springing from the head of Zeus,¹ to which might be added the birth of Pegasos from Medusa's bleeding neck. But there the juxtaposition is the essence of the story and unavoidable. To Studniczka's composition there is no parallel in archaic art. Below, in 236-7, we read

ἐπὶ δὲ δεινοῖσι καρήνοισι | Γοργείοις ἰδονεῖτο μέγας φόβος.²

which seems a fair comparison. And here φόβος can hardly be personified, since, though single, it would have to straddle the heads of two creatures. If then this centrepiece was conceived throughout pictorially by 'Hesiod', ἐρίς here must be an abstraction: if Ἔρις is personified, he has ceased to think of his artistic inspiration.³

154-60. Furtwängler deleted these lines, and Mazon follows him; but they are in keeping with the poem. 156-9 are lifted from Σ 535-8; only ἰθύνειον is substituted for δμίλειον, which perhaps indicates that these lines were in the text of the *Shield* before the Alexandrine recension of Homer. Nor was this 'Hesiod', who tagged his poem on to over fifty lines of the *Ehoiai*, afraid of patchwork; and if, as seems likely, δράκοντος is the right reading in 144, some other subject is acceptable between the δράκοντος φόβος and the ὀφίων κεφαλαί. Irrelevance and clumsiness are strange arguments for tampering with the text of the *Shield*. This passage is anyhow based on Homer, and shows no trace of the influence of archaic art.⁴

161-7. Next there were twelve snake protomes. There seems to be no difference between δράκων and ὄφεις; compare 161 and 166. The repetition of idea only shows the limited imagination of the author. He himself felt so, and added a miraculous detail, that their teeth clattered. If emphasis is to be laid on these teeth, one might compare the plastic devices on some of the shields represented by mid sixth century vase-painters:⁵ such devices might have supplied the idea, but a *silentio* 'Hesiod' conceived of his snakes as flat decoration, if indeed he had any pictorial concept of them; for in Λ 26-8, part of a passage used elsewhere in the *Shield*, there are six snakes, κύνειοι also, on Agamemnon's breastplate.⁶

The next seventy lines break new ground. The author has laid his Homer aside and writes, except perhaps in one section, from his own knowledge and observation—of art. Homer's vision defies clear analysis: here are compact and clearly defined scenes and groups.

168-77. This paragraph gives a sounder of swine (of undetermined sex unless χλοῦνης helps)⁷ advancing to fight a pride of lions. The combatants are in two rows

¹ *Op. cit.*, 64-6. His comparison to the Idaean shields I do not admit: the connection of the figures he cites is accidental.

² Rzach and Mazon here use a small initial.

³ So Lippold, *Griechische Schilde*; *Münchener Arch. Stud.*, 486 (1909).

The Ἔρις ἀλσχιόνη τὸ εἶδος of the chest of Cypselus (Paus., v, 19, 2) cannot properly be compared; for there she attends a duel of Ajax and Hector, and is of full size.

⁴ Wilamowitz (*op. cit.*, 119-20) deletes 157-9 and makes the eight *Scheusäler* of 154-6 join Eris on the head of a central Phobos. This is intolerable artistically; and Wilamowitz's criterion seems to be generally for the *Shield* 'das Echte erkannt man wieder daran, dass es darstellbar ist' (118). Anyhow the use of the introductory ἐν δὲ in this piece is to mark the transition to another group of figures.

⁵ Satyr heads in low relief appear occasionally on Attic vases of this time: e.g. the Vatican amphora of Exekias (referred to below, p. 213,

n. 7). A bull's head on the lip-cup by Phrynos, British Museum B424 (J. D. Beazley, *A.B.S.*, pl. 1, 2).

⁶ Studniczka, after bracketing 151-9, made the twelve snake heads a halo for his Gorgoneion,—an excellent archaic composition, but achieved at the cost of nine lines, one emendation and some slippery exegesis. Wilamowitz (*op. cit.*, 119-20) agrees. But ἐν δὲ, as used elsewhere in the *Shield*, seems to introduce a new and separate composition, certainly not organically connected with what goes before.

⁷ Judging by early usage χλοῦνης is an epithet of a boar and not of a sow. It is not likely that 'Hesiod' understood it as 'castrated', the meaning familiar to Aristotle: few animals were more consistently or better sexed by archaic artists than the pig, male or female. Incidentally the sow did not come into her own till the middle of the sixth century. Wilamowitz (*Aischylos; Interpretationen*, 217-9) supposes that the early meaning should be from 'dangerous' to 'strong'.

or files (*στίχες*). In the middle, presumably, lie already dead a lion and two boars, one on either side.¹ Perhaps Σ 579-81, where two lions maul a bull, suggested the propriety of an animal scene on the shield of Herakles. But the 'Hesiodic' group smacks strongly of archaic art, with its long lines of processing animals and dislike of overlapping among them. Regrettably for a clue to the date, this sort of composition continues throughout archaic art: lions are common from the end of the eighth century, boars from about the middle of the seventh, and though the representation of bristles becomes freer in the sixth century that is not enough upon which to build up a theory.

178-90. After the animals comes a heroic combat of the Lapiths² and the Centaurs. 'Centaurs', armed as here with pine branches, appear in Greek art in the second half of the eighth century.³ They do not appear in mythological contexts much before the middle of the seventh century, and then it is with Herakles. The earliest example I know in which their opponents are Lapiths is on the neck of the François vase.⁴ Apparently the sides are in two long lines,—*Κένταυροι δ' ἐτίρωθεν ἐναντίοι ἡγερέθοντο*; although later they are *συναίγδην* and *αὐτοσχεδὸν ὀργιζόντο*. This seems to follow a formula of archaic art, which avoided representation in depth, the pictorial disposition ----- being equivalent to $\frac{1}{3}$ of life.

The naming of the combatants is important. How was the spectator to recognize Hopleus and Exadios and Arktoḥ or the other lesser Lapiths and Centaurs? Surely because their names were written against them. The labelling of figures, to judge by vases, was sporadic in the seventh century; the first example I know of is Protoattic of about 665.⁵ The East never took to this innovation: the Euphorbos plate,⁶ of Rhodian manufacture of about 600, is a solitary example; but the Euphorbos plate is clearly based on free painting, so that the addition of names may have been more general than one would suppose from the study of vases. However, the extensive, and even otiose, use of names on vases begins with the decade 580-70; and in the absence of other evidence, since archaic vase-painters were often artists of the first rank, I should imagine that such naming had just become fashionable. The poet had in mind, when writing this passage, a work or works of contemporary art, on which a line of Lapiths on one side meets a line of Centaurs on the other (hence nine Lapiths are mentioned against seven Centaurs,—for Centaurs take up more space than men; and against each figure is written a name).⁷

191-237. The next paragraph is divided into five groups,—Ares, Athena, Apollo, a harbour and the pursuit of Perseus. The first three and the last are regular archaic subjects, though the choice of Ares and Athena is probably due to their

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¹ Giving this composition,—Swine, dead Boar,

dead Lion, dead Boar, Lions. Probably each of the slaughtered boars is being torn by a pair of lions, and perhaps lying on its back, with its snout touching the ground—*ἀλχένας ἐπεπύκτες*.

² List based on A 263-5.

³ First common in Attic Late Geometric of the last quarter of the eighth century. But the type had apparently not yet been particularized as the Centaur of mythology. Buschor (*A.J.A.* 1934, 128-32) argues that in the early seventh century the man-horse monster could represent Typhon and Medusa; and that it was about 675 that the identification was made with Homer's presumably human Centaurs (A 268, B 743, φ 295). This is very reasonable, and

agrees with the general tendencies of Greek mythology in the eighth and seventh centuries. Certainly the earlier 'Centaurs' of Greek art are often winged and show no attachment to the Centaur legends. Cf. above, p. 206, n. 6.

⁴ *F.R.* i, pls. 1-3, 11-13. About 575-0.

⁵ Fragment of a middle Protoattic amphora in Berlin with the legend *Μενέλας* (G. Karo, 26 *Hall. W. Pr.*, 14 ff.; Hampe, *op. cit.*, fig. 30); but the companions of Menelaos are nameless and inglorious.

⁶ British Museum A749 (H. Schaal, *Bilderhefte* III. 1, pl. 5. 8.

⁷ Studniczka's real objection seems to be that the other figures on the shield are not named (*op. cit.*, 76, n. 3): but, as he assumed that 'Hesiod' was describing faithfully a single original, he required strict uniformity between the parts.

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presence on the shield of Achilles (Σ 516). The harbour might perhaps be a literary exercise or reminiscence. First Ares (191-6). He is in his chariot, with Deimos and Phobos beside him; their names are from Homer.¹ The *πρωλίες* are not described and so probably not depicted; for 'Hesiod's' descriptions are fairly detailed. This group and the second are comparable to some archaic metopes and panels, where there is the same compression in treatment and much is left outside the pictorial field to be supplied by the imagination of the spectator. Secondly, Athena (197-200), in side view, with aegis, helmet and spear.

Studniczka, who supposed that 'Hesiod' was describing a real shield, felt obliged to join these two deities to the battle of the Lapiths and Centaurs.² In the second zone of his restored original he places at the top on the left the nine Lapiths, on the right the seven Centaurs; Ares and Athena are behind the Lapiths, directing and encouraging them. (Other reconstructors have assigned one immortal to each side or put them together in the middle: but if one is determined to bring Ares and Athena into the battle, Studniczka's positions are more satisfactory.) But a straightforward reading of (and not between) the lines gives no support to this theory. The introductory *ἐν δὲ* in the *Shield*, as in Σ , marks a new group or, where it is used within a group, a loose and accidental, not an organic connection.

Thirdly, there come Apollo and the Muses, making music for the immortal gods. 203^{b-5} are rejected as a doublet by most editors, with reason. The gods themselves are not represented. Evelyn-White takes *χορός* to mean 'company', but there is no authority for this sense of the word before the end of the fifth century. More natural is the sense 'dance', or even 'dancing floor', as in Homer's shield,³ of which this passage is strongly reminiscent.⁴

These three groups are in art definitely sixth-century developments, of the first third of the sixth century in particular. Athena soon after grows more feminine and willowy; she stands encouraging, no longer strides purposefully along.

The harbour scene (207-15) comes curiously between the gods and Perseus and his Gorgons. 209^{b-11} are not in the earliest papyrus and seem to be in origin a doublet of 211^{b-2}: editors reasonably reject them. A literary analogy, if there was one, would be the easiest origin for this scene.⁵ 'Hesiod' might have invented it, but he does not seem addicted to invention. The remains of archaic art provide no close parallel. Fishermen are rare, and as far as I know never with nets, though hunters sometimes crouch with nets on Protocorinthian hare-hunts of the mid seventh century.⁶ Seascapes occur infrequently: usually scenery is to be supplied by the spectator, sometimes with the assistance of appropriate fauna or flora. For example the namepiece of the Nessos painter,⁷ an Attic work of about 625, shows the Gorgons chasing over the sea: the sea is suggested by a school of dolphins. I know of no serious representation of waves before the end of the first quarter of the sixth century.⁸ Dolphins and fish are common enough, especially on middle Corinthian

¹ On Agamemnon's shield *πεπὶ δὲ Δαίμονος τε Φόβου τε* (A 37): here *παρά* for *πεπὶ*.

² *Op. cit.*, 77-9. A fuller discussion of Studniczka's general theory later.

³ Σ 590; 603.

⁴ Cf. 201-3 with Σ 569-70; 205-6 with Σ 604-6 for the reuse of words and phrases.

⁵ Φ 22-3 may have influenced the choice of words, hardly the scene.

⁶ Very occasionally in the sixth century hunters are provided with nets.

⁷ Buschor, *Greek Vase-Painting*, pl. 23, fig. 48.

⁸ I give the earliest examples that I know. *Corinthian*: (1) Berlin. Pinax. Posidon riding on a sea-monster; dolphin plunging into sea,

represented by a band of varnish with a wavy upper edge. *A.D.* i, pl. 7, 26. About end of first quarter of sixth century. (2) Berlin F. 1652. Amphora. A, Perseus, Andromeda and the monster, which is emerging from a scalloped varnish sea; Perseus is throwing stones, instead of petrifying his opponent with the Gorgoneion. Neugebauer, *Führer*, pl. 13 (references in text). Early second quarter of sixth century. *Attic*: (1) Florence 4209. Krater (the 'François vase'). On lip, B, the return of Theseus; in the varnish sea a man swimming ashore. F.R., pl. 13: Buschor, *Greek Vase-Painting*, pl. 48, fig. 90. About 575-0. *Laconian*: (1) Kassel. Lip-cup. Nymphs bathing; in the background a varnish

aryballoi, that is of the first quarter of the sixth century. A good example is Halle 138, where four dolphins are closing in on two fishes.¹ Some such composition might account for the marine life; but there remain the swelling sea and the fisherman with the net. 'Hesiod's' source might here be contemporary art, but there is not enough evidence to decide either way. Studniczka² argued that on the original work of art described here (and though he presumed that a single original provided 'Hesiod' with his subject, his argument is valid if the description of the shield is eclectic) the harbour belonged to the scene of the flight of Perseus. The fisherman was Perseus's foster-father Dictys, identified cantingly by his δίκτυον, with which also he fished up Danae's chest: the harbour represents Naxos, to which Perseus returned. 'Hesiod' misunderstood the connection and so the harbour became a separate scene and the δίκτυον an ἀμφίβλητρον. This brilliant interpretation makes the harbour scene fit much better into the paragraph: and the absence of Dictys from the archaic representations we have of the Perseus story is perhaps not serious.³

The fifth of these short groups is the pursuit of Perseus by the Gorgons (216-37). Apart from two miraculous details (217-8⁴ and 231-3) this is a pretty faithful description of a common archaic composition, popular from about 625.⁵ Winged sandals, cap of darkness, tasselled κίβωρις and sword are Perseus's normal attributes. And he is in full course. The Gorgons follow, a pair of snakes at their girdles.

Lines 236-7 seem to imply an expression of fearfulness on the faces of the Gorgons, not a personified emotion perched on their heads: and most editors take this view. Yet in the similar passage, 147-8, ἔρις is generally regarded as a personification. But the concept of a small personified emotion (and how is its nature to be recognized?) perched on the head of a larger figure is completely alien to archaic literature and art. The inconsistency of editors is due, I suppose, to the ineptitude of the idea of emotional expression on the forehead of a snake: but our 'Hesiod' is in other places inept.

237-70. After so long a digression into contemporary art we must, of course, be brought back to Homer. 'Hesiod's' City at War is throughout reminiscent of Σ 509-40, though there is little direct borrowing. Compare the prolixity of the *Shield* with the economy of Homer.

pool with incised wavy lines. Boehlau, *Nekropolem*, pl. 11. E. A. Lane (*B.S.A.* xxxiv, 137) dates it to the first quarter of the sixth century, but if so it must be late in the quarter.

¹ Compare the Laconian bowl in Taranto of the early sixth century (Lane, *op. cit.*, pl. 30 top).

² *Op. cit.*, 69-76, esp. 75-6. Mazon (*op. cit.*, 140, n. 2) seems to favour this connection.

³ This mistake would imply that 'Hesiod' was not very familiar with the original he was here describing. If so, it can hardly have been the great votive shield that Studniczka claimed (see below, pp. 213-14).

⁴ Some scholars suppose that Perseus is a free figure, fastened to the shield by a nail,—an intolerable effect in a real work of art; and here 'Hesiod' seems certainly to be describing, and with some exactness, a real work of art. Other supernatural details appear in 164 and 299. This is a shield made by a god, and so something unusual is to be expected.

⁵ In Attic first in the works of the Nessos

painter, who is dated about 625. He seems of late Protoattic painters to have been the most interested in mythology. On at least five of his surviving pieces this scene is represented, though not always in full. Many of the attributes mentioned in the *Shield* are missing from the types of the Nessos painter; they are established in Attic by the beginning of the sixth century. Corinth, however, was in advance of Athens. The Thermon metopes (*A.D.* ii, pl. 50), which provide us with our earliest representation of the story, show substantially the same types as ours; these metopes belong to Payne's Transitional period, that is they are contemporary with or slightly earlier than the works of the Nessos painter. Payne, with some reason, wrote of the *Shield* that the Perseus episode is 'a description which clearly goes back to a Corinthian painting of the kind which is partially preserved for us in the Thermon metopes' (*NC.*, 86).

For further remarks on the Gorgons see above, p. 206, n. 6.

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 516-9; March out with Athena and Ares:
 520-9; Ambush:
 530-2; Relief arrives:
 533-4; Battle:
 535-40; Battle spirits.

'HESIOD'.

237-42; Introduction:
 242-8; Non-combatants:

 248; Battle:
 248-70; Battle spirits.

Homer in about the same number of lines presents more and clearer pictures. The *Shield* selects two aspects and expands clumsily, even brutally. The one new idea is that of the old men praying to the gods (246-8). There is a close similarity in the construction of the scenes. In particular in that of the non-combatants note how the old men are described—οὗς ἔχε γῆρας (Σ 515) and γῆρας τε μέμαρπεν (245), picked up in Homer by οἱ δ' ἴσαν (Σ 516) and in 'Hesiod' by τοὶ δ' αὐτὲ μάχην ἔχον. And perhaps the ὑφίσσων of 258 is an echo of ὑπολίζονες (Σ 519).¹ The monstrosity of 'Hesiod's' description of the Keres is typical: and he has already lifted whole Σ 535-8. The *Shield* here is homerizing busily, and has no relation to contemporary art.

270-313. The City at Peace is dealt with at greater length. For 'Hesiod' returns to the more familiar ground of the art he knew. Of the seven short scenes of which this paragraph consists only two are taken from Homer: the other five are typical subjects of contemporary painting, a two-dimensional art, which contrasts strongly with the elaborate compositions of the Homeric shield.

The marriage procession (273-80) is closely copied from Homer, Σ 491-6, even to phrases. Though such processions are common enough in archaic art, Homer is clearly the model.

The komos (281-4) seems to be an archaic institution: at least the words κῶμος and κωμάζω do not appear before the time of the lyric poets. As a subject for artists the komos begins in Corinth at the end of the seventh century, and comes to Athens early in the sixth. Its greatest popularity is during the first third of the sixth century, particularly in the decade 580-70.² In Ionian art komos scenes first appear at the very end of the seventh century, and are common, as on the Greek mainland, till the third quarter of the sixth. The komasts of art regularly dance, sometimes with the flute-player among them. 283 is probably spurious: it is omitted by many of the MSS.

Agricultural scenes follow (286-301). This passage again depends on Homer. 286-8, of the ploughing, correspond to Σ 541-9, in particular to 542-3: 288-91 to Σ 550-6: 292-301 to Σ 561-72. There are several verbal reminiscences. 293-5 are probably spurious, a doublet on 296-300: 298 is intrusive.³ The details are simpler than Homer's: but perhaps 'Hesiod' felt that as Achilles' shield had agricultural scenes, Herakles should be as well equipped. Studniczka regarded the ploughing, the harvest, the vintage and the hare hunt as tableaux symbolical of the four seasons; the boxers and wrestlers he put as filling in the vineyard.⁴ This is very rash: anyhow, to the archaic artist a hare hunt is a very subsidiary subject, not comparable to Studniczka's other seasons.

285-6 and 301-13 give four scenes all frequent in archaic art. Horses with riders (285-6), presumably here not armed, become common in the mid seventh century: by the middle of the sixth their popularity is declining. Boxers and

¹ Wilamowitz (*op. cit.*, 119) rejects 258-60; Mazon follows him. Rzach and Evelyn-White keep the lines.

² Payne, *op. cit.*, 118. A. Greifenhagen, *Eine attische s. f. Vasengattung*.

³ Wilamowitz (*op. cit.*, 117) further brackets 299 as a doublet of the (spurious) 295, wrongly: see Mazon, *op. cit.*, 144, n. 2.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 82.

wrestlers (301-2), although they occur sporadically earlier, last rather longer. The hare hunt (302-4) is the earliest of the Orientalizing compositions, and falls out of favour in the early sixth century: here, as often on vases, more hares than one are being coursed. The chariot race (305-13) perhaps becomes popular in the late Geometric period and lasts throughout the Archaic. As usual the prize is a tripod (312). 310-1 are curious; there is no end to the race. This possibly suggests that on the original which the poet had in mind the chariots occupied a complete zone, so that there was no start or finish marked.

314-7. 'And round the rim flowed Ocean', as on the shield of Achilles (Σ 607-8); but for the greater glory of Herakles stocked with swans and fish.

There is one compensation for the badness of the *Shield*: the writer used his sources slavishly, and they can still be detected. Homer's shield and contemporary art served him not so much for inspiration as for imitation. For convenience I tabulate the sections.

HOMER.	ARCHAIC ART.
154-60; Battle:	144-53; Snake:
	168-77; Pigs and Lions:
	178-90; Lapiths and Centaurs:
	191-6; Ares:
	197-200; Athena:
	201-6; Apollo and the Muses:
	216-37; Perseus and the Gorgons:
237-70; City at War:	
270-(3); City at Peace:	
273-80; Wedding:	
	281-4; Komos:
	285-6; Riders:
286-301; Agriculture:	
	301-2; Boxers and Wrestlers:
	302-4; Hare hunt:
	305-13; Chariot race:
314-7; Ocean.	

The source of 161-7 and of 207-15 is uncertain.¹ The adaptations from Homer are close and obvious, not only in the choice of scenes, but often in their construction and wording.² It is unlikely that so dependent a writer would show much originality over his other, more humdrum sections. *Prima facie* one would look to contemporary art for his originals: and in archaic art one finds that these subjects are common. In archaic literature, as far as one knows, there were not these models. It remains then to decide to what period of archaic art belong the descriptions in the *Shield* that are not based on Homer. Some are stock motives throughout archaic art. But Perseus and the Gorgons do not appear till the last thirty years of the seventh century and the Komos not till its end: and the Lapiths, the elaborate use of names, the groups of Ares, Athena and Apollo bring us into the sixth, and suggest more precisely the archaeological decade 580-70,³ to the end of which the François vase

¹ For 161-7 I favour Homer; for 207-15 archaic art.

² Further, apart from the tags which are numerous, only two passages of Homer are used for the *Shield*, rather obviously Σ on the shield

of Achilles and A on the arms and arming of Agamemnon. This latter passage is also used for the arming of Herakles (122 ff.).

³ As does the representation of waves, if 207-15 are based on artistic models.

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and probably the chest of Cypselus belong. And it is on the François vase and the chest that the best parallels to the *Shield* are found. Further, it is in Attic and Corinthian art that we find these motives.¹

If then the original assumption is sound, that 'Hesiod' drew partly on the art of his own time, we may conclude that the *Shield* was written in the early sixth century, probably about the end of the first third, by a poetaster familiar with his Homer and with Attic and Corinthian art. This fits well with the reasonable assumption that it was composed for the sanctuary of Apollo at Pagasae by a Thessalian or Boeotian.

There remains another theory, that 'Hesiod' was describing a real shield. If this is true, the date given above can only be a *terminus post quem*. This theory is probably not now widely held, but it must be considered.

The close relation to archaic art of parts of the decoration of our shield² has led some scholars, notably Studniczka, to suppose that 141-317 are a more or less straightforward description of a real shield.³ Congenial though this theory may be to archaeologists, it does not really hold water. Studniczka, with remarkable ingenuity, produces a plausible reconstruction, which he justifies by the arguments⁴ (1) that such a reconstruction is possible from the text; (2) that so elaborate a work was within the ability of archaic artists; (3) that votive shields (and the original must have been a votive shield ascribed to Herakles) are recorded from Greek sanctuaries⁵; and (4) the close connection to archaic art, as shown in particular by the misunderstanding of Dictys.⁶

On the other side Studniczka's reconstruction does put a heavy strain on the text, especially for the two cities at war and at peace. The artist of the original must also, it would seem, have had the shield of Achilles in mind. If there was an original, it must, as Studniczka observes, have been a votive ascribed to Herakles: for 'Hesiod' would hardly have given to Herakles a duplicate of the shield of another (and probably lesser) hero. Then why is no mention made in the poem of the dedication? (It would, incidentally, have been a pretty obvious forgery.) The lack of similar shields among our remains of archaic art is perhaps accidental.⁷ It

¹ Mazon (*op. cit.*, 127) refers to 'une œuvre de style ionien sortie des ateliers d'armes de Chalcis'. Similarly Studniczka and Wilamowitz. But first some of the artistic motives never occur in Ionian art, and others not till the middle of the sixth century and then borrowed from Attic: secondly the style of Chalcis is quite unknown, anyhow for this period. It is time that the Panionian heresy was forgotten.

² Cf. Mazon (*op. cit.*, 125): Payne (*op. cit.*, 86): R. Hampe (*op. cit.*, 62, n. 4), who mentions the *Shield* as 'die erste archäologische Beschreibung'.

³ The literature on this subject is considerable and much of it I could not obtain. The chief of the fundamentalists was F. Studniczka (*Serta Hatteliana*, 1896, 50-83), whose reconstruction superseded those of his predecessors: he has a bibliography of the earlier literature on p. 50, n. 1. U. v. Wilamowitz (*Hermes* xl, 116-24) in 1905 generally followed Studniczka. P. Friedländer, *Herakles*, 108-20 (*Phil. Untersuch.* xix, 1907), believed in an original pruned of Homeric imitations: cf. *Johannes von Gaza* (1912), 8-11. G. Lippold (*Münchener Arch. Stud.*, 1909, 483-8) reasserted the eclectic theory: he brings Stud-

niczka's bibliography up to date (p. 483, n. 4). Since then interest has waned. P. Mazon (*Hésiode*, 1928) makes much use of Studniczka, but is eclectic, as was H. G. Payne (*Neocorinthia*, 1931, 86). Many scholars avoid the question.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 55-8. I think that this is a fair digest.

⁵ Two in Argolis, one at the temple of Pallas, ascribed to Diomedes (Callim., *Hymns* 5, 35); the other at the Heraion, supposedly of Euphorbos (Paus. ii, 17, 3).

⁶ See above, p. 210. Mazon's argument (*op. cit.*, 127) that archaic art would not have combined on the same object such different classes of motives is quite untenable: nor is the decoration of this shield 'l'art plastique'.

⁷ I know of no shield of purely Hellenic style that has elaborate concentric decoration. The favourite archaic type, to judge by the numerous representations on archaic vases, was a single figure or object or a simple composition: at most the field was divided into three horizontal registers. Yet archaic vase-painters did not jib at the most painstaking minuteness of detail. The magnificent amphora of Ereklas in the

is more important that the technique of what archaic metalwork we have is relief or incised, not inlaid¹; and Herakles' shield is inlaid, as was some Mycenaean metalwork and, it seems, the decorated armour given by Homer to Agamemnon and Achilles.

It is simpler and more satisfactory to conclude that 'Hesiod' chose his decoration at random, whether from Homer or contemporary art. It is noticeable also that where his model appears to be Homer, tags and reminiscences of the relevant passage of Homer tend to be more frequent and the artistic description to be less exact.² One can, if one wishes, try to reconstruct the decoration, but not with complete success. It was not, I suppose, completely thought out by the writer. Presumably the shield is conceived in concentric rings: at least there is a snake in the centre and Ocean round the rim, and it is hard to believe that the archaic mind would think except in terms of zone decoration. The central tondo is clear—the snake. Then come four zones, with a battle, heads of snakes, pigs and lions, Lapiths and Centaurs. This is probably as far as the writer had thought. Ares, Athena, Apollo, the harbour and Perseus could be put in the fourth zone. But the two cities are very difficult; and remember the relative importance to the archaic artist of the chariot race and the hare hunt. Proof or disproof of the reality of Herakles' shield is impossible; but the eclectic solution has much more to commend it.

R. M. Cook.

MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY.

Vatican (F.R., pls. 131-2; photo Alinari no. 35768), with the scene of Achilles and Ajax at dice, gives full due to the details of the heroes' cloaks. Their shields stand behind them. Achilles sports the head of a satyr in low relief; above is a snake and below a panther. Ajax, whose smith is human, has a flush Gorgoneion, and a snake above and below. Compare also the detailed design of the nymph's chiton on the sherd of Sophilos in Stamboul (Blinkenberg, *Lindos*, pl. 126) dated about 580-70 and, I suppose, roughly contemporary with the *Shield*.

¹ See Payne, *op. cit.*, 94-7. The exceptions are few and inconsiderable. The arguments for inlay work in metal are: (1) that the chest of Cypselus was inlaid (Paus., v, 17, 5); but this is in wood: (2) that the Protocorinthian polychrome style is based on metalwork; Payne much more convincingly derives it from free painting: (3) that certain details on terracotta vases, e.g. polychrome tongues round the base of the handle, are in imitation of inlay on metal;

but even so, the colours of such details, red and white, would suggest a filling of some soft paste rather than metal inlay: (4) that the devices on shields on archaic pots represent inlay on metal; but these devices could as well be incised or painted. The lack of any actual examples of elaborate inlay on metal is, to my mind, decisive against its existence. Further the inlay of this shield is far too elaborate. The shield itself is of bronze (415), and the inlaid substances are then τίτανος (apparently a white paste), ἐλέφας, ἡλεκτρον, χρυσός, κύανος, ἀργυρος, κασσίτερος, ἀδάμας: and a red also is required. 'Hesiod' has borrowed his technique from Homer and tried to go one or two better.

² P. Friedländer (*op. cit.*, 108-20) believed that 'Hesiod' was describing an actual shield. The Homeric imitations, however, he felt could not be represented in archaic art. His original shield is, then, achieved by eliminating the Homeric imitations, which 'Hesiod' added for padding. This is very slippery reasoning.

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SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS

LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

Classical Philology. XXXII. 2. April, 1937.

C. M. Bowra, *The Poem of Parmenides*: examines P.'s imagery in relation to the ideas of his time; it serves to relate his enquiry to spheres of experience already familiar to his readers and shows that his approach is mystical or religious. Blanche B. Boyer, *A Paris Fragment of Codex Bern 207*: Bibl. Nat. Lat. 7520 ff. 1-24 is probably three quaternions of the corpus grammaticorum represented by Bern 207 and supplies some missing items (Probus, Bede) in its table of contents: the quaternion containing Priscian is still missing. Walter Petersen, *Greek Masculines in -ās*: the suffix has two apparently unrelated usages, one developed in Ionic, the other in Attic: the two merge in the κοινή and the suffix is extended in the Roman period. H. V. Canter, *Ill will of the Gods in Greek and Latin Poetry*: a classified catalogue of instances. Glanville Downey, *Q. Marcius Rex at Antioch*: re-examines Malalas' account and suggests that M. visited A., not as a special commissioner, but as pro-consul of Cilicia in 67 B.C., perhaps to assist the new King Philip and obtain some return for Rome's friendship; Mal.'s ἐκτιθε means no more than that M. restored old buildings. Vincent Scramuzza, *Publican Societies in Sicily in 73-71 B.C.*: argues for the existence of two companies, one collecting the *portorium* of the old Carthaginian province, the other the *portorium* of the old kingdom of Syracuse and the *scriptura* of the whole province. H. C. Youtie compares with ἐχονομα in P. Ox. VIII. 160, P. Mich. Inv. 5805, two instances in P. Lond. II. 319 and suggests that the word is a vulgar variant of ἐχόμενα used prepositionally = *chez*. W. C. Helmbold on Juv. I. 157 suggests *atque latus media sulcum deducit harena*. Eva Lange on Antiphanes fr. 52 reads γλακτοθρέμματα. C. P. Bill on Cic. Att. 5. 20. 3 reads τὰ καινὰ τοῦ πολέμου, comparing Thuc. 3. 30, Ar. Eth. 1116b 7.

Eranos. XXXIII. Fasc. 1-2.

I. Düring in a long paper on 'Literary language in old Greek poetry' discusses the diction of Epic, Elegiac, Iambic, Melic and dramatic poetry, and modifies the usual ideas of mixed or artificial styles considerably. The language of the older poets is living material. It is an archaizing 'high' language on the basis of the speech of the upper classes, conditioned by the poet's genius, and not a dialectic mixture. Much in the paper is both original and interesting, especially on Pindar. T. Kalén discusses the thirty-six fragmentary lines of Aeschylus' *Myrmidones* found by the Italians in 1932 at Oxyrhynchus on the basis of Vitelli's supplements, which he criticizes and varies. The interlocutors are Achilles and probably Phoenix. Heralds have been to press Achilles to fight, threatening a charge of treachery and the punishment of stoning. The suggestions τὴν ἄλλως δοκεῖς and παρὰ τοῦτο at the beginning of a line seem improbable. The fragment contains the new word πολυσκεδής. H. Ziliacius decides that Greek β began to have a spirant sound in centuries I and II A.D. Latin 'u' was transliterated by β at first in the middle of a word, later at the beginning. The transliteration -ov was retained longest in proper names. H. Armini discusses various late Latin inscriptions, proposing *inter alia* a new word 'inaurarius' = maker of earrings, and a mention of the consulship of Aetius who defeated the Huns. I. Heikel contributes a number of corrections of the text of Plato, chiefly by ejection of glosses. D. Tabachowitz discusses ellipse of principal verb in N.T. In Mt. xxvi. 50 he understands ποίησον or γένεσθω. In

Jude 22, 23 he proposes to take οὗς μὲν οὗς δέ as relatives, and supply mentally μὴ σῶζεσθαι with the second clause. G. Säfslund sketches the ethnographic prehistory of Italy with special reference to the Etruscans, in a paper read at the opening of the Swedish Institute in Rome in February, 1935. He supports Myres' (J.H.S., 1907) view of the Pelasgians, and in detail establishes a migration to Italy from the Balkan peninsula after the Trojan War, and gives the archaeological data which support his view. It is a very important paper. G. Rudberg deals with the abbreviations of sacred names in the unknown Gospel published by Bell and Skeat, and in the Chester Beatty papyri. T. Kleberg gives some notes on Latin inscriptions.

Neue Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft (formerly N. J. für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung). XIII. 1. 1937.

R. Herbig, *Spätantike Bildniskunst*. Deals with Roman portraits of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries A.D., emphasizing their merit and originality. There are two plates, with sixteen illustrations.

XIII. 2. 1937.

A. Hausrath, *Germanische Märchenmotive in griechischen Tierfabeln*. In connection with the origins of Reynard the Fox, etc., H. points out that late Byzantine fables have been indiscriminately treated as 'Aesop' by Germanists, and shows that Northern elements were entering classical fable-literature from popular sources from the sixth century A.D. onwards.

LANGUAGE.

Indogermanische Forschungen. LIV (1936), 2.

A. von Blumenthal (with the co-operation of H. Krahe) writes a long article on Messapic inscriptions. Interesting interpretations are *zis* 'Iuppiter', *venas* 'Venus' (both as vocative), *marta* 'mortua', *pidova* 'testament' (cf. *ἐπιδοοῖς*), *steibasta* 'stipulata est', *vasti* 'esse' (cf. Goth. *wisan*), *tabara* 'δαδούχος' (cf. *P.I.D.* Index, s.v.). Notes also on *P.I.D.*, nos. 473, 493, 526, and on the Mess. abbreviations *sp*, *no*. V. Pisani replies to Hofmann's criticisms of his etym. of *contaminare*. H. Krahe explains Venetic *Enoclia* (cogn. *P.I.D.*, viii C) from the gloss (*Gl. Lat.* iv. 90) 'enocilis: . . . anguilla' and in other Lat. glossaries, cf. the Ven. cogn. *Anguilia* (*P.I.D.* viii C), these two cognomina occurring only in Ven. territory; K. concludes that *enocilis* came into Latin from Gk. *ἐγγέλως* through Ven. Illyr. sources, cf. the Illyr. ethnica 'Εγγελαῖες, 'Εγγελαίαι. O. Beke on Germ. *Linde*, orig. 'bark' and cognate with *lind* (cf. Eng. *lithe*, Lat. *lentus*). D. Tschizewskij, Old. Russ. expressions of distance. Reviews.

LIV (1936), 3.

W. Preusler gives an interesting account of the linguistic publications of a 'forgotten German philologist,' Karl Gottlob von Anton (1751-1818); his historical and comparative method; founder of 'linguistic palaeontology'; Slavonic studies; some specimens of his etymologies. R. Löwe: I.Eu. numerals, especially 4, and multiples of 4. Effect on system of reckoning by decimals. The numerals 11-19 in Lat., Kelt., Avest., Arm., and Balto-Slav. Iteratives in -s. J. Duchesne-Guillemin, on Avest. *θραῖταona-*, I.Ir. **trāitavn-ā*, a patronymic (**tri-tavan-* 'thrice strong'), cf. RV. *gairikṣītā* 'son of *girikṣīt*'. A. Debrunner explains Skt. adj. of the type *paitrya-* as due to a reshaping of *paitra-* after the pattern of *pītrya-*. V. Pisani writes on the history of -*ie-* in Latin (-*ii-* becomes -*ie-*) with reference especially to the Romance development (Ital. *abete* etc.). O. Behagel. a criticism, on syntactic grounds, of Krogmann's account of Goth. *wodini hailag*. Reviews.

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